HOLDITCH. Newcastle-under-Lyme, Staffordshire. 2nd. July, 1937.

The Holditch Colliery was known locally as the Brymbo Pit and was about two miles to the north-west of Newcastle-under-Lyme, Staffordshire. The mine was the property of Messrs. Holditch Mines, Limited and Mr. J.O. Davies was the manager. There was no undermanager officially appointed under the Coal Mines Act, 1911 but Mr. H.L. Adkins held the position but was called the head overman. Besides him, there were two other overmen. Since the previous 2nd May, Mr. L. Whitfield who held a First Class Certificate of Competency had been employed at the mine to supervise the mechanisation of the working of the Four Feet Seam. he had no responsibilities under the Coal Mines Act, 1911 and acted only in an advisory capacity to the manager. There were also eight firemen in the Four Feet Seam., three on the day and afternoon shift and two on the night shift. The three overmen were distributed over the three shifts. The number of men employed in the district on each of the three shifts was between 60 and 70 in average and the mine produced about 350 tons per day.

There were two shafts, No.2 sunk in 192 and No.1 sunk in 1916 both of which were about 2,000 feet deep to the stone drifts from which there were two working seams, the Great Row and the Four Feet. The Great Row Seam was not involved in the disaster. From the shafts two parallel stone drifts of “crust” had been driven, dipping to the south-west to tap the Four Feet Seam through the Apedale fault with an estimated 700 yards upthrow. The intake crut was level for 125 yards from the downcast shaft, and continued in a straight line for half a mile dipping at 1 in 11 to and through the Apedale fault. at this point it became evident that the Four Feet Seam was at a lower horizon than was estimated and the gradient was increased, at first to 1 in 4 and later to 1 in 3 until the seam was reached at 1,100 yards from the shaft. From that point the roadway continued in a direct line in the seam dipping at 1 in 22. At the date of the explosion this had progressed 200 yards from where the seam was struck. This meant that there was a straight road, 1,390 yards long from the downcast shaft bottom to the face which served as the main haulage road and for most of its length, as the intake airway. The return airway ran parallel to the main haulage road and had a similar succession of gradients. Both roads were supported throughout by steel arches 14 feet by 10 feet.

The seam was reached at the end of 1936 and a connection made between the cruts. From this connection, a longwall face, gradually increasing in width, was set away and on 2nd. July, 1937, this had been developed into a double unit conveyor face, 230 yards long. The roof was of soft blue shale, 4 inches of Black bass, 3 inches of cannel. The coal was four feet nine and half inches thick and the floor was of fireclay. The coal was undercut by compressed air machines to a depth of six feet, loaded on to the belt face conveyors and from there to a gate belt conveyor in the main haulage road. as the roof of the seam was weak, experiments had been made with various machines cutting in various positions with a view to avoid the firing of shots near the roof as far as possible. At the time of the accident, cutting was being done and inch or so off the floor.

A Sirocco fan driven by a 150 H.P. electric motor or a vertical steam engine at 300 r.p.m. at a water gauge of 4.6 inches provided the ventilation. On 25th June, 52,120 cubic feet per minute of air was circulating of which 29,000 cubic feet per minute came from the Four Feet Seam. As the airways in the Seam were in a generally straight line with few connections between them, there was little leakage from intake to return. The whole of the air current passed a place where a fire broke out and the men stated that the air was so strong that they had to wear goggles to protect themselves from flying dust and grit. In fact, the ventilation was anything but perfect. A large proportion of the intake air reached the face by the Right Hand carving, the remainder passing straight on to the face down the main haulage road and there joined the main current. fro that point at the gate end, all the air passed up the face to the Black Dip where some of it leaked through the doors and screens in the dip and back into the return, the rest passed up to the top end of the face. Here again the air divided, some going out by the Left Hand carving and some through an airway packed alongside the sold coal and rejoined the air in the carving by means of a hole through the pack. There were two headings in solid coal which were ventilated by diverting part of the intake and return air into them through 24-inch pipes. It was the intention to join these narrow roads by a road running parallel to the Main Dip which would form the start of a new conveyor face advancing North West at right angles to the existing face.

