Timsbury Colliery Explosion – Bath – 1895

TIMSBURY. Bath, Somerset. 6th. February, 1895.

The colliery was owned by Samborne, Smith and Company and was about 7 miles to the south-west of Bath. On the south and east it joined the Camerton Colliery where, in November 1893, there was an explosion which resulted in the loss of two lives and on the south-west it is next to the old Heyswood Colliery which had been abandoned for about 30 years. The colliery was made up of the workings of the Lower Conygre Colliery which was started about 50 years before this disaster and the Upper Conygre Colliery which had worked for about 70 years. They had both been worked as separate mines but had been joined underground and now traded as a partnership between the present owners.

There were four shafts, two at the Lower Conygre, a downcast and an upcast each 197 fathoms deep and 6 feet 6 inches in diameter and two at the Upper Conygre Colliery, again an upcast and a downcast 179 fathoms deep and 5 feet 6 inches in diameter. The two sets of shaft were separated by 1,127 yards. There was a single cage in each shaft in which coal was wound and there was one winding engine for each pair of pits.

The underground road that connected the two pits was known as the “through road”, one part of which was driven from the third coal hole at Lower Conygre, 166 fathoms from the surface and was 6 feet 6 inches in diameter and the other part driven from the Lower Slyving Vein Coal Hole at Upper Conygre, 171 fathoms from the surface. Allowing for the 20 fathoms difference of level between the shafts at the surface, there was a difference of 15 fathoms between these two parts of this road which were connected by “Peter’s Gug”, a self-acting incline about 125 yards in length driven in the Slyving Vein from the 70 fathom fault rising at 1 in 4. At the top of Peter’s Gug there was another fault broke up the steep seam from a part that was almost flat towards the upper pits.

The seams that were worked at the colliery were the same as were worked at the Camerton and formerly worked at Heyswood colliery. They belonged to the Radstock or Upper Series of the Somerset coalfield and were the Great Vein, 26 inches thick, the Little Top Coal, 20 inches thick, the Middle Vein, 15 inches thick which was not worked at the time, the Slyving Vein, 20 inches thick and the Bottom Little Slyving Vein, 14 inches thick. The coal was bituminous, moderately hard and was used for gas coal and manufacturing purposes.

The coal was worked on the longwall system, with gobs built on each side of the roadways and the waste stored as required or not. The old workings had not been completely filled. With the exception of the self-acting inclines or “gugs” there was no mechanical haulage done underground and eight ponies were employed on the main roads.

The ventilation was by a furnace and the quantity of air circulating through the mine had been considerably increased in the two years before the disaster. The current from the lower Conygre south workings came from a split from the downcast shaft and these workings had no bearing on the explosion. The air from the Lower Conygre travelled along the through road to Upper Conygre and as diverted by double doors at the top of Peter’s Gug, through the tunnel to ventilate the Top Little Vein and the overlying Great Vein workings. It returned by way of Wyatt’s Gug into the through road behind the double doors and continued its way to the Upper Conygre upcast shaft. The workings in the Great Vein and Slyving Vein, east of the Upper Conygre pits were ventilated from the Upper Conygre downcast shaft which was taken out at the 134 fathom level and travelled eastward on the road on to doors at the top of Ozam’s incline. It then branched off to the workings in the Great Vein, returned down Ozam’s incline behind the doors and outwards along the road on Top Little Vein to the bottom of the Branch incline, down Gullick’s Gug to the through road and so to the upcast shaft. The other split passed through a regulator and ventilated the workings on the Slyving Vein and returned along the north branch to the Upper Conygre upcast shaft. Some of the air taken off at the 134 fathom level travelled down the North Dukeway on the Great Vein turned east and south and met the North Branch just beyond where the effects of the explosion died out and where the current split. From this point a part went to the Great Vein workings and another returned along the North Branch to ventilate the Top Little Vein workings on its way to the Upper Conygre upcast shaft.

The owners met every two weeks and took an active interest in the running of the mine which was probably an economic interest. They received reports from and gave directions to Mr. F.R. Foot, the agent and certificated manager of the mine. He went underground every day. There were three bailiffs who were holders of undermanagers certificates who were in the mine throughout the day and three examiners who went down the pit at 8 p.m. carrying out and overseeing the necessary repairs and within two and a half hours of the commencement of the morning shift, making the examination of the working places in accordance with the Special and General Rules.

About 180 men and boys were employed underground at the colliery, 170 in one shift from 5 a.m. to 1 p.m., and three examiners with from three to ten men from 8 a.m. to 5 a.m. doing various repairers and other necessary work such as leading water, looking after the horses and examining places.

Safety lamps were completely unknown in the colliery and since they had started workmen and examiners used naked lights. Firedamp and other gasses were completely unknown in this coalfield and it had not been detected in roof cavities for the 70 years that the colliery had worked. The Inspector commented:

Up to the time of the explosion I had been given to understand on all side (including evidence given to the Camerton Explosion inquest in November 1893) that firedamp was entirely unknown and unrecorded, even by rumour, as having been met within any of the several seams forming the Radstock or Upper Series of the Somersetshire coalfield, which is that worked at this colliery. Upon such representations in 1888 when Special Rules were being prepared for the collieries in this coalfield, the Secretary of State acceded to the desire of the owners and their representatives that there should be no rules of any kind referring to or hinting at the works firedamp or safety lamp embodied in the code for Special Rules for the collieries working this or even the “Farrington” or Second Series, lying about 100 fathoms below.

