DUMBRECK. Kilsyth, Stirlingshire. 30th. January, 1938.

The colliery was the property of Messrs. William Baird and Company, Limited and was situated one mile west of Kilsyth and was sunk in 1885. There were two shafts Nos.1 and 2 which were sunk to the Kilsyth Coking Coal at a depth of 225 fathoms. The No.1 Pit was the downcast and from it, only the Kilsyth Coking Coal was worked. Ninety-eight persons were employed underground, sixty-eight on the day shift and fifteen on the back shift. Coal was wound only during the day shift and the output was about 110 tons per day. The No.2 Pit was the upcast and worked the coal from the Haughrigg and the Cloven Seams, at 109 and 140 fathoms receptively.

The Kilsyth Coking Coal was 2 feet 4 inches thick and had been extensively worked on the longwall system. The seam had a considerable dip to the south-east but the gradient varied considerably both in amount and direction. The main and side endless rope haulage roads as well as a length of airway known as Kelly’s Return were almost level. Waddell’s Jigger Brae rose from the side haulage road at 1 in 11 for a distance of 200 yards and then rose to 1 in 6 inbye. Kelly’s Brae rose 1 in 4 at the outbye end for 110 yards which decreased to 1 in 6 at the inbye length. Auchinvole’s Section had recently bee won by two dipping mines and there were only two coal producing places.

The No.1 Pit was worked with safety lamps, the workmen wore electric cap lamps and searching was carried out in accordance with Section 35 of the Act.

The ventilation was produced by an exhaust fan at the surface. There was only one ventilating current in the seam. It went down the No.1 Pit, passed along the main haulage road to a junction known as the “Circle” and along the side of the haulage road to the bottom of Waddell’s Brae. At the “Circle”, a small quantity of air was directed round Auchinvole’s Section coming back to join the main current at the “undercast”, which was in the course of construction, at the bottom of Patterson’s Road.

At Waddell’s Brae the air was split and about 7,000 cubic feet of air per minute passed up the brae to ventilate a small section which had ceased producing coal in early, January, 1938. The other split amounted to about 4,500 cubic feet per minute and this ventilated Kelly’s Section in which there were ten coal producing places on a longwall face which was advancing to the rise at an inclination of 1 in 6. The first working place on the intake side was on Stark’s Level and was 2,028 yards from the shaft by the intake and haulage road. The distance to the shaft by the return airway was 1,615 yards, or 413 less than the route through the intake.

When Kelly’s Section was being opened up, several faults and a “want” were found in the seam and, at a point about 100 yards from the side haulage road, three roads were driven through the faulty ground. The main body of the intake air travelled up the companion road, 12 yards west of the haulage brae but some intake air was allowed to enter Smart’s Level through a small airway driven in November, 1937, 100 yards west of the brae. This was intended for local ventilation when Smart’s Level was opened out. A considerable quantity of air scaled up the main haulage brae through canvas screens.

The return air from Kelly’s Section travelled down a companion road on the east side of the haulage brae and along an old level, known as Kelly’s return, the inbye end of which had last been used as a drawing road in September, 1937. The air the went to an overcast over Waddell’s Brae and after passing the top of Patterson’s Road, went direct to No.2 upcast shaft. There were doors at the air crossing which gave access to the return from Waddell’s Brae.

Part of the main Return Airway and Patterson’s Road had recently been enlarged. They were intended to be used as a mechanical haulage road for the conveyance of men when Auchinvole’s Section was ready to produce coal, after which Kelly’s Section was to be stopped.

The mechanical endless rope haulage ran from No.1 Pit to the foot of Kelly’s Section. Waddell’s and Kelly’s Braes were both worked by over-tub self-acting endless rope haulages. There were three self-acting inclines on Kelly’s Brae. The face haulages were “cuddie braes”, with the tubs hand-drawn along the levels.

The seam was worked on the longwall method with roads set at 45 feet centres. a top brushing was taken, three feet thick in the ordinary roads and six feet thick in the main heading and in the levels. Neither coalcutters nor conveyors were used in Kelly’s Section, but the coal was undercut by a longwall machine in Waddell’s Section until the section stopped on the 22nd. January 1938.

