WEETSLADE COLLIERY. Northumberland, 1st. October, 1951.
The manager of the colliery was Mr. Alexander Walton with Mr. William Milne as the undermanager. The seams that were worked at the colliery in descending order were the Five Quarter, High Main, Yard, Bensham and Low Main. The first three had not been worked for many years. Until a week before the explosion, when the output was reduced, the mine had been producing an average daily output of 700 tons, 450 tons from the Low Main Seam and 250 tons from the Bensham Seam. The colliery employed 408 persons underground and 183 on the surface. The explosion occurred in the Bensham Seam and claimed the lives of five men.
At the time of the disaster, the colliery was one of three which formed the “C” group of the No.1 Area of the Northern (N&C) Division of the National Coal Board. The Area Manager was Mr. A.R. Lawson, the Area production Manager, Mr. J.M. Pumphrey, the Group Agent, Mr. A. Lewin, the manager Mr. A. Walton and the undermanager Mr. W. White. There were six overmen and 32 deputies for supervision underground.
There was no history of an explosion at the colliery but inflammable gas had been considered a hazard and safety lamps had always been used. Those in general use were the Oldham-Wheat Electric Cap Lamps. Patterson A.1 Flame Safety Lamps and Patterson G.T.L.9 Relighter safety Lamps were used by workmen and officials respectively.
The Bensham Seam had a general dip of 1 in 22 to the south-east and consisted of 3 feet of top coal and 2 feet of bottom coal separated by a stone band which varied from 5 inches to 3 feet 6 inches in thickness throughout the mine. The roof was of blue shale and the floor a thick seggar. The coal was worked by bord and pillar system in which places are worked by an arcwaller 14 feet wide to leave pillars 86 feet square and so gave a 30 percent extraction. In 1944 the conditions were considered suitable for complete mechanisation and caterpillar mounted Universal arcwall coal cutting machines, Joy loaders, shuttle cars and trunk belt conveyor system were introduced. All the equipment was driven by electricity.
With mechanisation, the working places were more concentrated and more intensively worked. About six places formed the Deputy’s District of “Flat” which was the local term. The cycle of operations in each place was that an arcwall machine cut out the stone band, which was then loaded it by the Joy loader on to the shuttle cars and dumped in an old stenton where it was loosely stowed, the straight girder and prop supports in the latter being systematically withdrawn. The coal was then blasted out and loaded by Joy loader onto the shuttle cars, from which it was discharged onto the conveyor belt system and so transported to the permanent loading station, known as the Hopper, which was at the inbye end of the South endless rope system, about 1,700 yards from the shaft.
The arcwall machines and the Joy loaders, being portable, were supplied with power through flexible cables from a power supply. The shuttle cars, of 7 tons 16 cwts tare and 4 tons carrying capacity were vehicles with pneumatic tyres supplied with power from two lead-acid storage batteries coupled in series and carried, one on either side of the car, in fixed steel containers with wood-lined loose-fitting steel lids. Each battery weighed a ton and comprised 24 two-volt cells giving 96 volts to the motors. They had a capacity of 385 ampere-hours with a 6-hour period of discharge. Duplicate sets of batteries, which were charged at the end of the working shift, were provided for each shuttle car, so that while one set was in use, the other was being charged at a conveniently placed charging station appointed by the manager, in accordance with the Special Regulations which were in force with regard to the use of shuttle cars at the mine.
From 1944, the Bensham Seam workings advanced slowly to the south as succeeding easterly offshoots were worked and then abandoned until the 3rd East District was gained. Here, further progress to the south was halted because of the deterioration of the seam in that direction and the 3rd East then became the main winning. Progress was held up for a year after it had advanced about 840 yards from the 3rd. East junction while the rise side of flooded workings in the Yard Seam, 50 feet above which was proved by boreholes from a rise drift and so the water pressure head was found. This did not, and could not drain the water from the main portion of the old workings, which lay to the dip side of the point of contact.