Halewood flame lamps and Davis alkaline electric lamps were used throughout the seam at the time of the disaster but later, electric cap lamps were issued to coalcutting machinemen who also had flame lamps as firedamp protectors.

On the morning of 2nd July, two coal cutter men, Herman Payne and William Beardmore, were moving a compressed air driven coal cutter down the face to start cutting three yards or so to the right of the main haulage road. The machine was fitted with sharp picks when it arrived, jibbed in and started to cut uphill. After it had cut for about two yards, there was a fall of coal onto the compressed air pipe. This was cleared in a few minutes and cutting resumed.

At about 5.45 a.m. the machine had cut past the gate end and the back of the machine was about three yards beyond the left hand gate side pack when Beardmore, who was shovelling away the cuttings, saw a flame which seemed to run around with the picks for a moment and then extend under the cut coal. The flame flashed back along the holing to where the cutting had commenced, a distance of seven or sight yards, came out of the cut and spread up the coal face towards the roof. It was described Beardmore as “like a wall of fire.”  The extent of the flame and the heat that came from it were such that the first thought of those near it was to get away as quickly as possible.

At this time there were 55 men working in or close to the coal face. Among these were two firemen and an overman. The two firemen were Jesse Moore and Ernest Astles who were quite close to the machine. Moore was just inbye on the return side of it and Astles was at the ripping in the Main Dip where he was preparing to fire a shot. Overman Trevor Hughes was at the top end of the face to the end of the left-hand Carving. The fireman, Jesse Moore, went down the face with the fouled air current, shepherding out the men who had not gone when they saw and smelled the fire but the majority of the men had already left as the overman, Hughes had already told the men to get put of the upper part of the face. Two men W. Haystead and A. Stanton were building a pack in the middle waste between the Back Dip and the Left hand Carving and they failed to come out. It was a mystery why they did not escape but is was possible that by the time they realised their danger and made their effort to escape, the smoke was so dense they lost their way and wandered into another waste and were overcome.

At about 6.15 a.m., all the men except Haystead and Stanton, along with the three officials, gathered at the bottom connecting cross cut at the entrance to the seam and made plans to put out the fire. Several men were instructed to carry bags of stone down the Main Dip to the face and the overman and the two firemen went forward to investigate. They found that the fire had taken a good hold. The timber at the face was blazing and crackling. The roof near the face of the Main Dip was threatening to fall. No one could get near the fire so the overman ordered the stone dust to be dumped as near the fire as possible which was just on the ripping lip.

When the futility of these efforts was realised another retreat was made and a roll call was taken and it was at this time, about 6.35 a.m. that it was noticed that Haystead and Stanton were missing. Efforts were made to find them and the explorers went down the Left Hand Carving and the Back Dip which was now the only means of access to the face and egress from it. There they met fumes and smoke which was so dense that they were driven back. The search was abandoned and there was little hope of finding the two men alive.

In the meantime, the day shift officials for both the Great Row Seam and the Four Feet seam, having been notified of the fireman arrived in the district. One of them, H. Bentley, a fireman in the Great Row Seam who was stranger to the Four Feet workings, was under the impressing that some of the searchers had gone into the Right Hand Carving. He asked J. Hassell, a night shift ripper to take him there. At about 6.30 a.m. whilst Bentley and Hassell were there, an explosion occurred which appeared to have been confined to the coal face and the Right Hand Carving sine no other persons were injured. Bentley came out a little singed accompanied by a collier, E. Beech, whom he had met in the Main Dip, and learned that Hassell had not come out. He went back along the roadway to searching for the missing man but failed to find him.

The effects of the explosion were evident at the bottom of the downcast shaft and were felt by Mr. Davies, the manager and Mr. Whitfield, the assistant manager who had just arrived there and were talking with the party at the bottom of the dip on the telephone at the time. Mr. Davies ordered them to withdraw and told them that he and others were on their way down the dip. While the night shift men were walking out, the effects of three further minor explosions were felt, one about seven o’clock, one a few minutes after and the last a few minutes later. At this time there was no one in the Four Feet workings except the three missing men.

