Norton Hill Colliery Explosion – Midsomer Norton – 1908

NORTON HILL. Midsomer Norton, Somerset. 9th. April, 1908.

The colliery was in the Parish of Midsomer Norton near to and on the Radstock side of the Somerset and Dorset Railway Station. About 40 to 50 years before, it had been worked by a pair of small shafts, 4 feet in diameter which was the practice in Somersetshire at that time. Work appeared to have stopped and until 1897 it remained waterlogged. In that year, Messrs F.B. and J.B. Beauchamp, trading as the Norton Hill Colliery Company, gained possession of the mine and surrounding mineral rights, started to pump out the pit through the existing shafts and in June, 1899 had succeeded up to the 385 yards landing which corresponded to the 391 yard level or landing in the new shaft, the sinking of which was commenced in 1902 close to and on the south side of the Railway, about 368 yards from the old shafts.

The new shaft was 13 feet in diameter and sunk to a depth of 500 yards. The upper landing, at which the explosion occurred, was at 391 yards and the bottom landing at 490 yards from the surface, allowing for the 10 yards depth of the sump. It was sunk through 74 yards of New Red Sandstone to the coal measures where the Frittington or 2nd or Middle Series of the Somersetshire coalfield was struck.

The shaft and stone drifts from it struck, The Great Vein, 17 inches of stony coal about 334 yards from the surface, The Top vein, 12 inches of clean coal at 350 yards, The Middle Vein, 26 inches of clean coal at 385 yards, The Slyving Vein at 405 yards. This Vein consisted of 6 inches of top coal 3 to 6 inches of Benching and 27 to 30 inches of clean coal. Below this there was The Bottom Little Vein with 14 inches of clean coal with a bad roof at 141 yards and The New Vein at 430 yards. This was made up of 6 inches of top coal, 9 to 12 inches of Benching and 18 to 10 inches of bottom coal. Below The New Vein there are five seams or beds of unworkable coal which are the seams of the Upper or Radstock Series. It was thought that these were the seams that were worked at the original colliery.

The 391 and 490 yard levels were connected only through the New  Shafts, and a road in the new Vein district. At the time of the accident, the seams had not been extensively opened out.

The ventilation of the colliery was provided by a furnace at the bottom of the old shaft and was carried in two splits with a total of about 15,000 cubic feet per minute of air in total. About 7,000 cubic feet went to the bottom and 8,000 cubic feet to the landing.

Mr. Martin the Inspector, commented:

In view of the increasing area of the workings, it may, however, be well to provide in good time for a large number of splits, in order to avoid causing the air currents to have too heavy a drag or friction, and being unable to give the working fresh air towards the ends of the splits. This is a fault which exists in several non-fiery collieries at the present time and had not been unknown in Somersetshire collieries, where, although the current may appear to be satisfactory the quality is not so, as the air is used up in the great length of the workings and roadways it has to pass through.

There were about 380 men and boys employed at the colliery of whom 30 were underground at the time of the explosion, working on the night shift in different parts of the colliery. The manager of the Colliery was also the manager of the Farrington Colliery which belonged to the same owners and was about two and a half miles away. There was also an undermanager and six examiners, three on the day shift and three on the night shift. Those were authorised to fire shots, whether examiners or not, were appointed and authorised in writing. Mr. F.B. Beauchamp as the managing owner took an active part in the working of the colliery and was well aquatinted with all that went on.

Some of the main haulage roads were dry and dusty with a considerable amount of dust on the floor. The incline in et Middle Vein, at the north side of the shaft, which was the intake to the Middle Vein and the Slyving Vein workings, was, in parts, deep with dust. The Slyving Vein Incline, in which the shot was fired was the return for the air from the workings and had a lot of dust on the floor, especially near where the fatal shot was fired. The incline in the New Incline was also dry and dusty and attention had been called to both at different periods. It was not the practice at the colliery to water shots before they were fired on roadways. Mr. Martin went on to say:

It is a fact that a number of managers of the Somersetshire collieries, if not all, have considered the dust of these mines explosive, and have taken as their basis, Mr. Hall’s Report of the 20th August, 1893. p.15, to the Royal Commission on coal-dust in mines, that he failed to get an explosion with the samples which he had received from Somerset, and they consequently considered the necessity for watering outside the considerations of practical mining in the Somersetshire coalfield.

It seems strange that they should never have accepted the Camerton and Timsbury explosions as clear and definite proof on the subject, and it indicates how tenacious the human mind is of early imbued principles, especially where trouble an expense attend the acceptance and carrying out of so called “new-fangled ideas”.

Naked lights were used in the colliery since the start of its development. Even the examiners used them when making examinations before the commencement of the shifts. This was allowed by the 4th General Rule and no accumulations of firedamp had ever been found in the air before or after the explosion and the manager and officials never suspected that there was gas present. It was stated at the inquest that one of the dead men, Burge, had found gas which caused his candle flame to flare up at the bottom of the workings where they were sinking down after encountering a fault when he put his candle down near bubbles that were coming from water. He did not the others because he thought that they would laugh at him and the management never heard of the incident one of the men appointed in Burge’s place stated in evidence that he once heard the noise of a shot in the Slyving Vein which he believed was the result of a small explosion of gas.

