MOSSFIELD. Longton, Staffordshire. 21st. March, 1940.

The colliery was the property of the Mossfield Colliery Company Limited as was situated on the outskirts of Longton at the southeastern end of the North Staffordshire Coalfield. There were two shafts which were both sunk to a depth of 440 yards which was about 20 yards below the Cockshead Seam in which the explosion occurred. The seam dipped to the south-west about 1 in 3 and was recovered by a level crut, 60 yards long from the downcast shaft. Other seams both above and below the Cockshead were worked from the shaft and the roads in the Seven Feet Banbury seam were used as part of the return airway from the Cockshead workings. The seam was comparatively thick and there was 7 to 8 feet of clean coal with a parting of 1 to 2 feet from the roof and an intermittent band of pyrites nodules, 2 inches thick about 5 feet from the floor. The roof consisted of 2 feet of “Hussle”, a black and very friable carbonaceous shale and immediately above this there was 2 feet of dirt which was a soft coal measure shale followed by a layer of strong shale with ironstone bands. The seam gave off firedamp freely and safety lamps and only Permitted explosives were allowed in the workings. The seam produces a lot of dust and much stone dust was required to neutralise this.

This seam at the mine had an unenviable reputation and from its earliest days the workings had been dogged by troubles from spontaneous combustion and on the 16th. October 1889, an explosion initiated by a gob fire caused the loss of 64 lives. There was little doubt that the explosion was carried by coal dust into the workings of the second seam, the Seven Feet Banbury and there was little doubt also that this explosion would have been far more serious if the roadways had not been treated with stone dust. The experience of the intervening half-century was confirmed by Sir W.N. Atkinson’s description of the seam:

On account of the liability to gob fire, special methods of working were adopted and except for the accident of 1889 had been substantially successful until the present unfortunate occurrence. such special methods involved, fundamentally, the avoidance, as far as possible, of leakage of air through the packs, the systematic withdrawal of roof supports and the prevention of the accumulation of bituminous matter in the wastes, backed up by working in separate panels with only one way of ingress and one of egress for the ventilation, thus affording for rapid isolation in an emergency.

The 15’s longwall face was 90 yards in length and for all practical purposes was fully mechanised. the coal was cut at a height of 2 feet 6 inches fro the floor by compressed air driven percussive boring machines and delivered to the loading point in the level by a compressed air driven shaker conveyor. To the dip of the level there was a short length of about 5 to 6 yards of face which was hand filled directly into tubs. On account of the “hussel” and the 2 feet of dirt next to it, a thickness of 2 feet 6 inches of coal was left to form a safe roof in the longwall face. The strip pack were built up to this coal roof but the top coal fell into the wastes but as much of it as possible was recovered and sent out. Debris from this fallen roof provided the material for building the packs.

There was a patch of faulty ground which was encountered in the 15’s Level. This fault was crossed and the face opened out beyond it but another fault was found 20 yards further on with another down throw. This ran in the direction of the dip of the seam so that the two faults met near the rise side of the face. The face was stopped while a search was made to recover the seam beyond this second fault. First, a level crut in line with 15’s Level was driven in for 30 yards and, finding no coal, it was stopped at this point. Then a roadway was opened up on the line of the face alongside the inner fault and from its junction with the return airway another crut was set out and strata wee recognised as that which usually formed the floor and a slight extension of this crut to the left found the coal.

From this point a heading was driven 7 feet wide and supported by 7 feet steel arches until it reached a point which was known to be about the position of the first mentioned crut. A careful survey was carried out which showed that the floor of the seam in the heading was 18 feet vertically above the floor of the crut. The position of the seam was now accurately fixed and a third crut was started from 15’s Level veering slightly to the left. It cut the seam 40 yards in and an extension of the line of the crut along the seam was met by a downbank heading from the side of which a new face was opened out.

The explosion 1 a.m. on Thursday 21st March in the third hour of the night shift of Wednesday/Thursday, 20th/221st March and at the time there were 12 persons, including the fireman, at work in and near 15’s Level face. All of them were killed or severely injured by the explosion and only one, the fireman survived.

At the beginning of the day shift on the 15th March, a contractor collier named, William Neil Washington, reached the 15’s Level face at about 6.30 a.m. The face had been cut and the coal was ready for filling out. Proceeding up the face from the Level and looking into each waste on the way, Washington reached the third waste. Against the pack on the rise side he noticed a peculiar smell and traced it along the pack side for a distance of about a yard. He described the smell as an oily one which he did not consider it unusual in the Cockshead working except that in this instance it was stronger than usual. Along the face, going uphill, he lost the smell in a short distance. He did not make an immediate report to anyone because he knew that the fireman was coming along very soon. He went to work opposite the No.3 waste.

The day fireman, Marshall Carson, arrived shortly afterwards and approached the face from the return airway at the rise side. He noticed a faint smell when he was about 10 yards down the face and about opposite the lower side of the waste next to the return airway. He followed the smell down to No. 3 waste where he met Washington who then mentioned the smell to him. The time was then about 7.30 a.m. After he had examined the face and satisfied himself that there was nothing wrong with the waste, Carson thought the smell was coming from the pack. He completed his inspection of the face and came outbye along the 15’s Level and reported the smell to the overman, John William Birks whom he met in the main haulage dip. Birks and Carson made their way to 15’s face via Tam’s Jig and the return airway.