Following this, work was resumed in the Bensham Seam and just before the disaster, two working districts known as the 3rd East and 3rd North Flats respectively and had a common ventilation system, were in production. The 3rd East had three working places and extended for a distance of six pillars east of the terminus of the 3rd East Conveyor. The 3rd North Flat had five places in production and had advanced for eight pillars to the north of the conveyor road. An attempt to develop the places to the north of the conveyor road had to be abandoned, because the gradients proved too steep, and were above the maximum on which shuttle cars could legally be operated. The coal from the 3rd East Flat was discharged from the shuttle cars on to the end of the conveyor and that from the 3rd. North Flat side-loaded at the junction of the 3rd North road with the conveyor.
On the opposite side of this point, there was a battery charging station which was used by both Flats. This was constructed of brick sided walls on which rested “H” section girders which supported the roof. At the entrance to the charging station from the conveyor road, there were two motor generators and beyond the, through a steel ventilation regulator, two charging racks, one on either side. To charge the batteries, shuttle cars had to enter and leave the charging station at the bottom end which connected with the district return airway. The shuttle cars from the 3rd. North Flat reached the return airway by crossing the conveyor road at the next stenton inbye of the end of the conveyor.
As has been said, the stentons were loosely stored and were unlikely to be airtight unless finished off by stoppings. the workings in the shaft area had been ventilated by one main intake airway, which was also the haulage road and by one main return airway. When development first started in the Bensham Seam, it was realised that the capacity of the surface fan would have to be increased and a booster fan capable of delivering 61,800 cubic feet per minute at a water gauge of 4.2 inches was installed in the main return airway, 700 yards from the shaft and just outbye of the junction of the Bensham and Low Main Seams main return airways. This fan was in operation at the time of the disaster and approximately half the quantity of air was passing was drawn from the Bensham seam.
As development proceeded beyond the faults, the system was changed to dual intakes and one return which was to the west of and parallel to the intakes. The second intake was halted to the south when work stopped there and so the 3rd East District was ventilated by a single intake.
The electrical supply to the 3rd. East Flat was by a double armoured cable to a bank of four gate end switches controlling, the auxiliary fans, a coal cutting machine, a Joy loader and a small pump. Similarly the supply to the 3rd. North Flat was carried by a double wire armoured cable to the 3rd. North Road to a bank of five gate end switches two pillars to the right of the seventh level. These switches controlled two auxiliary fans, two Joy loaders and a coal cutting machine. A drilling panel was supplied by a double wire armoured cable from the busbars of these switches. The only other electrical apparatus in the district were four shuttle cars.
In December 1950, water appeared in a place to the south of the 3rd. East Flat. A small pump was installed but later withdrawn when all the workings south of the return were abandoned. There was no doubt that the water had come from the waterlogged Yard Seam above, through the fault planes. Within four months the water-filled the abandoned south workings and, when it approached the return airway, an 80 gallons per minute pump was installed but this was not large enough to deal with the water ad a similar pump had to be brought in. The water was kept in check until August 1951, when it began to rise again and a 350 gallons per minute turbine pump was installed. By bad luck, the suction end was laid in sludge and it had to be dismantled and re-sited, but before this could be completed, in early September the water level reached the return airway where it had a disastrous effect on the fireclay floor, which heaved, breaking props and letting down the girder supports. The resulting falls were small but reduced the flow of air in the return airway and the ventilation to the first working places was restricted. The falls also prevented the shuttle cars from getting to the charging station and production was brought to a standstill in the 3rd East Flat. The men employed there were placed on repair work which now became urgent.
The 3rd. North Flat was kept in production and the shuttle cars serving this district were brought to the bottom of the 3rd. North road where the batteries were charged by a makeshift and illegal arrangement which used cables laid from the charging station across the conveyor road.
On Tuesday, 25th September, a large fall occurred in the return airway between Nos. 29 and 30 stentons which completely blocked the road and cut off the second means of egress. The number of men working in the 3rd. North Flat was reduced to eight to comply with section 36 (3) of the Coal Mines Act, 1911, and the remainder were sent to work to clear the fall. On the back shift of that same day, the manager inspected the district and decided on the spot, that further restriction of the quantity of ventilation made it necessary to short circuit all available air directly through the turbine pumphouse so that the pump could be kept running. He did this by opening the door and screen which was just inbye of the charging station.
