MOSSFIELD. Longton, Staffordshire. 16th. October, 1889.

The colliery belonged to Messrs. Hawsley and Bridgewood Limited. and was situated near Longton in the Parish of Cavershall, Staffordshire. It was worked by two shafts fifteen yards apart and ten feet six inches in diameter and both were used for raising coal. There was one cage in each shaft and both cages were worked by the same engine one cage descended while the other ascended. The cages each carried four tubs on two decks and run on wire rope guides. Water was periodically drawn up the downcast by means of the cage and both shafts were wet.

There were three seams worked at the colliery the Hardmine at two hundred and fifty yards, the Banbury at three hundred and sixty-three yards and the Cockshead at four hundred and fourteen yards. The shafts are four hundred and forty yards deep to the hooking-on places near the bottom. The Hardmine was cut into the shaft at a depth of two hundred and fifty yards and the coal from this seam was put into the cage at the upcast shaft at a hooking-on place in mid-shaft. The workings of the Hardmine were not connected with those of the Banbury and the Cockshead seams except by the shafts and the Hardmine workings were not affected by the explosion. The workings of the Cockshead seams were reached by a cut or stone drift leaving the downcast shaft twenty yards below the Hardmine seam and through a short level cut of sixty yards and the Banbury seam was a hundred and sixty yards further on. The Cockshead seam was worked on a system of so called panel work. Levels were driven on the strike of the seam and from the upper levels excavations thirty to seventy yards thick were made. These were known locally as “drifts” and were driven to the rise sometimes exceeding one hundred yards. Between these drifts ribs of coal are left.

The Cockshead seam has the following section: roof, strong metal with ironstone bands, one foot four inches of ironstone in bands two to three inches thick with some partings between each, four inches of bass, eleven inches of metal, called locally, “thistle” which was loose bituminous shale, Top coal, three feet eight inches, Middle coal eight inches and Bottom coal three feet eight inches, a total of eight feet. The floor was of three inches of marl, too strong to hole in and then six inches of dark grey metal. This seam was holed in the Middle coal and in the first working, the top coal was left to form the roof. Part of the top coal was taken down to make height for the horse roads and at other places when it is not required for the roof. As much of the top coal was got from behind the faces of the drift as was possible between the pack walls and when the roof is not required. The Cockshead was a very dusty seam and there was always coal dust throughout the workings and the roads.

The Banbury seam was worked by the longwall system and all the coal was removed in one operation. The roads through the goaf were made by pack walls and the roof immediately behind the advancing face was supported by timber and stone packs four yards thick at nine-yard intervals. The coal was jigged down self-acting incline to a level road on the deep side of the workings and then drawn to the shaft by horses. The seam had the following section: Roof, strong grey bass, coal four foot one inches thick and holing dirt two feet seven inches. The floor was of grey metal. The holing was done in the dirt below the coal and this caused a lot of stone dust there was a large amount of coal dust on the roads.

A tramroad was maintained on one or both sides of the drifts according to the width. One side of the tramway was the coal and the other was a pack wall four feet thick. The roof of the working face of the drifts was supported by timber and pack walls four feet thick and five yards apart. The coal got in the drifts was lowered by gravity to the lowest of the series and then taken to the shaft by horses.  The ventilation for the pit was produced by a Waddle fan thirty feet in diameter, running at fifty revolutions per minute at one and a half inches water gauge and placed near the top of the upcast shaft. It was working properly at the time of the explosion. Both seams were worked by safety lamps but naked lights were used for lighting the bottom of the downcast shaft. The lamps were of the Meusler and Mausault lamps. Some were locked by a screw lock and others by a lead plug. The lamp stations in the Banbury seam was in the air intake at the junction of the crut and the horse level and the one for the Cockshead at the bottom of the downcast shaft.

There was no blasting in the Cockshead and in the Banbury the roof of the gate-roads was blown down by gunpowder in water cartridges, the shots being electrically fired. Some explosive was used in the coal for driving a new engine road near the outer end of the horse road. In the new cruts driven from the Banbury to recover other seams, gunpowder was used but the places were watered before the shots were fired.

The officials of the colliery were, Mr. J.G. Blackwell, managing director, who was a mining engineer holding a managers certificate but he did take an active part in the direction of the colliery. Mr. James Potts who was the certificated manager and he had been at the colliery for six years. He was also the certificated manager of two other pits belonging to the same owners which were being re-opened. William Barker, the underlooker in the Hardmine and William Fletcher, underlooker in the Banbury and Cockshead seams. Both Barker and Fletcher held certificates as under-managers but neither of them had been appointed in writing as was required by the Coal Mines Act. William Fletcher fulfilled exactly the same duties in the Banbury and the Cockshead seams as he would have had he been the undermanager in writing. Thomas Lane and Joseph Green were the firemen in the Hardmine and Arthur Fletcher, William Boon and Isaac Cooper were the firemen in the Banbury and Cockshead seams.