Explosives were used at the colliery with Compressed powder for the coal and soft ground and gelignite for harder ground and a permitted explosion, “Dragonite”, for the roadways. The explosives were stored in a magazine about 100 yards from the new shaft but, for the convenience of the shotlighters, about 15 to 20 lbs of compressed powder, 15lbs of gelignite and 10lbs of permitted explosives were kept in the candle house at the top of the pit from which the shotlighters took as much as they wanted for work underground, in wooden boxes. There was no record kept of what each shotlighter had taken down the pit and it was not known whether Burge had Dragonite with him or not. He fired the fatal shot and at the inquiry, it was thought that he had used gelignite.

On the night of 9th April, there was a shot hole drilled in the roof of the Slyving Vein, about 140 yards from the bottom of the 391 yard level, at a point where the loaded trams rubbed against the roof. The men who were engaged boring this hole stated that it was about 13 inches deep, rising into the roof. Charles Burge, who was killed in the blast, was the examiner and approved shotfirer. He went down the shaft at 7 a.m. to examine the working and fire the shots. He fired the shots in the Slyving Vein near the faces and came down the incline past this shot on his way to the surface to meet the night shift men before they descended. He did not fire this shot and there was no indication why he did not do so.

He saw the undermanager, Attwood, on the pit bank and had a conversation with him about the shothole, the depth of which he did not know. Attwood asked William Gould, the day examiner, who was at the pit bank at the time but he also did not know. Attwood stated in evidence, that he thought Burge did not think that the hole was deep enough and so did not fire it. Evidence was also brought forward which alleged that he had told a witness on Sunday night after the explosion, that he had told Burge to fire the shot. Attwood strenuously denied this.

It was admitted that as was the custom at the colliery, Burge would have been justified in firing the shot, if he thought it was safe to do so. Mr. Martin commented:

Whatever did actually pass, Burge left Attwood and went down the pit straight to the hole and fired it, and thus brought about the explosion and the men’s deaths.

Those who died were:

• Charles Burge aged 32 years, examiner and shot-firer.
• John James Ashman aged 34 years, collier.
• Andrew Brooks aged 27 years, collier.
• William Doughty aged 20 years, collier.
• Ernest Jones aged 23 years, carting boy.
• Frank Jones aged 41 years, collier.
• Stanley Jones aged 16 years, carting boy.
• George Maggs aged 20 years, incline man.
• Henry Sage aged 14 years, examiner and shotfirer’s boy.
• Gilbert Winsley aged 25 years, incline man.

Some of the bodies which were brought out of the mine before 3 p.m. and on the following day, 10th April, showed the effects of severe burning, others badly bruised by the force of the blast and others as if death had been due to carbon monoxide poisoning by the fumes contained in the afterdamp. There were also five horses killed in or near the stables within about 30 to 40 yards from the bottom of the Slyving Vein Incline.

The inquest into the deaths was opened by Dr. Craddock, Coroner for the northern division of Somerset on Thursday 10th April when evidence of identification was taken. The inquest reopened at the Town Hall, Midsomer Norton on the 24th April and was continued on the 30th April and the 8th, and 21st, 23rd, 26th, and 30th May and the 3rd and 4th June. All interested parties were represented and Mr. R.A.S. Redmayne Chief Inspector of Mines attended along with Messrs. Martin, Robinson and Geenland-Davies, Inspectors of Mines.

The inquiry was protracted as to the cause of the explosion as the explosion was attributed to gas and not to dust by the representatives of the owners.

The jury returned the verdict:

That Winsley Burge and others, ten in all, met their deaths in an explosion of coal dust caused by a shot fired by C. Burge in the Slyving Vein Incline, Norton Hill Colliery, but whether Burge did it on his own initiative or by the orders of Mr. Attwood (undermanager), we are unable to decide on account of conflicting evidence.

The Report on the disaster by Joseph Martin was presented to the Right Honourable The Secretary of State for the Home Department in September, 1908. Dr, Cook tested the dust from the mine and expressed the opinion that it was non-explosive which meant that the explosion was one of gas. Gas had been known to come from the watering the mine. Mr. Martin thought that it was an explosion of dust and concluded his report:

The effect of this experience will, I believe, be, not only to satisfy managers and others connected with the Somersetshire collieries that they are not immune from the dangers of coal dust, but also further impress the necessity of watering upon those who, having previously realised the danger, have shirked the trouble and expense of carrying it out. I have no doubt that had there been a small percentage of gas in the air the damage and force of the explosion would have been greater and probably extended further into the new vein.

REFERENCES
Mines Inspectors Report.
Report to the Right Honourable Secretary of State for the Home Department on the circumstances attending an explosion which occurred in the Slyving Vein Incline at Norton Hill, Colliery, on the 9th April 1908 by Joseph S. Martin, I.S.O., one of His Majesty’s Inspectors of Mines.
Colliery Guardian, 1st May 1908, p.847, 22nd May, p.990, 29th May, p.1025, 5th June, p.1071, 12th June, p.1123.

Information supplied by Ian Winstanley and the Coal Mining History Resource Centre.