RISCA. Black Vein Pit. Risca, Monmouthshire. 15th. July, 1880.

The New Risca Colliery was on the eastern side of the entrance to the Sirhowy Valley about one mile to the west of the outcrop of the South Wales Coalfield and about 1,260 yards to the north-west and in the same seam as the Risca Colliery in which an explosion occurred in 1846 which led to the deaths of thirty-five, another in 1853 causing 10 deaths and another in 1860 causing one hundred and forty-two deaths.

The existing colliery began work in June 1878 and was separated from the old colliery by an extensive barrier of unworked coal. The shafts were 298 yards deep and passed through the Rock Vein, which was 4 feet thick, at 113 yards, other seams and the Black vein, nine and a half feet thick at 287 yards and the Brass Vein, two feet thick, at 298 yards. The only seam which was worked at the colliery was the Black vein and was the seam in which the Abercarne explosion occurred in 1878. A section of the Black Vein showed 3 feet of coal, a small smooth parting, three feet six inches of coal, an inch of rubbish, two feet six inches of coal, three inches of rubbish and six inches of coal. The strata dipped to the north of the shafts for about 100 yards then flattened at the working faces. The same seam was traversed in many places by transverse slanting and splits or cleavages. The coal was a hard steam coal, extremely fiery and very dry and dusty and contained streaks of soft coal that were even more fiery.

The Black Vein was 298 yards from the surface but the principal workings were driven under the mountain which gave an additional height of  800 to 900 feet so that the depth of the workings from the surface was from 5 to 600 yards. The roof was fro the most part, shale but in some places, the shale was replaced by sandstone and it was near to one of these places that the explosion was thought to have originated, but only six feet of coal was got leaving three feet of coal as the roof in most parts of the mine and the other parts as the floor. The mine was subject to a lot of creep of the floor sides and roof. In the main intake, the No.1 North Dip, the floor had risen so much, that continual excavations to maintain the height had raised the floor level clear above the top of the vein in which it was originally excavated.

The Risca Colliery had two shafts, a downcast, 293 yards deep and an upcast 287 yards deep both seventeen and a half feet in diameter. From the foot of the downcast shaft, two straight main roads, No.1 North Dip, which was the main intake and No.1 Return had been driven 80 yards to the north. From the No.1 North Dip a branch passed off to the right or East side to the “old Long Wall” district and another further on, on the same side to “Hill’s and Wrentmore’s” District. Further on towards the ends of these main roads, there was a third district, Crook’s, Brake’s and Dix’s.

On the left or west side, another branch crossed the return and was called No.2 level which formed a fourth district comprising several sub-districts, Sage’s and Bright’s, Harvey’s and Lewis’, Paget’s and Penrhiwbicca. On the south-west side of the shaft two other new roads had been driven for 700 yards, the West Intake and the West Side Return. There were no working faces on these at the time of the disaster and had little bearing on the explosion.

The four principal districts of the mine, Hill’s and Wrentmore’s on the east, the North Dip, the Old Long Wall on the east and the No.2 Level on the west were not entirely separate districts with the division made between them was by movable doors.

The colliery had been worked by double stall, two roads being driven 14 yards apart and the whole of the coal taken away between the and the space filled up with rubbish and small coal and pillars of coal, six yards wide left between the roadways separating one stall from the next. About 18 months before the explosion, longwall working had been adopted with the roads eight yards apart and the whole of the coal, except that for the roof and floor, extracted between the roads and the space between them filled.

The long walls were worked away from the shaft and the consulting engineer, Mr. Foster Brown, considered that the system of driving advance headings to the boundary and working longwall towards the shaft was not applicable to the colliery. His view was supported by Mr. Wilkinson of Powell Duffryn and Mr. Green of Newport Abercarne. These men were all of the opinion that the great pressure on the roof would make it almost impossible to keep the necessary roads open. Mr. Joseph Dickinson pointed out that longwall system was worked under similar conditions in the north-west of England and suggested that some of the dangers might be minimised by these longitudinal transverse walls to support the roof and gob.

There were 650 persons employed in the mine. The mine was worked on three shifts of eight hours each, two being work shifts and the third a repairing shift. There had been some objections of working two working shifts in a day and carrying on the faces too fast which did not allow the gas to drain away. About four men and two boys were employed to every 20 yards of the face. These men did their own stowing and timbering of the face. They undercut the coal and brought it down by wedges. The output of the colliery was about 600 tons per day. The workplaces were examined regularly by the firemen and overmen and from the evidence given at the inquest, the mine was worked by Clanny lamps and the firemen had Davy lamps.