The colliery was worked in two shifts; the day shift of two hundred men and boys went down at 7 a.m. and came up at 3.30 p.m. The night shift employed one hundred persons and went down before 9 p.m. and came up at 5.30 am. The numbers mentioned also included those who worked in the Hardmine. A shift of contractors and datallers went down at 3.30 p.m. and came up at 12.30 a.m. and the night shift on Friday and both the shifts on Saturday went down and came up an hour earlier than weekdays. The colliers and loaders were employed directly by contractors and each contractor employed about six men who had a particular face to work or “drift” that was assigned to him. About seven hundred and fifty tons of coal was got from the Banbury and about 1,000 tons from the Cockshead seam per week.

There was drop in the atmospheric pressure which started about sixteen hours before the explosion and this was accompanied by an increase in the temperature but there was no reason to believe that this had any effect in the cause of the explosion.

Over the years, considerable portions of the workings had been sealed off due to gob fires. The Inspector’s Report lists the numerous occasions that gob fires had been dealt with at the colliery in the past and there were signs in the pit that another gob fire was imminent before the explosion. At the inquiry, it was thought that this was a likely cause of the explosion. Signs of the fire were noted in the drift by the workmen on the 14th October between 2 and 3 p.m. when they smelled the characteristic smell that indicated that the gob was heating. It was observed by Arthur Fletcher, the night shift fireman and reported by him to his father William Fletcher, the underlooker, the next morning. William went to the place at 8 a.m. on the 15th October and satisfied himself that there was a “gob stink”. The men working in the place complained of the smell to him. The next day Potts ordered stoppings to be made at points nearest to the fire but it was impossible to erect air-tight stoppings because of the crush between the broken strata.

At the inquest the accounts of the events at the colliery differed between those given by Potts and those given by Fletcher and it emerged that there had been problems between James Potts and William Fletcher for some months before the explosion. Her Majesty’s Inspector for Mines for the Staffordshire District, Mr Atkinson, did not go into great detail but he pointed out:

That a grave misunderstanding or want of confidence and mutual reliance between the officials of the colliery may be a serious source of danger and should not be allowed to exist.

About a month before the explosion, Potts had an accident, when he was thrown out of a conveyance, injured himself and was unable to go down the pit as often as usual. He had been down the pit once or twice only since the accident but he was able to go down when the gob fire was reported. Mr. Atkinson thought that he did not make proper arrangements to deal with the gob fire and thought it was a grave error to put in a stopping while the men were still working in the mine. He also believed that there were serious faults in the supervision of the colliery.

At the time of the explosion there was only one fireman on duty at night, Arthur Fletcher, for both the Banbury and the Cockshead seams. This was a temporary measure for a week only until another fireman had been appointed. He had both seams to examine before the morning shift came down but he was dealing with the gob fire and did not proceed with the inspection. Clearly, there was too much work for one man to do.

The repeated accumulation of gas should have been removed. William Fletcher said he had made preparations to restore the ventilation and he had asked Potts to allow him to remove the gas but it was still there at the time of the explosion.

The ventilation of the Cockshead seam was not good and should have been divided and taken from one district to the next. Some of the airways were in a bad state and were too small so that when the stoppings were made, not enough air would pass through. The ventilation was also interrupted by the passage of the cage. As the cage in the downcast shaft rose, hen water was being wound, it went directly above the top of the upcast shaft and the ventilation was interrupted for a short time.

With these problems the explosion was probably inevitable and it took place about 3.50 a.m. There was little damage to the top of the shafts and the officials were informed as soon as possible and the work of exploring the mine was started. The thirteen men in the Hardmine were got out alive and assistance from neighbouring collieries came quickly. The work worked round the clock at the tremendous task of clearing the damage and great care had to be taken to avoid further loss of life. The explorers found that the timber was displaced near the downcast shaft and the doors on the road leading to the upcast shaft were blown towards the shaft. The Banbury seam was quickly explored through out but the Cockshead was only partially explored and five bodies were recovered and taken to the pit bottom.