Going up the Main Crut at about 7.10 a.m. the party met Mr. Davies and Mr. Whitfield near the 5’s crosscut. The two men were informed of the later explosions. After an examination of the return airway and a consultation with is officials, the manager decided that stoppings should be put in the cruts, just below the cross cut. He gave orders for materials to be brought to build the stoppings. Mr. Davies was sure that there could be no possibility of recovering the three men who were missing. He said

After my examination in the morning, my mind was made up that those three men were dead. I do see they could have possibly have been alive from the atmosphere I saw.

At 7.20 a.m. the night shift men were instructed to go home and the day shift man sent to the 5’s crosscut to receive the materials for the stopping. Davies, Whitfield, two overmen and four firemen went into the Four Feet district to make an inspection. On their way down the Main Crut they noticed a reversal in the air which was caused by a fifth small explosion.

Some of the party stayed behind to take the tubs off the rope and the rest went to inspect the Right Hand Carving. About 40 to 50 yards from the face of the roadway, firedamp in explosive quantities was found and the party withdrew. No signs had been seen of Hassell, one of the missing men although they and penetrated further inbye than the place where he was thought to have been when the explosion occurred at 6.50 a.m.

The party returned from the Right Hand Carving about 7.30 a.m. and met Mr. John Cocks, the Managing Director of the Company who had been informed of the situation when he reached the shaft bottom. With others Mr. Cocks went down the Main almost to the face. On the way they found the ventilation doors open, probably as a result of the explosion. It was decided to leave them lest the firedamp known to be in the Right Hand Carving should be driven on to the fire.

Near the face of the Main Dip it was found that the rippings had fallen. No fire could be seen and no inflammable had been detected. This could have been expected as the intake air was coming down this road. At this point the flame in the main road had been temporarily smothered, probably because of the collapse of the roof in the face and at the main road ripping and no more explosions were noticed for some time.

Mr. Cocks decided to put stoppings in the roads of the Four Feet Seam even though Mr. Davies expressed disagreement. One of the stoppings was to be put in the short length of the road in the Main Dip between the new narrow heading and the Right Hand Carving, one in the Back Dip inbye of the bottom cross cut and a third at the entrance to the Left Hand Carving. Mr. F.H. Wynne, H.M. Chief Inspector of Mines, who produced the report on the disaster, commented:

This change in the original plan of the manager was a vital matter, resulting, as it did, in the large death toll.

Mr. Cocks had summoned the Holditch Rescue Brigade, who arrived in the district at 7.45 a.m., and he ordered them, to make an inspection in the Right Hand Carving where the previous party had been stopped by firedamp. The brigade made their way right up to the ripping, which they fond had fallen, but no trace of Hassell could be found. The Rescue men were then sent to explore the Back Dip between the bottom crosscut and the coal face in the hope that some trace might be found of Haystead and Stanton. The smoke in this roadway was so dense that progress without a lifeline was impossible. A lifeline was sent for but in the meantime, Mr. Cocks ordered the brigade to explore the Back Dip above the bottom cross cut to see if Haystead and Stanton had gone that way.

About 9 a.m., two of H.M. Inspectors of Mines, Mr. H.J. Finney, Senior Inspector and Mr. J.A. Bloor, Sub-Inspector, had arrived and made contact with Mr. Davies at the pit bottom who outlined the position to them. On their way into the Main Crut, at 9.10 a.m., the sixth explosion occurred. Its effects were noticeable in the crosscut and the men there saw Mr. Bloor make an entry in his notebook.

Materials and men were arriving in the district, fitters and an electrician had gone down to disconnect pipes and cables. At 10 a.m. there were 28 men in the seam, including five members of the stand-by rescue team, the two Inspectors and Mr. Cocks. Four others were on the haulage road inbye of the 5’s crosscut. All except the stand-by rescue men and the Inspectors were engaged in work connected with the erection of the stoppings. The Holditch Rescue Brigade were all on the way up the Back Crut at this time.