The electrical supply was both AC. and D.C. The A.C. equipment was obtained from the Company’s Gartsherrie Works and the D.C. equipment was made on site. The A.C. system was 3,000 and 500 volts, earthed neutral and the D.C. system 440 volts earthed concentric. The major proportion of the plant, both above and below ground was concentric D.C., but A.C. was gradually being introduced to replace this. the A.C. was not involved in the accident. Lighting at the bottom of the pit was supplied from a D.C. motor-generator at 110 volts by a separate cable in the shaft. The only lights off the D.C. concentric system were at the “Circle”.

The total generating capacity of the D.C. generating plant was 700 kW. from a 500 kW. turbo-generator set and a 2 KW. A.C. motor-driven motor-generator set which usually served as a stand-by. The main switchboard in the powerhouse was at the coke-ovens and was a multi-panel board, open type single pole air-break circuit breakers and single-pole knife switches. The overhead line feeder to the Nos. 1 and 2 Pits was protected by a 500 ampere circuit breaker on the main switchboard. This was fitted with a single series-connected overload coil and a dish-pot time lag which at the time of the accident was short of oil and therefore acted instantaneously. The rating of the overload coil was 500 amperes and it was set to operate at this value. Transmission from the coke-oven powerhouse to the colliery surface switchboard, a distance of 160 feet, was by two overhead lines, each of 0.2 square inches in cross-sectional area.

In the colliery surface switch-house there was a group of switches and circuit breakers. One circuit breaker controlled the supply to the No.1 Pit and two others the supply to No.2 Pit. Other switches controlled the supply to the surface plant. The switch protection the No.1 feeder was an open circuit breaker with an overload trip rated at 125 amps with an adjustable tripping plunger, capable of being set to 100 per cent overload, with a time delay of unknown value.

The No.2 Pit was usually fully manned to wind coal on Sundays. It was usual for the brushers at the No.1 Pit on the back or afternoon shift on weekdays to work on Sunday morning to avoid working on a Saturday afternoon. Thirteen brushers and two firemen came to work in the No.2 Pit on Sunday, 30th January. The fireman, Joseph Campbell, who was in charged of Kelly’s Section, descended the pit about 5.30 a.m. and the thirteen brushers with Thomas McDermott, the fireman in Archinvole’s Section, descended about 6.45 a.m. Four brushers went with McDermott down the main haulage to Archinvole’s Section. Nine, including Thomas Martin, the brushing contractor who worked in Kelly’s Section, followed their usual custom and went in by the main return as far as the air-crossing over Waddell’s Brae. They passed through the doors into the overcast into Waddell’s Brae, down the brae and into the side haulage road and up Kelly’s Brae to Kelly’s Section. The distance from No.1 Pit to the foot of Waddell’s Brae was 300 yards shorter by the return airway and Waddell’s Brae than by the intake endless rope haulage road. The return was also easier to travel than the haulage road.

They were met at the lamp station at the foot of Waddell’s Brae by Joseph Campbell. It was customary for Campbell to travel inbye by the same rout as the men and the side haulage road, outbye of Waddell’s Brae was not travelled by anyone after the end of the day shift on the Saturday. The pit bottomer in charge of the No 1 Pit bottom on Sundays had failed to come to work and no one was appointed to take his place. This was a contravention of Section 53 (2) of the Act. Two shiftsmen were employed all morning examining No.1 shaft.

The current was on in all the A.C. and D.C. cables in the pit as well as on the surface. According to evidence, there was no interruption of the current until the while of the D.C. plant, both on the surface and below ground, failed about 10.15 a.m. The breaker in the coke oven powerhouse tripped, which indicated a considerable load.

David Campbell, acting pithead man, found that the current had failed to the screening plant and had received a signal bell from the No.2 Pit bottom for the current to be switched on again, went with William Stewart, the lampman, who acted a switchboard attendant, to the switch house and after opening all the switches, he telephoned the coke oven powerhouse attendant to close the circuit breaker. This was done and Stewart and he closed all the surface and underground switches one by one. The powerhouse attendant noted that the current was normal and the No.1 Pit circuit breaker remained closed so that no reading was shown on the ammeter. No signal or message was received from No. 1 Pit bottom as there was no one in attendance there.

At some time between 10.30 and 10.45 a.m. the assistant electrician, James Wilson, entered the switch house and noticed that the circuit breaker for No.1 Pit was off. He pointed this out to William Stewart and Wilson closed the switch without making any further inquiry at the time but later reported what he had done to the head electrician, William Patrick. The switch remained close and the ammeter indicated that there was no current in the circuit. As was the usual practice, both men made no attempt to find the cause of the switch being tripped.