The coal was moderately hard and led to coal dust deposits in the roadways when it was transported to the shafts. Parts of the mine were dry but it had not occurred to Mr. Martin that the mine could be “dry and dusty” as the roads had been watered when he had made previous visits to the mine on other matters. The undermanager, John Treasure and the bailiff, Sidney Lewis stated that on the day before the accident they had passed along the road between the 70 fathom fault and the Lower Conygre pits and noted its condition particularly at the point where they instructed Carter to fire a shot in the roof. They considered it damp, free from dust and suitable for blasting. The Inspector commented:

I do not agree, and judging by the later condition of the road when I saw it about 15 hours later, I feel satisfied, that there was and must have been dust on the sides and roof of the road at least in if not on the floor and that he had formed and erroneous, although probably bona fides, opinion on its condition.

Powder was the explosive that was used in the mine in the headings for ripping the top and blowing up the floor. Mr. Samuel Raine of Midsomer Norton supplied the powder which was made by the Elterwater Company. The shots were fired by squibs, motes or straws and fuze and all qualified colliers were recognised a competent persons to fire shots and there had been there explosions in Somerset collieries that were associated with the dust from the explosions.

It was noticed that there was something wrong in the mine by the engineman and the bailiff at the Upper Conygre pits about between 8.45 and 9 p.m. They were in the candle house not far from the top of the pit when they heard a noise down the pits as well as a rattle in the winding engine gear. They then noticed smoke coming up the shaft and contacted John Treasure, the undermanger who told Sydney Lewis, the Lower Conygre bailiff, and then returned to the pit. They found that the winding engine, which worked on the second motion was disabled as some of the teeth on the cogwheel had broken as the cage had been blown part of the way up the shaft, fallen back and had jerked the engine and broken the teeth. The undermanager and others went to the Lower Conygre shaft and went down the pit to the through road level. At the mouthing they found the examiner, Flowers and his friend, Fear, who informed him that an explosion had taken place. They went along the through road passed the damaged ventilation doors and found some roof falls. They reached the point where Carter had been instructed to fire the shot in the roof and they found that this had been done. Further on at the bottom of Peter’s Gug at the 70 fathom fault they found the body of James Carter in a manhole severely burned. The manager had arrived with assistance and further explorations indicated heavy falls and indications of great force up the incline in the workings. The bodies of Bridge, Durham, Gage and Harding were found in the workings of the Top Vein and some hours later those of Kieling and Sperring were found near the Upper Conygre pit as were the four horses that were in the stables.

The men who lost their lives were:

• John Cage aged 38 years, examiner,
• John Kieling aged 55 years, examiner,
• Joseph Bridges aged 51 years, miner and repairer,
• James E. Durham aged 29 years miner and repairer,
• George Harding aged 19 years miner and repairer,
• George Sperring aged 73 years. miner and repairer.

The inquiry into the deaths of the men was held before Dr. Craddock, the Coroner for the northern division of Somerset and was held at Timsbury. The owners and Government were represented and Mr. Whitheouse represented Somerset Miners Association and Messrs. Aspinall and Harvey the National Miners Federation.

Despite the Colliery Rules not calling for safety lamps and the complete absence of firedamp in the mine, three miners gave evidence to the inquiry that they ad seen firedamp ignited in these seams. Frederick Bull, a miner aged 48 years, told the court of occasions twenty years before when he had seen firedamp ignite at his own candle in the Camerton Colliery. he said that after a shot had been fired in the Great Vein which was the same seam that was worked at Timsbury, he placed his candle near a crack at the back of a lump of coal when a light ran up the roof for two or three yards. There were three others working at the place at the time but no one was hurt. Another man, Frank Heal, denied that he saw a flame in the incident. The Inspector was sceptical that this had been an ignition of firedamp.

There was further evidence of firedamp in the Radstock series from about 50 years before the disaster when a collier, John Manderville who stated his aged at 55 years, and had worked all his working life in the Timsbury and surrounding collieries, He started work in 1853 at the then abandoned Heyswood colliery as a filler for Job Cox who told him that he had lighted “foul air”. a lad named Knight was there at the time and their shirts and hair were singed by the flash.

George Brice the undermanager of the Kilmersdon Colliery stated his aged a 65 years and he had started work at the Heyswood Colliery when he was 12 years old and he recollected seeing firedamp ignited in the first year he was working at that colliery. He said:

The lads used to light it at a hole in the roof which was drilled three or four inches deep, for a plug from which was suspended a surveyor’s line for driving the road in its proper course.

The plug had fallen out and the gas came from the hole. He said that he knew that it had been ignited on a Saturday and was still burning on Monday morning. The Inspector dismissed these reminiscences by saying that “one swallow does not make a summer” but as well will see firedamp did not play a great part in this disaster.

It was found the shot had been overcharged and the Inspector had no doubt that the explosion was caused by this shot igniting dust and the verdict of the jury was that:

That James Carter and six other men were killed on the night of February 6th last by an explosion caused by a shot fired by James Carter, but the nature if the explosion we are unable to explain. We wish to add that we consider the management free from blame.

There was a recommendation that Roberite or some other so-called flameless explosive be used in the further instead of blasting powder.

REFERENCES
The Mines Inspectors Report.
The Report to the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for the Home Department of the circumstances attending the explosion which occurred at the Timsbury Colliery on the 6th February 1895 by Joseph S. Martin, Esq., Her Majesty’s Inspector of Mines and J. Roskill, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.
The Colliery Guardian, 8th February 1895, p.265, 1st March 1895, p.412, 19th July, p.118.

Information supplied by Ian Winstanley and the Coal Mining History Resource Centre.