PODMORE HALL. Minnie Pit. Halmerend, Staffordshire. 12th. January, 1918.

The colliery was at Halmerend in the Parish of Audley in Staffordshire at the northwestern end of the coalfield and was the property of the Midland Coal, Coke and Iron Company, Limited. This was not the first occasion that an explosion had taken place in the mine. In February, 1898 and in January, 1915 explosion occurred in the Bullhurst Seam. No lives were lost in the former but nine men lost their lives in the latter. Both explosions were attributed to gob fires.

The total number employed underground in the mine was 405. At the time of the explosion, there were 248 underground. Mr. O.J. Bromley had been the agent since September, 1916, Mr. Joseph Smith, the manager since May, 1913 and Mr. Charles Herbert Weaver, the undermanager since February, 1908. There were two overmen, one on the day shift and the other on the night shift, 14 firemen, 2 shot shotfirers, one on the day shift and one on the night shift and one gob-stink examiner.

The seams that were worked at the colliery were the Four Feet, the Five Feet, Banbury Seven Feet and Bullhurst Seams. There were two shafts, No.1 was the downcast which was known as the Minnie Pit which was 16 feet in diameter and sunk to a depth of 359 yards and No.3 was the upcast shaft. The Minnie Pit was used from raising coal and water and lowering and raising man employed in the roads near the shaft and in the Four Feet and Five Feet Seams to the west which were not involved in the explosion. The inset in this shaft was 339 yards from the surface and the remaining 20 yards were used as a water lodgement.

The other shaft was 280 yards deep and 845 yards to the south-east of the downcast shaft but the hanging on was 20 yards from the bottom with the portion below this level used as water lodgement. No coal was raised at this shaft but it was used for pumping water and for raising and lowering men employed in the workings affected by the explosion in the Bullhurst Rear workings.

Two main intakes started at the bottom of the downcast shaft, one in the direction of the workings to the west and he other in the direction of the workings affected by the explosion. Both these intakes were used for the haulage of coal, and the one to the west played no part in the disaster. The other intake led to the explosion area and was flat and in line with the No.3 shaft for 45 yards and then turned slightly to the left and rose at an average gradient of 1 in 11 for 500 yards. It then turned to the left for 540 yards and rose at an average gradient of 1 in 4.5 when it was level for 260 yards. the last 60 yards were driven in the Ten Feet Seam, in which there was no work being done at the time of the disaster.

The Banbury Seven Foot and the Bullhurst Seams were cut by a crut or stone drift driven at this point where there were highly inclined and were known as the “Rearers”. the Bullhurst was the only seam worked in this section and all the 57 men in it were recovered alive. The workings were damp and free from firedamp. The road was continued as a crut known as the Banbury Dip dipping at a gradient of 1 in 3 for 370 yards to where it intersected the Seven Feet Banbury Seam at about the same level as the “hanging on” level at No.1 shaft. the road was driven level in that seam for 45 yards, it then turned to the left almost at right angles and continued as a level cross measure crut for 210 yards before it dipped at 1 in 6 for 60 yards to intersect the Bullhurst Seam which was 90 yards vertically below the Seven feet Seam. The roads from both shafts to the foot of the Banbury Dip Cruts were wet and damp and in consequence, this part of the mine did not suffer from the explosion. On the inbye side of this point the roads were dry and dusty and it was this area that was traversed by the explosion. The force and flame were confined to the Seven Foot and Bullhurst Seams beyond the bottom of the Banbury Dip Cruts.

The Seven Foot Seam was worked from this point by a modified longwall system. The main roads were driven in the solid and pillars left to support the roadways, the longwall face being opened up off the counter heads. In one section, owing to the undulating character of the seam and the large number of faults the pillar and stall method was adopted. At the date of the explosion the whole longwall work was completed and the pillars left to support the roadways were being extracted.