A monument or two before 10.10 a.m., there was a seventh explosion followed immediately by a large one, the force of which blew people of their feet at the pit bottom and reversed the whole of the ventilation system between the shafts and the Four Feet workings. Every man in the seam was badly burned and although they were brought out alive, all of them, except one who had been shielded to some extent by a brick door frame died; twenty-seven in all. With the two who had been lost by the fumes from the fire and another who had been lost in the explosion at 6.50 a.m., thirty lives were lost.

The men who lost their lives were:

  • H.L. Adkins aged 35 years, undermanager.
  • James Alfred Bloor aged 51 years, H.M. Sub-Inspector of Mines.
  • John Cocks aged 57 years, managing director.
  • Percey Condliffe aged 35 years, collier.
  • Josiah Cooke aged 37 years, collier.
  • Albert Leslie Cooper aged 30 years, collier.
  • Albert Edward Cornes aged 26 years, haulage hand.
  • Harold John Finney aged 41 years. H.M. Senior Inspector of Mines.
  • John Harvey aged 39 years. Fireman.
  • John Hassell aged 35 years, ripper.
  • William Haystead aged 45 years, packer.
  • William Stanley Hodkinson aged 38 years, underground mechanic.
  • Frederick John Howle aged 36 years, collier.
  • Reginald Jackson aged 35 years, collier.
  • Harry Johnstone. aged 34 years, overman.
  • Ernest Jones aged 51 years, fireman.
  • Thomas Henry Jones aged 28 years, collier.
  • Abel Maiyer aged 39 years, underground mechanic.
  • Henry Mitchell aged 44 years underground mechanic.
  • William Pepper aged 39 years, fireman.
  • George Thomas Pickerill aged 30 years, ripper.
  • Charles Price aged 33 years, collier.
  • George Thomas Rushton aged 41 years, ripper.
  • Albert Warwick Seaton aged 26 years, collier.
  • Arthur R. Stanton aged 31 years, packer.
  • Frank Turner aged 22 years, underground electrician.

The members of the Hanley Rescue Brigade who lost their lives:

  • J.W. Forrester aged 40 years,
  • W. Hough aged 37 years,
  • T. Harris, aged 46 years,
  • Samuel Latham aged 28 years and
  • Job Lightfoot aged 33 years, was injured.

Those who were injured were:

  • Harry Bentley aged 47 years, fireman,
  • Harry Birchall aged 34 years, collier,
  • Percey Bloor aged 49 years, fireman,
  • John Owen Davies aged 45 years, manager,
  • George Edwards aged 29 years, collier,
  • Frederick Charles Salt aged 39 years, collier,
  • George Stanier aged 37 years, collier.

Salt was in the devastating explosion and was the only one of twenty-eight who were there to escape uninjured.

In the Official Report, Mr. Wynne made special reference to the Holditch Rescue Brigade was led by Azariah Clarke, an overman at the mine. The brigade received the call at 6.30 a.m. when two members were just finishing their shift underground. They were met at the pit top. Another member was off work, sick and was not sent for but three others were sent for. On lived some distance from the colliery and was late. They went down when he arrived at 7.30 a.m. and the sick member was sent for if he was fit. He subsequently arrived and attached himself to the stand-by brigade and was one of those who lost their lives.