Blasting was prohibited except in the main intakes, No.1 North Dip and No.2 Level. The shots were permitted only at night by the firemen or deputy overmen and it was restricted to the parts of the mine where the roof was rock. No shot had been fired on the night of the explosion.

Discipline and the ventilation in the mine were good and there had never been an accumulation of gas in the pit. The workings were regularly inspected. The agent, Mr. Llewellyn, inspected the workings on the first three days of each week and the Manager. Mr. Evans, was in the mine every day. Three overman, one for each district, attended each working shift and two attended the night repairing shift.

Ventilation was from a Guibal fan 40 feet in diameter and 12 feet wide. It was driven by a steam engine that had a 36-inch cylinder and a 36-inch stroke. There was also a spare engine of the same type. Both worked at a pressure of 40lbs. per square inch. There was a total of 132,830 cubic feet of air per minute and 46,110 cubic feet went to Hill’s and Wrentmore’s district and the North Dip, 33,600 cubic feet to the Old Long Wall district and 27,300 to the No.2 North Level. The stables and the new main roads on the south-west took about 37,700 cubic feet.

Timbering was very important due to the exceptional conditions in the mine and there had been complaints that there was an insufficient supply of timber in some parts of the mine but there had been no such complaints recently and there were few deaths from falls of roof after the explosion which stood as a testament to the work of the colliers.

The roads that were to be filled up to the top for about six yards from the end and to about 15 to 18 yards of the top, this being left open to allow some ventilation to get to the end until they were filled up. The filling consisted of the rubbish from the partings in the coal, the slack or small coal and the shale or rock got from the driving the headings, cutting the roofs, floors or walls of the main roads. It was never necessary to stow rubbish above ground. There was no evidence that the method of stowing the gob had anything to do with the subsequent explosion.

The explosion occurred about 1.30 a.m. on the morning of the 15th July. At the time the only men that were in the pit were a repairing shift consisting of one overman and 117 men and boys. The shift had descended between 10 and 10.30 p.m. on the 14th and had been at work for about three hours. The explosion affected all working parts of the mine.

G. Drew, the fan man was working at the moment of the disaster and the engine and fan was working perfectly up to that time. He was greasing the engine with tallow when he saw a bright flash and at the same time heard the sound of the explosion. The covering of the fan was blown off and the fan stopped. The book that recorded the state of the fan was buried with debris and was not recovered for some hours. Two men, H. Harris and Watkin Watkins came from the bottom of the shaft a few minutes before the explosion and stated that the ventilation was normal, a third man, Coles came up ten minutes before and gave the same account.

The blast went through all of the open workings and apparently killed every man in the pit on the spot. The ventilating fan was damaged in the explosion. The covering doors of the upcast shaft acted as a safety valve and gave way; otherwise, the damage to the fan might have been greater. The men who came to the surface prior to the disaster said it was all right at the pit eye and others who had come from the workings two to four hours before the disaster said that they had seen no gas.

From Friday, numerous gangs had been used in the exploration and by Saturday they had cleared away to the foot of the upcast shaft. Near this point, there were three roads one to the east-west and north. The air was first established on the west side.

On the Saturday after the disaster, Mr. Joseph Dickinson, the Chief Inspector of Mines and Mr. Wales, the Inspector for the district arrived at the colliery. They descended and inspected the “great fall” at the bottom of the shaft. The condition of the dead horses below ground was offensive and it was decided that the bodies of the remaining horses should be got out of the pit as soon as possible. By Saturday night and Sunday morning, twenty-one horses had been brought out of the pit which made thirty-four animals had been killed in the disaster.

No human bodies were brought up and the repairs continued and the ventilation pushed forward 700 yards from the downcast shaft. Saturday and Sunday was spent with efforts made to clear the falls in the No.2 District. The work was arduous as the falls were very great but there was no gas encountered and the explorers reached a point beyond Brights’ heading to Sage’s Deep and Monday was sent clearing away a fall in that place.

Bodies were recovered from the No.1 and No.2 Districts and two more bodies were found on Monday night. The further the teams went into the mine more evidence of the violence of the explosion began to emerge. Early on Tuesday, they found a horse with its legs blown off.

Mr. Dickinson, Mr. Cadman, Donald Bain and Mr. Foster descended the pit with Mr. Llewellyn, the manager, went down at 9 a.m. and stayed until 4.30 p.m. Owing to the falls in Sage’s Level, it was found impossible to get air into the main roadway to the upcast shaft and it was necessary to make a “spout hole”, ten yards long, through the old workings in order to take the air into the main airway.