The section of the seam was a roof of 1 foot 6 inches of Rider coal, 1 foot of bass, 1 foot 3 inches of Top coal, 7 inches of holing dirt, 5 feet 6 inches to 9 feet 10 inches of Main coal and a floor of fireclay. The Bullhurst Seam had been worked in two directions from the bottom of the Banbury Dip. Some years before, a pair of cruts were driven and the seam was worked at the rise until the explosion of January, 1915 occurred causing the loss of nine lives and injury to three others. No one was in the workings which were allowed to fill with water. A pair of level cruts were the driven and they intersected the Bullhurst Seam and were known as Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 districts.

Owing to the liability of spontaneous combustion, this area was divided into separate and distinct panels with 25 yards barriers of coal between then to ensure that the coal could be extracted as quickly as possible. Each panel had two roads in it, intake and return, in both of which were preparatory stoppings, four feet six inches thick which were built in readiness the speedy sealing of that panels soon as there were symptoms of heating. Each panel was formed into pillars 12 to 15 yards wide and the pillars were extracted by working from the barrier starting at the highest point and worked downwards thus allowing the goaf to be filled with gas in order to form an atmosphere which would not support combustion. Four such panels had been headed out and only in a small area of them had pillars been extracted or partially extracted.

Shots were fired in getting coal in both the Seven Feet and the Bullhurst Seams. The explosive that was used was Roberite No.4 with a minimum charge of 14 ounces allowed by the Coal Mines Order. Explosives were issued in locked canisters by authorised persons to workmen and the keys and locks were only in the possession of authorised and certificated fireman and shotfirers. Detonators were issued in locked cases to authorised personnel and clay from the surface was used in stemming. All the shots were charged and stemmed under the supervision of authorised shotfirers and were fired by them by means of a magneto-battery provided with a push-button and removable handle.

Since some of the top working were closer to the goaf, shotfiring had been prohibited by he management for about three weeks but there was evidence that shots had been fired in this area a day or two before the explosion but it was clear that no shots were fired in this place on the day of the disaster.

The mine produced 630 tons of coal per day, 140 tons from the Banbury Seven Feet, 330 tons from the Bullhurst, 130 tons from the Bullhurst Rearers and 30 tons from the West District seams. The main haulage from each seam to the shaft was in the intake airways. The tubs were constructed so as to prevent dust escaping through their sides, ends and floor and they were not filled above the level of the top. For the first 1,300 yards from the downcast shaft, the man haulage was by two self-acting endless rope haulage sets, 500 and 800 yards long with a speed of about two and half miles per hour. The haulage up the Banbury dip which carried coal from the Seven feet and Bullhurst Seams were hauled by an endless rope actuated by a rope band from the surface of No.3 shaft with a speed of about one and half miles per hour.

Secondary haulage was by means of horses, self-acting inclines and in three cases by direct rope. The drums for the ropes were revolved through friction clutches keyed on to a countershaft which was driven by gearing off a main shaft worked by the Banbury Dip endless haulage rope. The speed of the direct ropes was about one and a half miles per hour. For 210 yards along the Bullhurst Main Level Crut and 700 yards along the Main North Level the haulage was done by horses. At the time of the explosion, none of the self-acting inclines was in operation in the Bullhurst Seam.

An electrical system of signalling was installed and used from the surface of No.3 shaft to the bottom of the Banbury Main Dip and the intermediate station and also form the Banbury Main Dip and the station. A telephonic system was also used at the same stations. There was an additional electrical system for the distribution engine house at the bottom of the Banbury Dip to the Bullhurst Seam but it was only carried into the seam itself about 70 yards in the direction of No.1 district. The voltage of the main system at the surface of No.3 Pit was said to be 24 volts and that of the secondary system, 12 volts.

