Coombs Wood Colliery Fire – Halesowen – 1929

COOMBS WOOD. Halesowen, Worcestershire. 18th. March, 1929.

The Colliery was the property of the Combes Wood Collieries Limited and was in Halesowen about six miles south-east of Birmingham at the extreme edge of the South Staffordshire coalfield. There were two shafts at the colliery, an upcast and a downcast to the Thick Coal Seam. Both shafts were sunk in 1908 and met the seam at 290 yards. The downcast was the winding shaft and the upcast was used to wind water and a second outlet for the mine. Coal was raised on the day shift only and the colliery produced about 3,200 tons per week employing 380 persons below ground. The mine was ventilated by a Waddle fan and there were means to reverse the ventilation in the case of an emergency.

Inflammable gas was not unknown in the mine but none had been found for the previous nine years and naked lights were used in the mine except in those parts where safety lamps had to be used to comply with the Special Regulations that were established in 1925. The haulage roads were illuminated by fixed electric lights fed from a D low voltage generator at 220 volts. Electricity was also used as the main motive power for the coal cutting machines and was supplied by a separate system at 550 volts from another D generator. Separate cables were installed for the two systems.

The seam worked was, the South Staffordshire Thick Coal was commonly known as the Ten Yard Coal which normally consisted of 30 feet of practically clean coal but in the Combes Wood area it is bisected by a parting varying from 2 feet to 12 yards in thickness and the bottom section of the sea was further split by dirt bands from a few inches to 5 yards thick. The top section of the divided seam was worked on a modified longwall system in which the full thickness of 15 feet of coal was extracted in one cycle of operations. On the seams forming the bottom section, a layer of coal known as Slipper Coal had been worked by an advancing longwall, the holing being done by coalcutting machines in an underlying bed of fireclay. Where it was of value a seam known as the Benches Coal which occurred immediately below the fireclay was also taken.

The accident occurred in a district of Slipper Coal known as the South West Bottom Coal District and was about a quarter of a mile from the Combes Wood shafts. The district constituted of five stalls, 9 yards apart which gave the total length of the face of about 50 yards and was opened up to form a pair of headings 35 yards apart which were driven 11 yards to the west of the “Manor Road”  and formed a rib of that thickness to protect the roadway. The Manor Road was one of a pair of exploring levels which extended southwards for a total distance of 1,000 yards.

The face was ventilated by a shunt off the Manor Road. A stout sheet consisting of three layers or more of brattice cloth, locally known as a “damp sheet”  about 10 feet wide by 5.5 feet high was hung across the Manor Road just on the intake side of the first and intake heading. The air was diverted by this sheet into the South West Bottom Coal District, and having travelled around the face, returned to the Manor Road by the second and return heading, which was also the drawing road for the district. The air current then passed inbye along the Manor Road for 300 yards to an open crosscut and through the latter into the return and so to the upcast shaft.

The main haulage road from the shaft was about 10 feet wide with a double track for endless rope haulage and about 5 feet high throughout itÔ s length from the downcast shaft to the terminus inbye of the damp sheet and a few yards beyond the junction of the Manor Road with the drawing road from the South West Bottom Coal District. Beyond this the Manor road was under repair which had been completed for 60 yards. Further on and as far as the open crosscut, much of the timber was broken and the roof fallen in. The parallel return airway was also under repair and was in good condition for 50 yards only beyond the separation door. There two roadways formed part of the second outlet from the South West Bottom Coal District in which about 20 men would be at work on the normal day shift.

The mine was managed by an Agent Mr. H.J. Newey who took a very active part, a manager Mr. F. Perrins and an undermanager Mr. C. Thompson who was absent due to illness at the time of the accident. The manager and undermanager were assisted by Mr. Archer Cartwright who held a 2nd Class Certificate of Competency.

At about 6.15 a.m. on the morning of the 18th March and before the day shift which was coming to work at 87 a.m., a fireman, Harry Jones, accompanied by a workman, John Westwood stated their inspection under Section 64 (1) of the Coal Mines Act 1911 of the workings in the South West Bottom Coal District. They completed the inspection and returned to the fireman’s meeting station which was at the junction of the drawing road with the Manor Road at 7.05.a.m. Nothing unusual was observed during the inspection.