It was thought that there were probably bodies in the upper workings but it was not considered safe to enter these workings as this was the seat of the gob fire and it was thought that it would be too dangerous if air was admitted to the fire. The blast affected the both the Banbury and the Cockshead seams. In the Banbury the blast had extended right up to the face and in the Cockshead seam, all the workings were explored and they had been damaged by the explosion.

At the time of the explosion there were seventy-seven men in both seams and sixty-four were killed and the sixteen horses in the mines were also killed. Tubs of stone on the horse-roads into the Banbury seam were badly damaged and near the end of the Banbury horse-level and a winch used for hauling up tubs the new engine-plane was blown sixteen yards inbye. In the Cockshead seam the air-crossing the horse-level was destroyed and nearly all the timber was blown out. There were numerous falls and the Cockshead seam and the explorers could get only twenty-five yards beyond the jig due to fall and the level was full of gas beyond the fall.

The bodies of the men found on the horse-level looked as though they had been at work when they died. Of the six bodies were found on the other jig, three were found on the jig-landing and of these D. Hulme was a loader who worked on both side of the level and jigged the tubs down the horse-level. J Steele was taking the coal down the thurlings and William Birchwood, who was a collier in the upper south level where his clothing was found. Evan Price, collier was found six to seven yards from the face in the south level where he was working. His body was divested of clothes and his belt was found four yards further on from his body. H. Sellars and B.L. Smith, both colliers were found near their workplaces and six lamps were found on the jig.

A considerable part of the Cockshead seam took some time to explore and the operations were confined for the recovery of the bodies. The exploration lasted over three months and five bodies could not be recovered.

The victims who were found in the Banbury Seam:

  • William Smith, aged 16 years a horse driver who worked the Banbury Crut to the main jig. He was slightly burnt,
  • Noah Ball, aged 39 years who was a horse driver in the Banbury Crut,
  • Thomas Brough. He was a holer and was sightly burnt,
  • Isaac Derricott, aged 60 years who was a holer and was badly burnt,
  • John Shenton, aged 15 years a horse driver who was badly burnt,
  • John Tomlinson, aged 32 years a collier who was asphyxiated,
  • William Hulme, aged 24 years the taker off in the Main Jig who was slightly burnt,
  • Joseph Cotton, aged 26 years a holer who was asphyxiated,
  • Thomas Walker, aged 25 years a waggoner to the Main Jig who was asphyxiated,
  • William Farrell, aged 23 years a loader who was asphyxiated,
  • Thomas Brough, aged 20 years a collier who was slightly burnt,
  • William Horleston., aged 35 years a contractor who was asphyxiated,
  • John Ball, aged 36 years a contractor who was asphyxiated,
  • Francis Malbon Shaw, aged 21 years a loader who was slightly burnt,
  • Jacob Bath, aged 23 years a contractor who was asphyxiated,
  • John Smith, aged 18 years a jigger in the Main Jig who was badly burnt,
  • James Bettany James, aged 23 years a loader who was asphyxiated,
  • Thomas James, aged 18 years a loader who was badly burnt,
  • James Bradbury, aged 20 years a horse driver who was very badly burnt,
  • William Salter, aged 50 years a collier who was asphyxiated,
  • David Hughes, aged 65 years a collier who was asphyxiated,
  • Thomas Sherwin, aged 25 years a loader who was asphyxiated,
  • Henry Wood, aged 20 years a loader who was asphyxiated,
  • Samuel Wedgewood, aged 28 years a loader who was asphyxiated,
  • Richard Jones, aged 24 years a jigger on the Main Jig who was very badly burnt,
  • Henry Calcott, aged 25 years a collier who was asphyxiated,
  • John Moffatt. A contractor who was asphyxiated,
  • John Hall, aged 16 years a taker-off who was slightly burnt,
  • Francis Enery, aged 50 years a loader who was badly burnt,
  • Edward Jones, aged 30 years a loader who was asphyxiated,
  • James Hulse, aged 26 years a loader who was asphyxiated,
  • John Bailey Moore, aged 31 years a contractor who was badly burnt,
  • William Hurst, aged 49 years a collier who was asphyxiated,
  • Sydney Rutter, aged 37 years a loader who was slightly burnt,
  • Edward Townshend, aged 30 years a horse driver who was asphyxiated,
  • William Burgess, aged 40 years a colliery who was asphyxiated,
  • Jonathan Harding, aged 25 years a collier who was asphyxiated.
  • The victims who were found in the Banbury Seam:
  • George Salt, aged 42 years a horsekeeper who was badly burnt,
  • George Radcliffe, aged 32 years a roadman who was badly burnt,
  • Samuel Sherwin, aged 18 years a horsedriver who was slightly burnt,
  • George Steele, aged 14 years a horsedriver who was slightly burnt,
  • James Henry Bailey, aged 18 years a horsedriver who was slightly burnt,
  • John Williams, aged 16 years a horsedriver who was slightly burnt,
  • George Bradshaw, aged 18 years a taker-off,
  • Charles Sherwin, aged 21 years a taker-off in the Main Jig,
  • William Lawton, aged 18 years a taker-off,
  • Albert J. Edwards, aged 28 years a collier,
  • George Edwards, aged 42 years a collier,
  • Joseph Edwards, aged 57 years a collier,
  • David Hulme, aged 22 years a loader,
  • William Breewood, aged 29 years a collier who was badly burnt,
  • John Steele, aged 16 years a raker down who was badly burnt,
  • Evan Price, aged 27 years a collier who was very badly burnt,
  • Herbert Sellars, aged 37 years a collier who was badly burnt,
  • Ben L. Smith, aged 33 years a collier who was badly burnt,
  • Charles Jenkins, aged 19 years who was asphyxiated at a stopping in the upper level,
  • Fred Ayres, aged 21 years who was asphyxiated while working at a stopping in the upper seam,
  • Joseph Bull, aged 60 years who was asphyxiated while working near the top of the main jig
  • Job Bull aged 26 years who was asphyxiated while working near the top on the Main Jig.
  • There were five bodies that were not recovered:
  • Arthur Fletcher, a fireman aged 26 years,
  • George Wilson aged 27 years,
  • Spencer Whitehurst aged 24 years,
  • Joseph Bull aged 25 years,
  • William Bull aged 19 years.