The signal bells were Wigan Ironclad type, totally enclosed gas a dustproof. The telephones were “Sterling” and “General Electric” magneto instruments, ironclad and totally enclose gas and dustproof. The ringing keys were ironclad stirrup type enclosed and gas-proof and the cables were two and three core conductors with 600 Ohm insulation, single wire armoured and jute compound overall. There was no other electrical installation in the mine

The ventilation of the mine was produced by a Bumstead and Chandler fan placed at the surface of No.3 shaft. The fan was 9 feet in diameter and 2 feet wide and was driven directly by high-speed steam engines which ran at 350 r.p.m. and produced about 60.000 cubic feet of air per minute at the bottom of the downcast shaft. There were provisions to reverse the air current if necessary. There was also a standby fan which was a Walker Indestructible type. This was 20 feet in diameter and 7 feet wide which was rope driven. It was run for about two hours every Sunday morning while the Bumstead and Chandler fan and engines were examined. The quantity of the air entering the mine was maintained during the weekends.

It was required by the Coal Mines Act, 1911, Section 29 (2):

That the quantity of the air in the main current, in every split and at such points as may be determined by the Regulations on the mine shall, at least once a month be measured and entered in a book to be kept for that purpose at the mine. General Regulation 77 specified that these points should be a) in the main intake airways of every seam as near as practicable to the downcast shaft, b) in every split as near as is practicable to the point at which the split commences and c) in each ventilation district at or as near as practically possible to a point 100 yards back from the first working place at the working face which the air enters.

Measurements in the Bullhurst Seam had not been entered in the correct form and so there was a breach of the Regulations. The manager’s explanation was that these measurements were made by Jones, the overman, who was one of the victims of the disaster and were entered in his notebook which was not recovered. Mr. Walker commented:

As the notebook was not recovered I am unable to state the volume of air which travelled the faces of the various districts and whether or not there was undue leakage between the entrance to the ventilating districts and the faces.

The safety lamps used in the mine were Richard Johnson, Clapham and Morris’ Marsaut type. All the lamps were examined by the lampman, by the workmen and, at the shaft bottom, by the fireman. There was a book to record the nature and damage to lamps but there was no re-lighting stations underground.

The men were searched at the start of each shift by two men who were themselves searched before they made their examination. The number of men searched and the result of the search was entered in a book provided for the purpose. At least 25 per cent of the men were searched in each shift and a surprise search was made at least once in every three months for everyone on the shift. Every man not being part of a shift was searched when he descended the pit.

In working the Banbury Seven Feet and Bullhurst Seams, firedamp was given off freely. The manager’s instructions were that the men were to be withdrawn when 2 per cent or more was detected in a working place and a report had to be entered in a book. The men were not allowed to return to a working place except to help the fireman in the removal of the gas, until the gas had cleared.

Rise and level places were ventilated by 18 or 12-inch pipes and a special pipe near the face that slid into these which enabled the ventilation close to the face. The manager’s instruction was that wherever possible, the ventilation through these pipes must be by suction.

Water was wound in the cages of No.1 downcast shaft and this caused the shaft to be wet, so little, if any dust was made in screening the coal or dust from the full tubs ascending, was carried into the mine. The manager admitted that the boards of the tubs were not all tongue and grooved a dust could pass between them on to the roads. The faces of the No.4 District were dry and dusty and the roads in the Bullhurst Seam contained dry coal dust in sufficient quantities to allow an explosion to propagate.

The means of dealing with dust on the roads was to clean up the floors by means of shovels. the roof and sides were not cleaned at all and no watering was done beyond the slight spraying of the floor from water barrels. It was said that watering would cause the floor to heave up and the sides to fall to such an extent as to make the maintenance of the road impossible. The manager did not realise the dangerous condition of the roads and faces and he thought the cleaning of the roads in conjunction of the dust from the fireclay of the floor was sufficient to allay the danger. The Inspector commented:

This was an assumption and not based on any sampling or analysis of the dust on the roads. He frankly admitted that, to prevent explosions of coal dust in this mine under the conditions that existed in the Bullhurst and Banbury Seven Feet Seams, systematic stone dusting should be done on the lines recommended by the Explosions in Mines Committee to prevent explosions of coal dust.