At the meeting station Jones met two workmen Jabez Edwards and John Hargreaves, and passed them on to their work. A few minutes later a third workmen, Joseph Chance arrived and went in. The time was then about 7.10 a.m. Jones started to walk outbye along the Manor Road. Inbye of the damp sheet he met to more workmen, George Parkes and James Harris who also passed in. Jones went through the sheet and met Harry Edwards, Edwin Walter Dukes and Edwin Barnsley to whom he spoke and passed through the sheet. There was nothing wrong at this time but none of the nine men were seen alive again except Jabez Edwards.

About 60 yards outbye from the sheet there was a sharp turn to the right where the Manor Road started and it was here that Jones met John Edward Forrest and Fred Hathaway to whom he also spoke and passed on. At the turn, Jones met another workman, David Hadley and was on the point of speaking to him when he heard a shout that the damp sheet was “afire”. The sheet was on fire at the right side going inbye and was visibly burning from the floor to about halfway up the sheet. In no more than five minutes the sheet became well alight and the road impassable. When they had seen the flames Forrest and Hathaway were about 20 yards from the sheet.

Immediately on hearing the alarm Jones quickly went back and helped Forrest, Hathaway and Hadley as they were trying to pull down the burning brattice cloth. The outer layer was pulled down although it was burning but the fire had such a hold on the outer layers that they were beaten back by the heat, smoke and flames. They then tried to put out the fire with dirt but that effort failed. Jones tried to get through the sheet but he failed in his attempt and suffered extensive burns to one of his arms. He tried to shout to the mine men he knew were on the other side of the sheet but he heard no reply. Realising that the position was serious, he sent a message to Archer Cartwright.

Cartwright reached the fire at 7.35 a.m. and found Jones partially overcome by the fumes but he was able to learn of the nine men behind the fire. Renewed efforts were made to raise the men by tapping on the rails and shouting. A supply of water was brought in druggans from the stables and efforts were made to throw it on the fire from buckets, but smoke prevented the men from getting near enough to be successful. To try to repel the smoke that was backing up down the road, a brattice cloth was run from one side to the middle of the road and continued a head. This increased the velocity of the air and it momentarily achieved its objective and a little ground was gained. While this was being done, Jabez Edwards emerged from the smoke at about 8 a.m.

At the inquiry Edwards described what had happened to him, he had descended the pit at 7 a.m. and had gone straight to the South West Bottom Coal District where he met the fireman, Jones. He then went to his working place which was straight ahead along the Manor Road where he was re-timbering the return airway. At a point 20 yards inbye from the junction of the drawing road from the South West Bottom Coal District with the Manor Road, he started to take off his coat, waistcoat and braces. On looking back he saw fire in the roadway. He estimated the time of leaving the junction and seeing the fire at no more that two or three minutes. He came outbye and met John Westwood near the junction and told him what he had seen. They went to the sheet together and tried to knock it down with slabs of timber but with no success. The smoke drove them back. They collected the other men who had not yet reached their working places and they went to the crossgate through which they returned from the South West face.

After a discussion of the position, Edwards asked two of the, Hargreaves and Barnsley, to try to get out by the intake air. They found that the smoke was so bad in that direction that they were forced to retire. Further discussion followed and Edwards was in favour of another effort in the direction of the Manor Road. The others disagreed, and in spite of this he went on alone towards the sheet but the smoke was too strong and he could not face it. He returned to the crossgate and remained talking to the others for some time and feeling, uneasy suggested another try. Apparently the other men had no conception of the danger and they were confident that all they had to do was to stay still and await rescue.

The atmosphere was getting gradually worse at the time but it was not too bad to cause the men anxiety, for, according to Edwards they said it was “pretty fair”  so that candles and even a safety lamp carried by John Westwood were burning brightly. Edwards did not share this view and he tried to the best of his ability to try to persuade the men to escape through the smoke. He made the attempt alone to the Manor Road where he found four empty tubs at the junction which stopped his way out. He pushed the tubs further inbye and with his cap in his mouth, crawled on hands and knees along the road past the site of the fire and out to safety. Edward said that when he came through the fire had burned the sheet away completely and the fire was confined to the timber in the roof.

There was little doubt that after the sheet was consumed the conditions in the Manor Road would improve since more air could pass and by a lucky chance Edwards had made his attempt at precisely the correct time. The bodies were later found in the afternoon after the fire had been extinguished and it was clear that they had all died from the inhalation of carbon monoxide. Nothing was known of their movements after Edwards left them but it was apparent that some had collapsed where they sat at the crossgate but four had made a belated attempt to escape. The Inspector commented:

The loss of eight lives is most lamentable, for it is clear from the fact that Edwards was able to get away almost unscathed that all of them might have escaped in the same way had they realised how serious was the danger they were in. That some of the more experienced of them failed to realise it, even after Edwards’ warnings and example, is tragic and inexplicable. From the evidence given by Edwards, it is clear that the possibility of escaping by the return airway which involved travelling a distance of about 800 yards, did not enter his head or the heads of the deceased. He stated that the matter was never mentioned by himself or by any of the others.