Birks gave the following account of the events to the inquiry. The account was reported almost verbatim and the Inspector commented on his “colloquial terms and expressions”:

I examined this face until I got to this third waste. Well, there was a bit of a smell. Of course, I got into this waste, and on the edge of this waste, the face edge of it, the hussel thickened due to this bit of an overlap, as Carson was saying. The hussel, just at the end of the waste would be 2 feet 6 inches and it made rather a big heap just at the top edge of the waste. Well, I could not perceive anything when I got over he top of it so I came back again. I went on the face in fresh air, and went topside of the waste again and came on it again, and I came to the conclusion that it was just the hussel smelling. There was nothing else to account for the smell. After going above and below and in the waste, I fixed it on this heap of hussel. I said to one of the chaps who was working on the face, “Get all this loose coal out of here, clean it all out”. Then I thought I would come round after it had been cleaned out and have another look. I went away and came back about half-past ten, and on going up the face at the first waste, I met the undermanager. I said to him, “Have you been around the third waste Sam?”

He said, “Yes”.

”Well”, I said, “can you perceive anything different about it?”

He said, “It is much the same only a bit thicker.”

I said, “I thought the same as that.”

”But anyhow”, he said, “we will go together and have a look at it.”

So with that we went up and, of course, we went into the [third] waste as far as we could travel as long as it looked safe to travel we kept on travelling to be sure. When we got to the back end of the waste I got down to smell this loose stuff that had fallen – the stuff that had fallen at the back end – smelling to see if I could smell anything. I could not smell anything but I got the air coming through. I dusted my trousers and I saw the dust was coming out. So I said, “Well, Sam, I have got wind coming through here.”

”Why?”, has said. “Of course I was a bit surprised you see being at the far end.”

I said, “I have got wind coming through”, and I knocked the dust and he could see it passing in. I said, “It looks to me as though we will have to stop this some way or other”.

So he said, “Have you got you tape?”

I said, “Yes”, and we measured it out from there to the face which was 44 yards. We then went out on the level and measured along the level to see if we could find whether it was leaking off the level. Well, we could not trace any air going through the packs on the level. This happened to be about 6 yards from the solid where we had started from, and we examined the packs and the level and we could not find any trace of air pulling through.

From when Birks found the leakage of air through the fallen debris by Birks, Samuel Baker, the undermanager moved quickly. Baker gave instructions to Birks to get men to timber the waste in order to make it safe for building a stopping immediately in front of the debris. Baker then went outbye and met the manager, Josiah Foster, at the pit bottom. Barker reported what he had found and what he had told Birks to do and Foster went to the spot. When he got there it was about 1 p.m. and the timbering was completed. Foster agreed that the best thing to do was to put up a stopping, and gave instructions for this to be done. He also gave instructions for a second stopping to be built across the waste some yards nearer the face. The second stopping was completed at 10 p.m. and a start was made on the barrier pack running parallel to the coal face throughout its length. Work on this pack went on uninterrupted throughout the weekend until it was completed on Tuesday, 19th March.

While the packing operations were going on, in addition to the normal supervision by the fireman and their superior officials, a fireman and an overman were detailed especially to supervise the work during the afternoon and night shifts and workmen who knew the skills of pack building were transferred to the district from other parts of the pit. The smell gradually disappeared but not all agreed with this. The manager considered that there was slight trace when he reached the No.3 waste on the Friday evening between 8 and 9 p.m. and Carson thought there was slight smell on Saturday morning but Birks said there was no smell when he went round at 10 p.m. on Friday night when the stopping the No. 3 waste was almost completed.

George Thorley, fireman was one who was specially detailed for the supervision of the work on the afternoon shift and he did not detect a smell at any time during the shift but he admitted that he had no previous experience of a gob stink. Washington, the contractor, who first noticed the smell said it had disappeared by Saturday morning when the pack across No.4 waste was finished. Arthur Seaton, the only survivor of the disaster, who was the fireman on the night shift was interviewed as he lay injured in hospital. He said that at no time during the recovery of the face inside the fault was there any sign of heating. He heard about the smell in the No.3 waste when he came to work. The stoppings had been built across the waste and there was still a faint smell from the waste which he thought was definitely gob stink. There was no smell at the face at the beginning of his shift on Wednesday night, 20th March. He considered that the barrier pack had effectively dealt with the trouble. Never at any time was the smell detectable in the return airway and nobody working on the face felt any of the symptoms normally associated with carbon monoxide inhalation.

The face or barrier pack was completed at the end of the night shift of Tuesday 19th March. On Wednesday 20th March normal working proceeded throughout the day shift, afternoon shift and night shift until the explosion occurred about 1.15 a.m. on Thursday 21st. March. Seaton, the fireman described it.