The fireman’s district in the Bullhurst started at the top of the Banbury Main Haulage Dip Crut. On the day shift in the Bullhurst Seam There were 97 men and boys including one fireman, one shotfirer and one gob stink examiner. In the afternoon shift, the district was in the charge of one fireman who supervised the datallers on that shift made two inspections, the second being two hours prior to the start of the next night shift. In the night shift there were 71 men and boys including one fireman and one shotfirer which held a fireman’s certificate. During the first part of the shift, the fireman made an inspection of the whole district which constituted the inspection prior to the day shift.

In the Bullhurst Seam the shotfirer held a fireman’s certificate and he made the first examination during the shift required by Section 65 of the Act, this was in the opinion of the Inspector, a breach of the Act.

In the Banbury Seam there were 45 men and boys in the day, 5 in the afternoon and 30 at night including a fireman on each shift. The fireman fired shots as wells as the shotfirer. There was evidence that the fireman fired 40 shots per shift. The fireman said that almost two hours of the shift were taken up in firing shots. This was illegal as the regulations stated that a fireman in charge of a district should not have shotfiring duties that would interfere with his inspection duties.

The workmen in each shift were accompanied by the fireman who remained with them during the shift. The examination before the start of work on the day shift was made by the fireman on the night shift,

At the time of the explosion Mr. Smith, the manager, was in the office at the surface of No.3 Pit when he was informed that the haulage lads at the top of the first haulage were at No.1 Minnie Pit bottom and wanted to come up the pit. There had been a sudden gust of wind against the air current and pieces of small coal and dirt had been thrown outbye and they thought that there was something wrong. At the same time his attention was drawn to the soot and smoke issuing from the fan chimney at the upcast shaft. He went to the fan house, where he found the fan running but the fan attendant informed him that a few minutes before it had slowed down. He went to the hauling engine house, where the engineman told him that the hauling rope was fast and the engine could not be moved. Mr. Smith than rang the Banbury Haulage and in a few minutes was speaking to Frank Halfpenny at the top of the Banbury Dip who told him that the men and boys there were lying down in the dark as their lights had been extinguished. Halfpenny had travelled inbye for 800 yards. Mr. Smith told him not allow anyone to go through the separation doors into the return airway and told the winding engineman not to allow anyone to go down the No.3 upcast shaft. He also rang the Central Rescue Station at Stoke-on-Trent and asked for rescue apparatus and teams to be sent to the Minnie Pit immediately.

The agent, manager and undermanager went to the Minnie Pit and after a brief consultation, decided that the agent and undermanager should go down the pit and the manager should remain at the surface to take control of the rescue arrangements.

On descending the pit, the undermanager and the agent found a party of men from the west district and went towards the explosion area through the haulage road. A lad was found dead about 20 yards outbye of the Rearers junction, three bodies were found in the entrance to the stable at the Rearers junction and close by, seven men and boys were alive though suffering the effects of afterdamp. The party arrived at the top of the Banbury Dip where one went to the Rearers district and the other down the Banbury Dip. No one was found alive below the top of the Banbury dip haulage road, but all the men and lads in the Rearers Districts were alive and safe.

At the surface, Mr. Smith made arrangements to receive the injured men and the rescue apparatus arrived from the Stoke Rescue Station and the Minnie Pit Brigade. They were fully equipped and descended with instructions to travel as far as they could in the direction of the workings. The top of an old shaft was removed which connected with the Bullhurst Rearers workings. This acted as a downcast and provided a direct supply of air to the men in those seams.

By noon all the injured men had been brought out of the pit. The Minnie Pit Rescue Brigade returned about 1 p.m. and reported that there was a large fall at the entrance to the Bullhurst Crut but air was travelling through to the Bullhurst. They put on their apparatus at the bottom of Lockett’s and went to the top of the dip where there was a large fall. They came back and went up the push-up for some distance. After returning they went into the Return Airway and saw smoke coming from the Bullhurst Seam.