Some of the bodies were burnt black probably from the effects of burning coal dust but no charred coal dust was found on the props. There were some who got out of the pit with their lives and of these only one was injured:

  • William Bracegirdle, hooker-on at the bottom of the downcast shaft,
  • George Timmins, who worked with William Bracegirdle,
  • Jesse Smith, a driver who was severely burnt,
  • George Hewitt, a roadman at the door nearest the face of the Banbury horse level,
  • Jesse Dennis, a contractor, who was at the far end of the Banbury drift,
  • R. Edwards, a collier who was at the bottom head,
  • John Doxy, a loader at the top head,
  • Ralph Rogers, a collier at the top head,
  • W. Ingle, a loader in the drift,
  • Richard Breeze, a loader in the drift,
  • George Green, a loader at the bottom head,
  • Ralph Edge, a taker off in the drift,
  • John Tompkinson, a collier in the drift.

Sixteen horses also perished in the disaster.

The inquest into the deaths of the men was held by Mr. A.A. Flint, the Coroner for the Utoxetter Division of Staffordshire. The Inspector thought that there were four possibilities as the cause of the ignition of the gas. First, the gob fire, second, an open lamp, third, a match, and fourth, a pick striking against pyrites in the coal. It was known from experiments that had been conducted that this could cause a spark that could ignite the gas.

He attributed the explosion in the Banbury seam to coal dust and the inspector thought that the explosion originated in the Cockshead seam and all the lamps that were found there were carefully examined. They were all Meusler types and all were found locked. Coal dust was recognised as a factor and the safety lamps were also suspect and the Inspector said it would be desirable to look into the coal dust and lamps in connection with explosions in coal mines.

At the inquest there was a basic disagreement of the events at the colliery prior to the explosion. Mr. James Potts, manager, gave his version of the events leading up to the explosion, was that on 15th October he received a verbal report from William Fletcher of a gob stink. This was between 10 and 11 a.m. He asked Fletcher if it was like the previous fires and Fletcher said that it was. He went on to ask if there was an immediate hurry and Fletcher replied that there was not.

Potts then gave him instructions to fetch all the working materials out of the drift where they were stored and put in a stopping the next day. He then looked at the plan to locate the best position for the stoppings. At the inquest, he made a point of saying that he did not say that he would follow in two or three minutes.

Potts said he saw Fletcher the same day about 5 p.m. when he was told that the materials had been brought from the drift and that Fletcher had removed some doors on the upper levels. Potts thought that this was right. He also told him that the stink was worse and Potts proposed to go down but Fletcher said there was no danger and no immediate hurry so Potts did not go down. He said that if he had known it had been as bad as that he would have come down the pit to Fletcher.