There was no disturbance of the current in the No.1 Pit. About 12.30, the supply outside haulage was cut off at the “Circle” by William Patrick.

The first indication that there was anything wrong underground was a telephone message received at the surface by William Stewart from Thomas Martin, who was to be the only survivor of the men in Kelly’s Section. At the Fatal Accident Inquiry, he stated that eight brushers, the fireman Joseph Campbell and he were sitting in Stark’s Bench about 10 a.m. eating their food when they noticed a “haze, a trace of reek”. One of the brushers, Joseph M. Kelly, went down the brae and returned to say that he thought it was the reek of some shots that had been fired in Archinvole’s Section. The reek died away.

After piece time, the fireman went down to the foot of the hutches which was 380 yards from the site of the fire, to bench two sets of hutches, while Martin worked the brake at Smart’s Bench. Thomas Martin said that on returning about 11 a.m. the fireman said that he had found nothing wrong. The fireman stayed with Thomas Martin and Joseph M. Kelly, who were erecting steel arches near the face of the main heading.

About 11.20 the reek was again noticed but this time it continued. About 11.55 a.m. Thomas Martin, after informing the fireman of his intention, went out to see what was wrong. He found smoke in the intake as he got below Smart’s bench. The smoke got worse on the side haulage road and he found it very thick at the bottom of Waddell’s Brae. He reached the doors in the air crossing leading to the return only with difficulty. Here he found the smokeless dense along the main return and he reached the bottom of the pit safely. As there was no pit bottomer, Thomas Martin telephoned William Stewart, the lampman at the surface. He also spoke to William Patrick and James Wilson.

Thomas Martin them went inbye along the main haulage road to beyond the “Circle” where he met the two electricians, Wilson and Patrick, about 12.20 p.m. The three men then returned to the “Circle” where William Patrick opened the switch to cut off the current from the side haulage road. He then travelled inbye where he found a fire 100 yards beyond the partly built undercast at Paterson’s Road. The fire was on both sides of the road but was greater on the side where the cable ran. The surface attendants were informed by telephone.

James Wilson noticed about half a hutch of stone had fallen on the right-hand side at the outbye end of the fire. the road a supported by steel arches 9 feet wide and 6 feet high with a large amount of wood lagging behind. Some of this was old railway wagon sides. There were also several wooden building chocks behind the arches. The road was an old longwall waste. A few bags of stone dust and some sand and cement provided for the construction of the overcast were thrown on the fire.

Robert Buchanan, the oversman in the No.2 Pit, was at the winding level at the Cloven Coal in the No.2 Pit about 1.55 a.m. When he noticed smoke coming up the shaft, which was evidently coming from the Coking Coal, he went to the surface and after getting the shaftsman, William Whyte, and his assistant while were examining the No.1 shaft out of the shaft, they went down the No.1 Pit. They looked into the return, found smoke and telephoned inbye to Archinvole’s Section where they learnt from Thomas McDermott that all was clear in his section. A little later, they got in touch with James Wilson at Paterson’s Road when they knew the position of the fire. They telephoned the surface and went inbye again contacting the surface at 12.45 p.m. and shortly after they contacted William McAlpine, the Agent.

Robert Buchanan, with the consent of the agent, arranged for two wooden doors on Paterson’s Road between the intake and the return to be opened so as to reduce the amount of air travelling past the fire. When William McAlpine received the message at 1 p.m., he went at once into the mine and contacted the Coatbridge Rescue Station and Mr. Arthur Stoker, Senior Inspector of Mines. Arrangements were made for a supply of fire extinguishers which were quickly obtained. About 50 to 60 men were organised to carry them into the mine and return the empty cases. Hundreds of extinguishers including refills were delivered at the site of the fire which was gradually brought under control but it spread inbye and at about 7 p.m. the lagging over the let side of the road, about 10 yards outbye from the original seat of the fire, burned through and a large amount of debris ran from the roof which hindered the operations.

Eventually water was piped to the fire which was finally put out about 3.30 a.m. on the following morning, about 15 hours after it was discovered. The fire had spread inbye 17 to 18 yards from the point where it was first seen and none of the steel arches were displaced.