This action achieved its desired objective but the ventilation to the two flats was stopped and there was no doubt that firedamp began to accumulate. There was an examination on the instructions of the manager by the overman and a deputy, T. Whitney, who was killed in the disaster. They checked the switches on the shuttle car parked at the top of the No.3 North were open and stopped all the auxiliary fans and isolated all cables and apparatus fed from either of the two banks of gate-end switches but the cables could not be isolated. This examination followed immediately after the short-circuiting of the ventilation and it came as no surprise that gas was detected.
The following day a deputy inspected the workings and found inflammable gas. He fenced then off at points three pillars up the 3rd. North road and in the stentons to the left of the conveyor road inbye of the charging station. The next day, the accumulation was found to have extended down the 3rd. North road and a fence was erected from the second pillar up. No further extension of the accumulation occurred and from this time to the shift in which the explosion occurred, both Flats remained gassed out, with no person passing beyond the fences during this period. A passage was made over the fall on Friday 28th. September and the circulation of air increased but the quantity was not known as it was not measured.
The workweek finished with the Friday night shift and during the weekend, the pump was kept running under the supervision of deputies who worked six-hour shifts, the last of which ended at midnight on Sunday, 30th September at which time Whitney arrived at the mine, to make a pre-shift inspection to admit his men who were due about an hour later. He was a regular deputy on the district and was aware of the problems. Before he went down he was told by the fore-overman, Thomas Short, that his shift would be of five men until further notice and they were to be employed in pumping and repair work in the district. He was instructed to report by telephone to Short at 3 a.m. Down the pit, Whitney admitted a pumpman and three other workmen, The fifth and, Vincent Love, was left in charge of the conveyor delivery point at the 3rd East Junction.
Whitney telephoned the overman at 3 a.m. and reported that everything was in order. Short instructed Whitney to send out a coalcutter trailing cable which was urgently required for the new face, which was due to start production that day. Shortly after 4 a.m. Whitney arrived at the 3rd East Junction with the cable which was to be transported on the conveyor. Vincent Love helped him to coil it up on the conveyor. Whitney then returned inbye. Just a few minutes before, Love had received a telephone call from Charlton, one of the men subsequently killed, as to the whereabouts of Whitney. From that time onwards no one spoke to or saw any of the five men alive.
At 6.45 a.m. Vincent Love felt a temporary reversal of the ventilation which raised some dust at the 3rd. East intake. He did not understand what had happened and wisely went to the new longwall face and reported the incident to the overman, Short, and told him that he thought there had been a fall inbye. Short went about halfway down the 3rd. East intake to investigate but did not find anything unusual. He went back and went along the return airway as far as the compressor stenton, into the intake and back to the 3rd. East Junction and saw nothing untoward. Satisfied in his own mind that there was no cause for alarm, he went outbye to the Hopper to arrange the work for the oncoming shift.
At 8 a.m. George Williams, a shotfirer on the new longwall face spoke to Love at the 3rd. East Junction and commented on the peculiar smell in the air when he reached the face. Love told him what had happened and that Whitney and the four men had not appeared. Williams spoke to Short on the telephone and was told to investigate. Accompanied by a workman, he travelled the intake to the overcast, three stentons back from the charging station which he found severely damaged and beyond that, he saw a heavy fall. They went back to the compressor stenton and entered the return airway and went inbye for 170 yards when they were driven back by foul air.
They were joined at the Compressor stenton by Short who came with some deputies from the incoming shift. They tried to explore the return airway but were driven back by the foul atmosphere. They confirmed that the overcast was wrecked and Short telephoned the surface that apparently the five men in the district had been overcome behind a large fall which blocked the intake airway.
When the manager learned of this, he descended the mine with the undermanager and travelled inbye by the intake. When they reached the booster fan they went into the return to see what conditions were like and realised by the state of the air that something more serious that a fall had taken place. The manager sent a message to the surface to call the Rescue Service and the went along the intake to the damaged air crossing where they found that repair work had already started to try to restore the ventilation inbye. These repairs were almost complete when the Rescue Brigade arrived at 11.12 a.m. and it was only then that the true nature of the disaster was revealed to those on the surface.