After receiving this report, a conference was held between Mr. Saint, H.M. Senior Inspector of Mines, Mr. Henshaw, the managing director of the Talk o’ th’ Hill Colliery and other mining engineers. It was feared that there was a fire in the Bullhurst Seam and it was decided to temporarily to seal off the seam.

To do this, the Silverdale Colliery Brigade with self-contained breathing apparatus went down the pit at 4.30 p.m. with Mr. Bull, the Sub-Inspector of Mines, Mr. Davies and the manager. They found the separation doors between Lockett’s Intake and Return were blown out but 50 yards further inbye separation doors between the intake and the return were intact. Analysis of the air showed that carbon monoxide was present in high concentrations and the team returned to the surface at 7.30 p.m.

Another team from Burley Colliery went down with a canary which died in the air. At 10.45 p.m. the fan was speeded up to 300 r.p.m. and canvas brattice stoppings, later replaced by wooden ones, were fixed across the Bullhurst Main Intake and the Return Airways. The separation doors were temporarily repaired with canvas brattice. A man, boy and a horse were found dead at the top of Lockett’s Dip. The Rescue Brigades continued their attempt to enter the Banbury Seven Feet workings as the air was advanced. By 8 p.m. Holland’s Place up the Push-up was reached and here they found three bodies.

Early on Monday morning the Captain of the Birchenwood Team, Hugh Doorboy, lost his life while wearing breathing apparatus in the foul atmosphere of Lockett’s Dip. The team of which Doorboy was a member consisted of six men and after Doorboy had a consultation with a team that was coming off duty, they went inbye.

On reaching the top of a fall in Lockett’s dip, they noticed an unpleasant smell. They tested for firedamp but found none but a safety lamp burned dimly and if they decided to put on the breathing apparatus. The team then went on slowly and reached a point where the lamp went out. As they were going forward they heard a sharp report and Doorboy say, “Oh! My apparatus.” The rest of the team tried to help him but he struggled violently. Efforts were made to get him back to fresh air but during the struggle he repeatedly knocked off the nose clips of the other men and actually knocked one man down. They were not successful in their efforts. The removal of the clips meant that the men were being affected by the atmosphere and they finally had to leave him. When they left him they knew he was dead. The body was recovered by Birchenwood No.2 Rescue Team the following day.

On the 16th January, the Chairman of the North Staffordshire Colliery Owners Association realised that the exploration of the workings was going to be a long and anxious matter and would have to be done by men wearing breathing apparatus.

A Consultative Committee was formed with Mr. Hensaw as Chairman and on the 19th January, the organisation of rescue teams and the work being done in the Seven Feet were discussed. The exploration was completed on the 7th February and all the bodies recovered from that seam. There remained 98 bodies in the Bullhurst Seam, three of which were recovered shortly afterwards from the entrance to the Bullhurst Crut.

On the 5th February the Committee held another meeting when H.M. Inspectors and representatives of the company were present. It was thought that there was a possibility of a gob fire being the cause of the explosion and the plan of the Bullhurst workings was studied, particularly with regard to the near proximity of two old districts in which explosions followed by fire occurred three and twenty years before. From the evidence of the company’s officials, it appeared that no fracture or gob stink had been observed in the pillars or roads near these old districts and no heat in the new district. Following the meeting the work to re-open the Bullhurst Main Crut by clearing the fall as carried on.

On 23rd February an inspection was made and gob stink was found over a fall in the Bullhurst Crut. At another meeting of the Committee, steps to prevent the circulation of air were proposed and it was as agreed to put on temporary stoppings and the smell to be closely watched. An inspection was made which again found gob stink after which it was agreed to build board stoppings and make them as tight as possible. By the 27th March, three schemes to re-open the workings and recover the bodies were considered by the Committee, one from the representatives of the workmen, one from Mr. Saint and one from the North Staffordshire Colliery Firemen’s, Shotlighters’ and Overmens’ Association.