The cable was found to be severed at the original seat of the fire, at the outer end of the junction box where the smaller cable was joined to the larger one. The junction box had slipped from the horizontal position about 4 feet above the pavement and was lying touching a heap of dirt. The end of the cable was lying underneath the heap of dirt which had obviously fallen from the side of the road. The switch at the “Cable” was examined and the fuse was found to be intact.

The Rescue Brigade set up a fresh air station close to the return airway at the top of Paterson’s Road at 2.10 p.m. The return was explored inbye but the smoke was so thick and the team could not travel far. Messrs. Arthur Stoker, Senior Inspector and George Hoyle Junior Inspector of Mines held a consultation to decide what was to be down. The reversal of the ventilation was impracticable due to the length of time it would take to get the men out of the No.2 Pit and all efforts to fight the fire would have to be stopped. There was also a risk of firedamp being carried to the fire.

The position of the imprisoned men was not known. There would have been three possibilities for them. The first to come out of the intake, up Waddell’s Brae and through the doors into the return, the same way they usually travelled. Second, to come out by Kelly’s Return, the shorter distance and finally to erect screens and doors to short circuit the smoke and try and maintain themselves in some part of the section in fresh air.

Two more teams from Coatbridge had been summoned and a number of trained men from local collieries were called in. Another attempt was made at 4.45 p.m. to get along the return with instructions to go down Waddell’s Brae and along the side haulage road to the foot of Kelly’s Brae. They reached the air crossing but found the Brae full of smoke. The visibility was poor and the air very hot that they could not proceed further. They opened the doors at the air crossing which allowed the smoke from the Brae to short circuit into the return. A third attempt was made when the smoke decreased and this party was able to reach a point along the level length of Kelly’s Return, about 50 yards inbye of the junction with Waddell’s Return. A fourth, unsuccessful attempt was then made. At the fifth attempt, Waddell’s Brae was still found to be impassable and the team travelled 1,350 yards to and from the base to reached point of Kelly’s Return about 35 yards from Kelly’s Brae. Here the road was considered to be too constricted for men with apparatus to travel and the time for the first half of the journey had expired. At the sixth attempt, the visibility was found to have improved and it was possible to pas down the Brae. At 8.50 p.m. The team returned having located the bodies of all the men, eight on Waddell’s Brae and one further inbye on the side of the haulage road.

A succession of teams, each of four men, was organised and the first body was brought to the fresh air base at 9.25 p.m. and the ninth and last at 2.30 a.m. on the following morning.

Those who lost their lives were all brushers. They were:

  • Edward O’Neil aged 23 years,
  • Peter Walker aged 36 years,
  • James Martin aged 38 years,
  • Robert Martin aged 35 years,
  • Joseph Campbell aged 59 years,
  • Joseph Martin aged 26 years,
  • Henry Hagan aged 26 years,
  • Joseph Melvin Kelly aged 30 years and
  • Peter Byrne aged 58 years.

Mr. John Dean Leslie, Sheriff-Substitute of Stirling, Dumbarton and Clackmannanshire with a jury, conducted the Inquiry into the circumstances under the Fatal Accidents and Sudden Deaths Inquiry (Scotland) Act, 1906 on the 25th and 26th April 1938. All interested parties were represented and the verdict of the jury was a formal one:

That the men died from asphyxia, caused by the inhalation of carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide, as the result of a fire which broke out in the side haulage road in the No.1 Pit.

The jury made no observations or recommendations. The Report into the disaster thought that there was little doubt that the fire started at the junction box where the small cable joined the larger one. This was the place where the fire was first seen and it spread from there. The effect of the first fire would have been to increase the quantity of air along the side haulage road but as it increased, it would alter the distribution of the ventilation in Kelly’s and Waddell’s Sections. With a large volume of air passing over the fire, this would serve to dissipated to the smoke and make it less noticeable. The air was heavily polluted with the poisonous gasses and would have overcome the men before the doors were opened in Paterson’s Road.

A full report of the electrical aspects of the fire was made by Mr. J.A.B. Horsley, H.M. Electrical Inspector of Mines.

 

REFERENCES
Reports of the causes and circumstances attending the fire which occurred at Drumbeck Colliery, Stirlingshire of the 30th January 1938. By T. Ashely, H.M. Divisional Inspector of Mines and J.A.B. Horsley, H.M. Electrical Inspector of Mines.
Colliery Guardian, 1938, 11th November, p.871.

Information supplied by Ian Winstanley and the Coal Mining History Resource Centre.

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