”At that time I had come down the face to fetch some Cardox shells from the tub in the level when I sensed something. There was a complete blackout. I thought something had struck me and remembered nothing more until I regained my senses in hospital.”

Of the four people in the 15’s face who were injured by the explosions and found alive after, only the fireman, Smeaton survived and he was able to say little about the events. There was evidence that the explosion occurred further outbye. A roadman George Boulton was at the outbye end of the 15’s level when he felt a peculiar sensation in his ears and noticed a cloud of whitish dust coming towards him from inbye. He said that he saw no flame or heard a noise. He telephoned the pit bottom where he spoke with Thomas Shenton, an overman on the night shift, who was in charge of the traffic at the bottom of the pit and on the main roads. Shenton said that there was a momentary reversal of the air at the pit bottom and a cloud of dust. He went to the telephone and called Douglas Silcock, a haulage attended. Silcock was concerned by the dust and the air reversal but by that time it had become normal. Shenton told Silcock to stay where he was and he would come down. Boulton also spoke to Charles Clewlow, the fireman in the “H” Level district which was a level on the opposite side of the main dip about 150 yards below 15’s. Clewlow had completed his inspection at about 1.10 a.m. when he felt a rush of wind and saw a cloud of dust. He went to the face but and found the men were all right so he went outbye and spoke to Boulton on the telephone speaking from the 15’s Level. Boulton asked him to, “come up quick to 15’s level”. Clewlow then phoned the manager who told him to withdraw the men and he sent a message for this to be done.

Shenton and Clewlow rapidly made their way to 15’s level where they were joined by Boulton and all three went inbye. When they had gone about 50 yards they were joined by others whose willing aid enabled the dead to be quickly found and taken out of the pit.

Those who died were:

  • James Blundred aged 28 years, collier,
  • Arthur Butler aged 26 years, loader,
  • Colin Dodd aged 20 years, loader,
  • James Robinson aged 37 years, collier,
  • Leslie Leake aged 16 years, haulage hand,
  • Arthur Middleton aged 54 years, collier,
  • Richard Porter aged 27 years, collier,
  • Roland Porter aged 55 years, collier,
  • William Arthur Ratcliffe aged 33 years, haulage hand,
  • Charles Rushton aged 25 years, loader,
  • James Matthew Wood aged 59 years, collier,

Arthur Seaton aged 47 years, fireman was injured.

The inquiry into the causes and circumstances attending the explosion which occurred at Mossfield Colliery, Longton, Staffordshire on the 21st. March 1940, was conducted by F.H. Wynne, C.B.E., B.Sc., H.M. Chief Inspector of Mines. By arrangement with Major Gerald W. Huntbach, H.M. Deputy (and Acting) Coroner for the City of Stoke-on-Trent, the inquiry was held jointly with the inquest at the Town Hall, Hanley on the 24th and 25th April 1940. All interested parties were represented and the verdict of the Coroner was as follows:

The eleven deceased men whose names were read out at the opening of the resumed inquest perished from injuries caused by an accidental explosion in the Cockshead seam at the Mossfield Colliery.

Immediately after the explosion, Clewlow, Shenton and Boulton found that there was a clear atmosphere in the level but there was smell of burning. Near to the haulier they found a smouldering bag and another was found further inbye lying on the wheels of an overturned tub of dirt. At the end of the level right against the face they found the special Cardox wagon askew. It was obvious even from a cursory examination that the explosion had been caused by spontaneous combustion in some inaccessible spot and the decision was take to isolate the district. Stoppings were constructed in the intake and the return airways and completed 12 hours after the explosion.

In the report, Mr. Wynne’s comments:

The observed facts would suggest that a considerable volume of firedamp was ignited, and that it exploded with considerable violence which was however dissipated in displacing potions of the 8 feet thick barrier packs across the ends of Nos.1 and 2 wastes. This brings us to consider the reason for the accumulation of so large a volume of firedamp. It was, of course, due, firstly to the sealing off of the leakage of fresh air through the No.3 waste and secondly to the further obstruction of the circulation of air offered by the barrier pack. Coincidentally, there would be a temperature rise within the now confined area tending to destroy the balance that existed between heat production by oxidation and heat dissipated mainly by conduction and so to produce more and more heating until active combustion started.

Valuable information might have been obtained by taking air samples, firstly in the return airway as soon as the smell was noticed and later by means of one or more small bore pipes from the atmosphere inside the packed off goaf. Samples from the goaf would have served the dual purpose by affording information regarding

1) oxygen consumption due to incipient combustion and

2) oxygen reduction due to its replacement by firedamp.

 

 

REFERENCES
The report on the causes and circumstances attending the explosion which occurred at Mossfield Colliery, Longton, Staffordshire on the 21st March 1940 by F.H. Wynne. C.B.E., B.Sc., H.M. Chief Inspector of Mines.
Colliery Guardian, 26th April 1940, p.613, 3rd May, p.658, 1st November, 140, p.421, 8th November, p.439

Information supplied by Ian Winstanley and the Coal Mining History Resource Centre.

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