The work was done in stages with the close co-operation of all parties and the Inspectors of Mines by rescue brigades wearing apparatus. The work was started on the 18th July, 1918 and four brigades were engaged for over 12 months. Thirty-four stoppings were built in an atmosphere devoid of oxygen and the seam was opened step by step until the last body was recovered on 19th August, 1919.

The men who died were:

  • Daniel Brayford aged 16 years, haulage.
  • Charles Platt aged 35 years, ropeman.
  • Thomas Sherratt aged 65 years, ostler.
  • Samuel Rowley aged 62 years, shifter.
  • Edward Downing aged 44 years, fireman.
  • Alfred Beckett aged 35 years, shifter.
  • Eli Lee aged 17 years, haulage.
  • Harry Wareham aged 14 years, haulage.
  • Joshua Amson aged 14 years, haulage.
  • Thomas Cope aged 16 years, haulage.
  • John Lee aged 16 years, haulage.
  • George Browning aged 59 years, ropeman.
  • Vincent Rowley aged 20 years, engineman.
  • Ralph Pointon aged 16 years, haulage.
  • Elijah Holland jnr. aged 30 years, collier
  • John Richardson aged 50 years, shifter.
  • Thomas Timmiss aged 50 years, shifter.
  • S. Brockley aged 19 years, haulage.
  • Arthur Pointon aged 24 years, roadman.
  • Lionel Rowley aged 19 years, haulage.
  • Fred Rhodes aged 15 years, haulage.
  • Peter Benson aged 14 years, haulage.
  • James Jones aged 16 years, haulage.
  • Enos Daniels aged 38 years, pumpman.
  • S. Richardson aged 56 years, hooker.
  • Charles Hulse aged 15 years, haulage.
  • Dan Leighton aged 39 years, collier.
  • Jabez Burgess aged 20 years, loader.
  • George Burgess aged 42 years, collier.
  • William H. Green aged 45 years, fireman.
  • Henry Dean aged 32 years, collier.
  • Joseph Mayer aged 16 years, haulage.
  • Job Harrison aged 38 years, collier.
  • John Harrison aged 28 years, collier.
  • Jesse Dean aged 26 years, collier.
  • Bernard Holland aged 23 years, loader.
  • William Pointon aged 15 years, haulage.
  • Percy Hulse aged 23 years, loader.
  • Charles Broad aged 32 years, collier.
  • Joe Bateman aged 32 years, collier.
  • Henry Wilshaw aged 21 years, loader.
  • Arnold Byatt aged 17 years, haulage.
  • Fred Woodvine aged 14 years, haulage.
  • Fred Edgeley aged 16 years, haulage.
  • William Hollier aged 42 years, collier.
  • Wilmot Scrivens aged 19 years, haulage.
  • Albert Roberts aged 21 years, loader.
  • Henry Jones aged 36 years, collier.
  • George Webb aged 35 years, loader.
  • William Genders aged 28 years collier.
  • William Davies aged 20 years, haulage.
  • John Hulse aged 31 years, collier.
  • John Rowley aged 31 years, collier.
  • Thomas West aged 30 years, collier.
  • Len Pointon aged 30 years, collier.
  • Thoms Morgan aged 44 years, collier.
  • John Austin aged 41 years, loader.
  • George Rowley aged 18 years, haulage.
  • Charles Leighton aged 45 years, fireman.
  • Bernard Spode aged 14 years, haulage.
  • William Kestervan aged 15 years, haulage.
  • John R. Davies aged 18 years, haulage.
  • Francis Beech aged 15 years, haulage.
  • Thomas Challinor aged 15 years, haulage.
  • James Wilcox aged 21 years, loader.
  • Ben Jones aged 19 years, haulage.
  • Reg Harrison aged 15 years, haulage.
  • Arthur Ratcliffe aged 20 years, loader.
  • William Ratcliffe aged 32 tears, collier.
  • Bert Brockley aged 14 years, haulage.
  • Fred Rowley aged 25 years, collier.
  • David Burgess aged 44 years, collier.
  • Ralph Dowling aged 26 years, loader.
  • John Barlow aged 18 years, loader.
  • John Dean aged 27 years, collier.
  • F. Cartledge aged 32 years, collier.
  • Ernest Harrison aged 20 years, loader.
  • Leonard Taylor aged 31 years, collier.
  • W. Richardson aged 47 years, collier.
  • Arthur Birkin aged 14 years, haulage.
  • Ernest Jebb aged 20 years, loader.
  • Joseph Lear aged 26 years, loader.
  • John Madew aged 42 years, collier.
  • Hugh Doorboy, member of the Birchenwood Rescue Team.
  • Bernard Spode aged 14 years was recovered in August and identified by his Boys Brigade belt with the motto “Press Forward”. He was the grandson of Elija Holand, the fireman, who lost four sons in the explosion. At this date there were still ninety-three bodies in the mine.

