WEST CANNOCK. Hednesford. Staffordshire. 16th. May, 1933.

The colliery was at Hednesford in the northern end of the Cannock Chase coalfield and was owned by the West Cannock Colliery Company Limited. The agent for the colliery was Mr. B. Madew with Mr. A. R Latham as manager of the No.2 (upcast) Pit from which the Shallow Seam was worked. The mine was in geologically disturbed ground near a large fault which was formerly regarded as the western boundary of the coalfield and, owing to a second large fault, the workings from the two pits were widely separated, the only connection between them being at the shafts.

The Shallow Seam had been extensively worked in the coalfield and gas had been encountered but it was not a fiery seam in the accepted sense and had been worked with naked lights. At the No.5 Colliery Protector flame safety lamps were used.

The coal was fairly hard and little dust was produced in the workings. The seam was 9 feet thick with 4 feet of Black bass above and above that 1 foot 6 inches to 2 feet of jointy rock. All this, underlay 9 feet of hard rock. The floor was of fireclay. The top two and a half feet of the coal was left to form the roof though some of this coal was recovered in the roads and wastes.

The Upcast District of the Shallow Seam was reached by two undulating roads which led from the shafts at a depth of 310 yards from the surface and reached the seam at a point 1,400 yards from the shaft. Of these roads the main haulage road was also the main return airway and travelling road.

The seam was originally opened with narrow headings and it was intended to work it by retreating longwall faces but after the headings had been driven for about 130 yards from the main roads roof troubles cause the retreating system to be abandoned and the seam was developed by hand-got advancing faces. The faces were supported by six-yard packs which were built with material got from the ripping. The wastes from six to eight yards in width were between the packs. The packing material consisted of Black bass and rock from above the seam, occasionally as much as four feet of rock were blown down to produce the packing material.

The seam was liable to spontaneous heating and it was decided to remove the pillars formed when driving the narrow headings. The removal of these pillars had a very adverse effect on the roadways of the district which had been developed to the East and West of the two main roads from the shaft. The area to the West was not affected by the explosion and that to the East was reached by two main levels, No 328’s and 340’s which were driven slightly to the rise with gate roads turned off them. The length of the face on the North side of this area between 377’s stall and 360’s level, was not being worked at the time of the explosion.

The face haulage was operated by a compressed air engine and a winch was installed at the face of 360’s level for hauling the empty tubs to the face and lowering the full ones outbye. Signalling on this level was by electric bell with bare wire conductors. No electrical power was employed in the area affected by the affected area.

On average 40 shots were fired in 24 hours in the Eastern half of the district for coal getting and ripping. The district was ventilated by a single air current which entered at the Western end and, after coursing round the faces, passed into the main return airway at the foot of the 340’s level. A measurement taken no the 5th May showed that 2,835 cubic feet per minute were entering the district at a point 100 yards outbye of the first working place. A small fan, a Typhoon Blower driven by compressed air, was installed near the face in 360’s level to drive the air into the extreme rise corner of the face. This fan was running at the time of the explosion.

From the reports of the night fireman, Bertie Reynolds, and the statements of other men on the night shift, conditions in the district appeared to have been normal except for a fall that had occurred about 6 a.m. in 328’s level at a point 70 yards from the coal face. No firedamp was reported by the fireman who completed his round about 6.45 a.m. and the night engineman at the winch at the face of the 328’s level noticed nothing unusual up to the time he left the place at 7 a.m. or a little later.

The day fireman, Charles Abner Perks, met Reynolds at the fall in 328’s and received the report that, apart from the fall, the district was “All right”. He then proceeded to the outbye end of the 360’s level, then through the 327’s road, when he repaired a sheet, to the fan near the top corner of the face. He had been at the fan for only a short time when he was knocked down and burned by a flash which came from the direction of the 362’s stall.

After meeting the two firemen, the men proceeded towards their places. John and Joseph Williams to 362’s stall, Cornwall and Higgs to 337’s, Gwilt and Turncock to 333’s and Craddock to the engine at the face of 328’s level.

The fall in 328’s had damaged the signalling wires, though they could still be used, and a machinery examiner, Arthur Thomas Lote who was sent to repair them, reached the place about 8.25 a.m. A dirt tub was dealt with by the haulage engine while Lote was in the level, and before he repaired the wires, he gave a signal of 10 rings on the electric bell to inform Craddock that the wires were in order.

In the meantime, Craddock’s two lamps had been extinguished as had the two lamps belonging to John and Joseph Williams. Craddock took his lamps outbye to be relighted and George Archer had taken two other lamps out. Archer passed Lote in 328’s level and met Joseph Williams about 30 yards from the face and gave him the lamps. He then started outbye to look for the tubs while Williams returned to the face. After Archer had gone about 30 to 40 yards the explosion occurred. He saw no flame but was knocked down a slightly burned. Lote a little further outbye, was knocked down but not hurt.

The men in the 328’s Pillar, T.J. Middleton and E.A. Handy, saw a flash and felt the shock from the explosion. The flames extended from the fan near the top corner of the face, along the East face, to a fall between 361’s and 365’s stalls and travelled a distance of about 70 yards down the 328’s level and about 30 yards down 361’s.