Mr. Wynne went on to say:

It has been narrated how the members of the brigade explored the Right Hand Carving right up to the ripping, beyond which further progress was prevented by a fall (the sick member of the brigade joined them and completed their number after exploration) how they attempted to travel down the Dip towards the face, but were frustrated by smoke and sometime later, they started to travel up the Back Dip from the bottom crosscut. At first, they could only stumble about on a steep gradient through thick smoke but, as they progressed, the smoke grew less dense and the gradient easier. At 10.10 a.m. when the big explosion took place, the brigade had halted to take pressure gauge reading at a spot 100 yards below No.5’s cross curt. Fortunately, although they were subjected to the force of the initial blast of the explosion and subsequently the backlash of the air, they were not materially affected by either and were able to proceed on their away through 5’s crosscut to the Main Crut, where they heard the telephone bell ringing. The atmosphere here was still dusty and foul, but a few minutes later, when it had cleared and the ventilation had resumed its normal course, the captain (Azariah Clarke) answered the telephone and found the manager speaking from the pit bottom asking for information. The manager suggested that the rescue brigade should go back down the dip to explore, but this was impossible immediately, since the apparatus in use was nearing exhaustion and replenishments for it were required. The brigade, therefore, went to the pit bottom, exchanged their apparatus for that of another brigade who were standing by and travelled in again, finding, on their way, an injured fireman (Bentley), for whom they summoned a stretcher, and another fireman (Bloor), also slightly injured.

On arriving at the top of the steep portion of the Main Crut, a fire could be seen blazing at the bottom. Fortunately, the explosion had burst a nearby water pipe, so the brigade, bringing their breathing apparatus into use, were able with comparative ease to subdue the flames which came from burning loose props and a cable.

A few yards further on, the rescue brigade came upon a number of injured men and proceeded to succour them and make them as comfortable as possible, pending the arrival of further assistance and a supply of stretchers. One of the brigade was sent back to the pit bottom to report to the manager how many stretchers and bearers would be required, and the brigade therefore took a prominent part in evacuating the injured and some of the dead, among whom were included their own colleagues, who composed the stand-by rescue brigade. This took until about 4 p.m. The brigade then made a final examination of the accessible workings. Having ascertained that there were no living persons left behind, and have noted with some precision the positions of the dead, they were ordered to withdraw, as fears were expressed by those in charge on the surface that there might be further explosion any moment.

During the early evening (about 6 p.m.) doubts having arisen as to whether all living persons had been got out, the brigade set out to make a further exploration, which only served to confirm the opinion formed as a result of previous ones, viz., that no person could possibly be alive in the district it was valuable also, inasmuch as the captain (Clarke) reported that the fire was still burning and, in his opinion on a larger scale than when he left the district previously at 4 p.m. The remainder for the story goes beyond this history, but the whole is an epic worthy to rank with the best tradition of British mining, in which such stories of gallantry in the face of imminent peril are not lacking.

The inquiry into the disaster was held by Mr. F.H. Wynne, H.M. Chief Inspector of Mines in the Council Chamber of the Guildhall, Newcastle-under-Lyme, from the 14th to the 17th September. All interested parties were represented.

After an exhaustive examination, it was concluded that the original fire originated in the coal cutting machine and was due to frictional heat produced by the picks in the cut. There was no evidence of any friction between the moving parts of the machine. All the explosions were due to the presence of firedamp.

The two plans that were devised, the first by Mr. Davies and the second by Mr. Cocks; Mr. Davies’ plan was to erect stoppings in the cruts below 5’s crosscut. Here the ground was solid and there was easy means of transporting materials over a distance of no more than 500 yards from the pit bottom. The second plan involved the erection of three stoppings and the sites were in broken and unsettled ground. The materials had to be transported 1,300 yards and the number of people required to do the work was much large that with the Mr. Davies’ plan. Mr. Wynne commented that the second plan involved more danger than the first and went on to say:

It is my considered opinion that at the time the second plan was adopted, very dangerous conditions existed and were known to exist at the time which made the attempt to follow the second plan a matter if imminent peril to the lives of the necessary large number of men required to execute it.

 

 

REFERENCES
The report on the causes and circumstances attending the explosion which occurred at Holditch Colliery, North Staffordshire on 2nd July 1937 by. F.H. Wynne, C.B.E., B.Sc., H.M. Chief Inspector of Mines.
Colliery Guardian, 17th September 1937, p.523, 24th September, p.566, April, 1939, p.719.

Information supplied by Ian Winstanley and the Coal Mining History Resource Centre.

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