Hednesford Colliery Fire – Cannock Chase – 1911

HEDNESFORD. Cannock Chase, Staffordshire. 14th. December, 1911.

The colliery was the property of the Cannock Chase Colliery Company Limited and the accident occurred in the No.9 Pit, Hednesford Mine at about 12.10 p.m. There were two shafts about 48 yards apart which were 258 yards deep to the Bass Seam in which the accident took place.

The workings were ventilated by a 24-foot diameter Guibal Fan, 10 feet wide which at the time of the accident was running at 55 r.p.m. The bottom of the downcast shaft was lit with paraffin lamps and there were boys who were employed at the shaft bottom who carried ordinary “shukey” lamps. A few gallons of oil for re-filling the lamps were kept in sheet iron bottles or in cans in a small cabin in one of the main air intakes and the boys were permitted to re-fill their cans when it was required. A spout was provided but this was not regularly used and a pail was placed under the cans to catch any drops of oil but the boys usually filled their lamps by dipping them into the pail. Fag ends of lamp wicks were occasionally thrown about and the floor in the immediate vicinity of the cabin was saturated with the oil.

A heave-up doggy was employed at the shaft bottom with instructions to clean up the place daily and it was stated that this had been done at 11 a.m. on the day of the accident. When the man returned after snap time, when noticed flames which had spread along the floor and ignited the woodwork. He ran in and removed the pit bucket and attempted to stamp out the flames. He tried to overturn some tubs butt but they were too closely buffered and he was unable to do so. The alarm was raised and the manager and overman sent for. The overman reached the bottom of the shaft about 12.30 p.m. and immediately took steps to withdraw the men. There were 161 in the pit at the time. He also gave orders for the separation doors between the shafts to be opened in order to short circuit the air but unfortunately never thought of stopping the fan. By 12.30 p.m. nearly all the men had been withdrawn with the exception of four who were working in Nos. 2 and 3 stalls.

Henry Merritt, an examiner who had been shot firing in the No.1 stall when the alarm reached him, made his escape to the shaft bottom by way of the return airway. He was then asked by the overman to go into the Nos. 2 and 3 and fetch the men out. He immediately consented.

Tom Stokes, a stallman who had come out of the No. 109 stall volunteered to go with him. They went through the separation doors and up an incline, to No.2 stall, a distance of over 800 yards and told the men to come out at once. Up to this time the air in the return airway carried some smoke and the products of combustion but was breathable.

Meanwhile, the manager and undermanager had been summoned from an upper seam. The messenger told them they were wanted at once in the Bass seam but was not told the reason. The undermanager returned with the messenger to the shaft, but the manager, not knowing how serious the situation was, continued his travels around the workings. When the undermanager reached the bottom of the downcast shaft, he found that the fire, fanned by the full air current, had developed alarmingly and was creeping out bye along the roof and against the air towards the shafts. Fearing that it would reach the upcast shaft and cut off their retreat, he ordered the separation doors to be closed the effect of which was to drive the smoke through the workings.

When Merritt, Stokes and the four men who they had gone to fetch from No.2, they found large quantities of smoke was leaking through the double doors which separated the intake from the return and that the airway on the return side was badly fouled.

Some of the men were reluctant to enter it but Merritt told them it was the only way out and led the way, closely followed by a miner named Payne who held on to Merritt’s waistcoat. Bradbury followed, but the others appeared to have remained where they were and died from the smoke and poisonous fumes from the fire.

On reaching a point where the air was comparatively clear, Merritt sent Payne outbye and returned through the double doors and shouted to find out if the others were following. Bradbury had reached a pint where he had succumbed to the smoke so Merritt got no reply and, finding that it was impossible to proceed along the return, he went towards the upcast shaft and met some other men who had come from sections of the workings which had been less affected. He sent these men to the surface and then, retaining the cage at the bottom of the upcast shaft he went to the doors accompanied by some other men but when he opened the doors, the smoke was so dense that they could not go forward. He went up the shaft and arrived at the surface in a very exhausted state.

Meanwhile a donkey pump on the surface had been connected to a pump which was led down the shaft and the fire was gradually driven back and extinguished. It was three days later that Bradbury’s body could be brought to the surface and six days before the bodies of the other men could be recovered.

Very valuable work was done by the local Fire Brigade and a rescue team from North Staffordshire led by Professor Cadman wearing breathing apparatus was at the scene but their efforts were useful only on combating the fire.

Those who lost their lives were:

• William Reeves aged 48 years, stallman.
• Thomas Stokes aged 41 years, stallman.
• Jacob Ward aged 49 years, holer.
• William Baugh aged 28 years, loader.
• William E. Bradbury aged 19 years, loader.

The actual cause of ignition was not determined but it was thought that it had been caused by a smouldering lamp wick or snufter from the lamp of one of the lads employed at the pit bottom having fallen on the saturated floor. the cabin had been built with considerable care with brick walls and irons plates on which to stand the oil cans but the inspector thought that it was inadvisable to position it where it was. Mr. Hugh Johnstone also commented:

I am also of the opinion that if the fan had been stopped and the separation doors opened immediately the alarm had been raised, the fire would not have assumed the proportions that it did it could have been dealt with before it reached either of the shafts and that the men in the pit could have been brought out without loss of life.

REFERENCES
Colliery Guardian, 5th January 1911, p.38.

Information supplied by Ian Winstanley and the Coal Mining History Resource Centre.