By Wednesday eighty out of the one hundred and ten bodies were unrecovered but by Thursday another nine were brought out bringing the total recovered to forty-four but the work was still impeded by the damage.

Those who died were:

  • Uriah Edwards aged 37 years, overman,
  • Thomas Lewis aged 42 years, fireman,
  • Henry Brookman aged 44 years, fireman,
  • Thomas Bowden aged 36 years, hitcher.

The colliers:

  • Thomas Cheddy aged 30 years
  • S. Powell aged 76 years
  • Thomas Wooley aged 29 years
  • Llewellyn Lewis aged 17 years
  • Dan Lewis aged 47 years
  • David Brake aged 29 years
  • James Powell aged 18 years
  • Thomas Summerhill aged 24 years
  • George Poole aged 45 years.
  • Lewis Price aged 15 years.

The hauliers:

  • Henry Harvey aged 51 years, master haulier.
  • Thomas Lent aged 36 years, master haulier.
  • Henry Baker aged 24 year.
  • John Milsome aged 20 years.
  • M. Francis aged 26 years.
  • T. Theophilas aged 40 years.
  • William Lester aged 19 years.
  • M. Yemm aged 20 years.
  • Henry Marsh aged 18 years.
  • S. Williams aged 25 years.
  • Thomas Wallace aged 17 years.
  • J. Daley aged 18 years.
  • James Jones aged 20 years.
  • Edward Wilcox aged 30 years.
  • Thomas Thomas aged 18 years.
  • Thomas Price aged 32 years.
  • J. Woodford aged 18 years.
  • Thomas Breeze agd 23 years.
  • Henry Adams aged 43 years.
  • D. Moor aged 19 years.
  • T. Morgan aged 17 years.
  • F. Baker aged 17 years.
  • Thomas Jones aged 25 years.
  • Thomas Rogers aged 21 years.
  • A. Baker aged 24 years, roadman,
  • Evan Hayes aged 27 years, roadman,
  • James Haycock aged 25 years dukey rider.

The timbermen:

  • J. Leyshon aged 50 years.
  • M. Emery aged 29 years.
  • J. Harler aged 32 years.
  • Rees Leyshon aged 23 years.
  • J. Morgan aged 28 years.
  • J. Everett aged 59 years.
  • Thomas Dix aged 25 years.
  • William West aged 40 years.
  • C. Rendell aged 27 years.
  • T. Griffiths aged 38 years.
  • Thomas Wallace aged 50 years.
  • S. Dix aged 50 years.
  • P. Jones aged 26 years.
  • S. Gulliver aged 45 years.
  • J. Wynn aged 30 years.
  • L. Williams aged 32 years.
  • T. Waters aged 32 years.

The top rippers:

  • William Hayes aged 54 years,
  • J. Potter aged 29 years,
  • C. English aged 45 years,
  • William Cordey aged 48 years.

The bottom cutters:

  • Robert Lugg aged 40 years,
  • George Evans aged 55 years,
  • S. Tucker aged 35 years,
  • George Yemm aged 38 years,
  • William Morgan aged 31 years,
  • C.L. Edmunds aged 50 years,
  • D. Scarall aged 43 years,
  • William Benney aged 40 years,
  • S. Bash aged 64 years,
  • D. James aged 39 years,
  • J. Hiatt aged 54 years,
  • M. Crook aged 30 years,
  • William Mills aged 50 years.

The doorboys:

  • William Stafford aged 13 years,
  • J. Howells aged 16 years,
  • W.J. Dovey aged 13 years,
  • W. Vaughan aged 13 years,
  • C. Poole aged 13 years and
  • A. Shaw aged 13 years.
  • C. Ford aged 16 years, timekeeper,
  • J. Bragg aged 57 years, lampman,
  • J. Harvey aged 13 years, pump-boy.

The ostlers:

  • J. Fry aged 27 years,
  • William Caires aged 60 years,
  • W. Hughes aged 43 years.

The masons:

  • Thomas Jones aged 72 years,
  • J. Jones aged 34 years,
  • H. Toze aged 29 years.

The labourers:

  • Jerry Hurley aged 22 years.
  • W. Sheen aged 43 years.
  • W. Charles aged 45 years.
  • W. Bush aged 25 years.
  • W. Ashman aged 24 years.
  • F. Bald aged 38 years.
  • J. Johnson aged 26 years.
  • G. Vaughan aged 55 years.
  • Rosse George aged 35 years.
  • Thomas Dale aged 46 years.
  • J. Hemmi aged 40 years.
  • Edward Edwards aged 50 years.
  • George Smith aged 24 years.
  • S. Harris aged 38 years.
  • L. Harris aged 36 years.
  • William Davies aged 34 years.
  • Edward Jay aged 44 years.
  • C. Meade aged 38 years.
  • D. Lewis aged 31 years.
  • William Palmer aged 50 years.
  • J. Jones aged 27 years.
  • T. Edwards aged 24 years.
  • J. Sage aged 42 years.
  • T. Thomas aged 36 years.
  • J. Davies aged 18 years.