The first rescue team soon discovered that water in the return airway, outbye of the charging station had risen to within two feet of the roof as the pump had been out of action for several hours. Progress on the intake side was prevented by a large fall but this was bypassed by means of the charging station and the return airway to the pumphouse where the body of the pump attendant was found.
The four men who were missing had been carrying out repairs, either to the conveyor road or the return airway and to reach them, falls would have to be cleared and the ventilation restored. Before any such work could start, it was discovered that the water was rising at such a rate that the return would be blocked and all energies were directed to installing a pump in the main intake at the charging station. Before suitable pumps could be transported into the district, which took some hours, the water reached the roof of the return roadway and cut off all ventilation which made the site of the pump untenable.
A new site was selected, two stentons further outbye and by superhuman effort by all concerned, the pump was installed but it could do little but hold the water at the level it had reached. A larger pump was required and this could not be installed until 9 days after the explosion. On 9th October, it was started and lowered the water to one foot below the roof of the return and air started to flow again into the explosion area. The rescue brigades had established that the air in the explosion was unbreathable and all hope of finding the missing men alive was abandoned. By the 11th October, the ventilation was restored and rescue teams were sent in. They discovered that the entrances to the charging station had collapsed and falling girders had broken open batteries whose acid had spilt. They also found that the charging batteries on the other side were undamaged and that the terminals were dangerously close to steel girders. Air samples were taken and found to containing firedamp so, confronted with an alarming situation, in which 70 or so men were facing imminent danger, it was decided to withdraw all from the mine until the situation could be properly assessed.
It was decided that the only permanent safeguard was to allow the water to rise. This would dilute the acid and hopefully, discharge the undamaged batteries. It was estimated that 10 days would be required for this and an extra two days were allowed as a safety margin. Plans were made to re-enter the district on the 23rd October. On that date, the sandbag stoppings were breached and through ventilation was established as far as the compressor stenton. The first stage of the recovery operations was now finished and the Rescue Service withdrew.
In the second stage of the recovery work, the roadways were repaired and experiments were conducted to found out who immersion in water would affect the shuttle cars. The bodies were recovered between the 19th and the 29th November and the pump, fans shuttle car and bank of gate end switches in the 3rd North Flat inspected. On 18th April 1953 operations were brought to an end and they were the most protracted and expensive operations ever undertaken to recover the bodies of the victims and gather evidence as to the cause of the disaster.
Those who lost their lives were:
- Thomas Whitney aged 56 years, deputy,
- Thomas Patterson aged 54 years, timberman,
- Matthew Charlton aged 30 years, loader operator,
- John Fisher aged 33 years, driller,
- John Davison aged 58 years, pumpman.
There was a full and exhaustive inquiry into the disaster and it was found that no electrical equipment could be faulted. There was no contraband found in the clothing of the victims and there was no evidence of spontaneous combustion. An open verdict was returned on those who lost their lives.
At the end of the Report, Mr. W. Brown, said:
I welcome the opportunity if recording in some detail my sincere appreciation of the assistance so willingly and ably given by the Weetslade miners who courageously and tenaciously performed miracles of work in some of the most trying conditions, even for a pit their representatives who displayed great consideration and forbearance especially during moments of stress and strain from those directing the operations the Rescue Brigades, comprising 199 teams of Permanent Corpsmen and colliery trained men from Northumberland and Durham, who gave full cover underground during the emergency, frequently being the spearhead of the operations, during which 7,678 lbs of liquid air were used in 50 sets of self-contained breathing apparatus.
REFERENCES
The report of the causes and the circumstances attending the explosion which occurred at the Weetslade Colliery, Northumberland on the 1st October 1951 by W. Brown, H.M. Divisional Inspector of Mines.
Colliery Guardian, 15th December 1955, p.746, 22nd December, p.782.
Information supplied by Ian Winstanley and the Coal Mining History Resource Centre.
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