The men who died were:

• Edwin Barnsley aged 61 years,
• Joseph Chance aged 66 years,
• Edwin Walter Duked aged 27 years,
• Harry Edwards aged 44 years,
• John Hargreaves aged 32 years,
• James Harris aged 58 years,
• George Henry Parkes aged 45 years and
• John Westwood aged 38 years.

The inquiry into the causes and circumstances attending the fire which occurred in the workings of the Combs Wood Colliery, on the 18th March 1929, was conducted by Mr. F.H. Wynne, H.M. Deputy Chief Inspector of Mines and was held on the 24th to the 26th April 1929 at the Police Court, Halesowen. The report was presented to Ben Turner Esq., M.P., Secretary for Mines on the 15th July 1929.

There was little doubt that the fire originated at the “damp” sheet in the Manor Road and there were several possible causes of ignition. Arcing due to a breakdown of the electrical insulation was a possibility, the friction of the haulage rope or moving tub against the metal or timber, the brattice cloth itself or the fire occurred spontaneously in the coal or carbonaceous shale in the roof above the timber or a naked light or cigarette end. The men went to work with naked candles and smoking was not prohibited in the mine. The Inspector came to the conclusion that the sheet was set on fire by a candle which the men carried through between 7 and 7.15 a.m. or a glowing cigarette was dropped near the sheet. The inspector commented:

I fear that ignition is a comparatively easy matter when the cloth is slightly worn and had become frayed at the edges. No prolonged contact between a candle flame and the frayed ends if required to start the latter smouldering thereafter, fanned by the air current, the smouldering soon becomes actual flame. And flame once started spreads rapidly over the cloth, which is impregnated with a readily inflammable tarry compound.

As to the steps taken to combat the fire, there was little that the men on the spot could do and when the first rescue brigade reached the spot at 9.25 a.m. It was almost two hours after the request for help had been made although the rescue station was only four miles away. This was due to several adverse circumstances that were beyond the control of the management of the mine. The morning was very foggy and the surface foreman was unable to raise the Rescue Station on the telephone and Mr. Perrins had to drive to the Station at Dudley and bring back the rescue apparatus as soon as possible. He returned and was with the first team that went down about 1.25 a.m. Mr. Perrins faced criticism that he had left the pit but the Inspector thought that he had acted correctly in the circumstances. The team had to withdraw because of the heat and the help of the local fire brigade was sought to pump water in hoses on the fire. These pipes were ready but a fall of roof occurred and put out the fire.

The inquiry thought that the easiest way to prevent a similar occurrence was to prohibit the use of naked lights in all mines. The Inspector went on:

There is, however, much to be said in favour of the use of naked lights where there is no danger of firedamp that I am unable to recommend such a prohibition. In this connection, it is only necessary perhaps to mention the freedom from nystagmus enjoyed by workmen using naked lights.

The Inspector recommended that brattice cloth should be made of fireproof material and as to the outlet from the South West District and quoted the Coal Mines Act 1911, Section 36 (3) which said that:

Every part of the mine in which ten or more persons are employed at the same time shall be provided with at least two ways affording means of egress to the surface, and so arranged that, in the event of either becoming impassable at any point, the other will afford means of egress to the surface.

This section applied to the mine and more than 20 people were employed in the South West Bottom Coal District. The Manor Road had been under repair for several weeks before the accident and it could not be denied that it could be travelled as David Hadley had gone through on 16th March, two days before the fire but only by crawling on his hands and knees for part of the way and so there was no breach of the Act.

The final matter raised in the report was the suggestion by Herbert Smith for the Miner’ Federation of Great Britain that two sets of rescue apparatus should be kept at the pit for immediate use. The report of the Rescue Regulations Committee, 1926 expressed the opinion that these should be kept only at Rescue Stations and the Inspector saw no way, from the evidence that was brought forward that this should be changed. With these comments, the inquiry closed.

REFERENCES
The report on the causes and circumstances attending the fire which occurred at Coombs Wood Colliery, on 18th March, 1929
Colliery Guardian, 8th August 1930, p.484.

Information supplied by Ian Winstanley and the Coal Mining History Resource Centre.