The formal inquest into the men’s deaths was held in October 1919 by Mr. H.W. Adams, H.M. Coroner. The delay between the accident and the holding of the inquest and the formal inquiry was due to the fact that the Bullhurst Seam gave off firedamp freely and was also liable to spontaneous combustion and the men employed in the inspection of the mine had to wear breathing apparatus which made progress very slow. As a result of the inquest the jury returned the following verdict:

  1. We consider that the deceased persons met their deaths from the medical point of view as follows-
  2. a) 144 from carbon monoxide poisoning.
  3. b) 11 from violence and carbon monoxide poisoning.
  4. The cause of death was an explosion of gas and coal dust in the Bullhurst and Banbury Seams of the Minnie Pit.
  5. There is not sufficient evidence to show what caused the initial flames.
  6. We consider that the pit had been carried on in accordance with the Coal Mines Act, 1911, and the General Regulations, so far as they have been issued, but were are of the opinion that, if the dust had been systematically removed, the explosion would not have been so extensive.
  7. We do not consider that any particular person is to blame for the explosion.
  8. As a result of the Inquiry we consider that further regulations should be issued at once for the treatment of coal dust, but we disagree with the minersÕ representatives that nothing whatever should be introduced which will injure the miners or the young life employed in the mine and that there is great scope for inquiry by the Government experts on this point, particularly, making coal dust itself inert.
  9. The jury consider that any shot lighter should report in writing anything he considers unsafe in the mine.
  10. It appears that the workmen have not taken advantage of Section 16 of the Coal Mines Act relative to the periodical inspection of mines by workmen and we consider that they should do so.

The inquiry into the disaster was conducted by Mr. W. Walker, C.B.E., H.M. Chief Inspector of Mines at the Town Hall, Stoke-on-Trent on December 3rd, 1919. Mr Walker said in the report:

After carefully considering the facts revealed I the evidence of the various witnesses and by personal investigation, I have come to the conclusion that the explosion originated in or near the goaf at the top end of the No.4 district in the Bullhurst Seam and that the cause was an explosion of gas developing into an explosion of coal dust which traversed roads reached by the Banbury Dip Crut in the Bullhurst and Banbury Seven Feet Seams to which the force and the flames of the explosion were confined. The igniting cause of the explosion of gas in or near the goaf was, in my opinion, either a defective lamps or sparks produced when the bull-dog stone over the goaf fell, of the two I think the former is the more probable cause.

James Thomas Machin, leader of the Rescue Brigade when Hugh Doorboy collapsed and Frank Halfpenny were commended for their bravery.

 

REFERENCES
Mines Inspectors Report
Report to the Right Honourable Secretary of State for the Home Department on the causes of and circumstances attending the explosion which occurred in the Minnie Pit of the Podmore Hall Colliery on Saturday the 12th January 1918 by W. Walker, C.B.E., H.M. Chief Inspector of Mines.
The Colliery Guardian, 18th January, 1918, p.134, 22nd February, p.383, 23rd August, p.398.

Information supplied by Ian Winstanley and the Coal Mining History Resource Centre.

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