There was evidence that the men in 337’s stall had realised that the ventilation was unsatisfactory shortly before the explosion. William Higgs found the place was hot and not fit to work in. he was preparing to dress and go out after telling Cornwall when the blast occurred. He was badly burned and gave his evidence before he died but could give no explanation as to the cause of the disaster.

When the explosion occurred, all the men in the Eastern half of the district, with the exception of Gwilt, Cornwall, Turncock and Abner Perks, immediately made their way out from the faces. The men in the Western half remained unaware that anything had happened until they were withdrawn by officials.

The day overman, William Challoner, entered the district just after the men from the Easter face had reached the main level and hearing that Russell Cowdell, a pony driver, was missing attempted with two other men, H. Lyons and F. Gough went up the 328’s level. They were driven back by afterdamp. They then went down the 340’s level to 342’s road where they met Cowdell who told them that Gwilt and Turncock were still inbye. They eventually succeeded in reaching 361’s road head but could get no further. On returning they heard some ponies in 328’s passbye but were unable to reach them.

Returning to the main level, Challoner learned that Perks, the fireman, was missing and with G. Devall went through 377’s stall to 327’s road-head where they found Perks. He was conscious and able to make his way out. Challoner attempted to go further but was stopped by bad air.

During this time Reynolds, the night fireman, had returned and with Parton succeeded in getting to within about 10 yards of the face in 328’s level. On their return they rescued two ponies from 328’s passbye. This was done with great difficulty and two other ponies in 324’s road were too far gone to rescue.

At this time the first rescue team had arrived and explored 328’s level. Passing up the level their bird died 30 yards from the main level and on reaching the face, they found Cornwall’s body on the flat sheets in front of the engine and Gwilt’s leaning over a toolbox near 333’s road head.

The electric bell at the haulage engine was ringing when they reached it and to stop it a zinc rod was removed from the battery. Two bodies were recovered by the second team and the air was improving. Mr. E. Rowley, H,M. Senior Inspector of Mines, Mr. Latham, the manager and Mr. W. Bagnall, Miners Agent, followed the team to the face where Turncock’s body was found in the face between 33’s and 362’s roads.

The idle face on the North side was explored up to point near the fan when progress was stopped by foul air. A sheet which had been at the end of 327’s road was found to be down and the air was short-circuiting along the road. When the sheet was re-hung the air resumed its normal course around the face and a later team succeeded in reaching Williams tool box in 362’s stall.

The face was found to be closed by falls extending from the fan near the North East corner almost to the fault in 362’s stall. Th return end of the district was examined and then left to the following day.

Those who died were:

  • Samuel Nickles Gwilt,
  • Benjamin Cornwall,
  • Charles Turncock,
  • John Henry Williams,
  • William Thomas Higgins.

Two others, Charles Abner Perks and George Archer received slight burns and a further thirteen others were affected by afterdamp, but only five of these were seriously affected.

The inquest was held by Mr. W.W. Morgan, H.M. Coroner for Stafford. Proceedings lasted over three days and all interested parties were represented. The report o the disaster was presented by Mr. W.E.T. Hartley, H.M. Inspector of Mines. At the inquest the jury returned a verdict that the deaths of Gwilt and Turncock died due to carbon monoxide poisoning and those of J.H. and Joseph Williams and Higgs to toxaemia due to extensive burns, shock and the after-effects of breathing carbon monoxide gas.

The inquiry found that the explosion was caused by firedamp and the part played by coal dust was very small. The roads were well stone dusted and the flames died out in the gateroads. The firedamp came from the normal bleeding of the strata combined with an emission from the extension of 328’s level beyond the engine. It was not cleared by the ventilating current being too weak partly from leakage through the sheets and partly by the derangement of some sheets.

The means of ignition was by an electric spark caused by the ringing of the signal bell at the engine but there was no evidence of what caused the bell to ring. The bell was not of a type certified by the Mines department by the colliery officials believed it to be incapable of igniting gas.

In the Report, Dr. S.W. Fisher commented of the arrangements at the colliery to deal with injured men, he said:

As usual, I went into the treatment, by the First Aid personnel of the mine, of the men involved in the explosion, and I found that every man was taken to the surface ambulance room and effectively given oxygen from three or four Novita Apparatus by the man in charge of the room and also by Mr. Payton, the Superintendent of the Hednesford Rescue Station, who in fact, supervised the whole organisation. All the men I spoke to in the accident room told me that the oxygen did them good.

Mr. Hartley concluded the report:

The overman, William Challoner and the man assisting him deserve credit for their actions immediately after the explosion. Challinor in particular, acted very well under trying circumstances. In the saving of the two ponies under very difficult conditions, Reynolds and Parton showed courage of a high order.

 

REFERENCES
Report on the causes and circumstances attending the explosion which occurred at the West Cannock No.5 Colliery, Staffordshire on the 16th May, 1933 by W.E.T. Hartley, H.M. Divisional Inspector for Mines.
Colliery Guardian, 28th July 1933, p.177, 4th August, p.204, 27th October, p.775.

Information supplied by Ian Winstanley and the Coal Mining History Resource Centre.

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