James Potts said he saw Arthur Fletcher at 8 p.m. He asked him to see his father and tell him what arrangements had been made about the gob fire and if he approved them. He told him that if he disapproved then he must come and see Potts that night with a view to putting in another stopping.

William was not at home when Arthur went to see him and so he was not told of the altered arrangements. Potts saw Arthur again at 9 p.m. as he was going to the pit and told him to come and see him at 12 p.m. to report to him about the gas was in the drift. Arthur came at 12.30 and told Potts that the gas was in the jig of the drift 25 yards from the upper level. Potts asked about the gob stink and Arthur replied that there was not one and it was “as sweet as a not.”

According to Potts account said Arthur said nothing to allow him to think that the situation was dangerous. Potts gave Arthur instructions about the doors in the upper level to the north of the stable jig before he closed the stopping. At 12.30 Arthur reported he had done this but did not say how by how much he had opened the doors.

William Fletcher, the underlooker at the colliery, told the court that Arthur, his son, told him of the gob stink before he went down the pit on the 15th October. Both of them went to the place but they found it was not bad. He came out of the pit between 10 and 11 am and reported to Mr Potts. Potts told him to get materials out of the drift and marked the place for the stoppings on a plan. He said that he would follow Fletcher down in two or three minutes when he was satisfied with the position of the stoppings. When he got down again he met men coming out of the drift and they told him that the smell had given them headaches. Two of the men went back into the workings with him and he saw that the fire had increased and there was a strong smell of smoke.

Fletcher got out of the pit about 5 p.m. and went straight to Potts and told him that it was getting serious. Potts told him that he had had an engagement otherwise he would have come down the pit and Fletcher told him that he had been expecting him to come down all afternoon. Fletcher saw his brother, Arthur about 7 p.m. and told him it had got serious and he had lifted the doors off to cut off the air and told him to send for Potts or himself in the situation got any worse.

William Bracegirdle, the hooker-on at the bottom of the pit, and was blown across the bottom of the pit when the explosion occurred. He told the court that he saw Arthur Fletcher after he had seen Potts and asked him how he got on. Fletcher said that all Potts wanted was coal and that the men had to get it out of the pit. Arthur told Bracegirdle that he had asked Potts to let him have some men out of the Banbury seam and stop the drawing of coal there. Potts had told him to take the lads in the Cockshead level to construct the required stoppings and he had told Potts that the lads were no use to him. This occurred about 2.10 p.m. When Arthur came out of the pit at 12 p.m. he said that things were getting worse in the mine.

At the inquiry, Bracegirdle said that he had not related these facts in his original statement and he had willingly suppressed the facts which he did not want to go before the jury. He was William Fletchers son-in-law and Arthur’s brother-in-law.

The Inspector stated:

I am of the opinion that he (Potts) made a grave error in ordering a stopping to be put in the main airway of the pit while the men were working in other parts. Such an act would have been wrong if there had been no gob fire and no accumulations of gas and no obstructions in the airways because it is not possible to foresee all the consequences which may be caused by such an interference with the ventilation.

Mr. Atkinson said:

This disaster is another example of how a colliery explosion is extended by coal dust and the loss of life is greatly increased in consequence. The normal condition of a dry and dusty colliery in which the roads connecting the different districts are dusty, is such that a terrible explosion is possible at any moment. However much the number of such explosions may be reduced by enforcing the use of safety lamps and restricting the use of explosives, they are likely to continue to occur so long as the mines remain in their present dusty state.

The inquiry was searching and lasted over seven days and the jury returned the following verdict:

    1. That the deaths were caused by an explosion.
    2. That the evidence did not show how the explosion was caused.
    3. That the manager was not guilty of culpable negligence in not withdrawing the men from the pit on the night of the 15th October.
    4. That we are unanimously of the opinion that the manager (Mr. Potts) is deserving of severe censure in not personally inspecting the mine previous to the explosion.

Mr. Potts was publicly censured by the coroner and later he resigned his post at the colliery.

For some months before the explosion, Mr. Potts the manager, and William Fletcher, the underlooker had not been on good terms and this difference of opinion had a serious effect on the safe working of the colliery. About a month before the disaster, Mr Potts had been thrown out of a carriage and was unable to go down the pit as often as usual. In fact he had only been down twice since his accident. He was able to go down when the gob fire was reported but he did not do so and the gob fire was not dealt with efficiently.

 

REFERENCES
The Colliery Guardian, 31st January 1890, p.177, 3rd January 1890, p. 27, 21st March, p.443, 2nd May 1890, p.674.

Information supplied by Ian Winstanley and the Coal Mining History Resource Centre.

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