On Saturday the inquest was opened at the Tredegar Arms in North Risca by the Coroner Mr E.B. Edwards. It had previously been decided to hold the inquest on the body of T. Bowden, a hitcher, who was the first to be discovered at the bottom of the shaft. After viewing the body the Coroner adjourned the proceedings until 17th August.

At the time of the inquest, the top old workings of the Old Longwall could not be reached because of gas but the gas had been removed when the ventilation was restored.

On the 1st October, an inspection was made by Messrs. Dickenson and Cadman who were accompanied by Mr. Wilkinson the new general manager who had been appointed because Mr. Llewllyn had left for a more lucrative position aboard to which he had been appointed before the explosion.

In one place in the east level, they found coked coal dust about half an inch thick was left on the props and coal trams and there was much more here than in any other part of the mine. The flames had come up the face and into the east return airway.

Mr. Dickenson did not think it mattered that the explosion was in Hills or the Old Longwall because if it was in the former then there must have been gas in the latter or a very large quantity of gas was sucked out which was a dangerous state of things. It was impossible to say where the blast originated as the doors were blown in all directions.

It has been decided not to resume work in any of the Old Longwall places and the proprietors were made to fill up the east return. A cutting was made form near the top of the west main heading into Haye’s level which when connected will be the return airway.

The falls in the No.1 dip north had not been cleared and on the 1st. October the ventilation fan was looked at. The building for the outlet air was about 48 feet high and 133 feet in area and was about 50 yards from the downcast shaft so that although the shafts are situated on the same side of a deep valley, in bad atmospheric conditions it might prevent the dispersion of the ventilated air and it there was a possibility that it could be drawn into the downcast shaft.

After his inspection, the Inspector concluded that the explosion was due to an outburst of gas but there was no evidence to prove this. The jury at the inquest thought that the mine was well managed. The blast was very violent and even the stoutest timber was blown down. It passed from the north side to the south side. On the north side, the bodies were little burnt but the cause of death had been a shock. Some had limbs blown off and the clothes of many were ripped off. According to the medical evidence the burning would not have caused their deaths. Traces of burning were left on the coal and the props in the working faces and there was coked coal dust in the Old Long Wall about half an inch thick.

There were several theories as to the cause of the explosion:

  1. A sudden outburst of gas at the top of Wrentmoore’s landing. This theory was supported by the direction taken by the blast.
  2. The gas that may have been in the old workings above the main level close to the downcast shaft where crushed arches were being replaced by baulks of timber and open lights were used.
  3. That it was lightning that went down the shaft. If this was so then there would have been burning on all four faces and this was not the case.
  4. The ventilation was temporally deranged by a door being left open or on the interruption of the fan. Mr. Dickenson thought this was the most likely. He thought that there were fast places in the pit and the ventilation good which would admit only a brief flame. He thought that the ventilation had been interrupted by some means.

Another possibility was that the fan could have been adversely affected by the thunderstorm at the time of the explosion. On the 1st October, the weather was fine but there was a little water standing underneath the fan and the air coming from the mine was saturated with moisture. Spray was being blown through a crevice between the shaft bottom and the fan but the crevice was not large enough to admit the passage of a large quantity of water at one time. It was considered possible that water from the thunderstorm could have accumulated in the fan and impeded the ventilation.

It was also found that dust was accumulating in the roadways and that the ventilation had not yet been returned to the original. At the inquest, it emerged that the colliers were in favour of stall working on the grounds that it gave more protection from falls.

A lamp with a pick hole in it had been found near the body of a collier named Matthews and it was speculated that this had caused the explosion. The number of the lamp was 408 and that corresponded with it being issued to Matthews. The lamp was handed to the Police and the evidence was produced at the inquiry.

The questions as to where the gas came from and how it fired were considered. Mr. Dickinson thought there was a general accumulation of gas and other expert witnesses thought that there could have been a sudden blower or outburst resulting from a sudden fall of the roof or from the floor and the general conclusions of the witnesses thought that the latter was the most likely cause.

As to how the gas ignited the naked light at the bottom of the shaft was discounted as was blasting and the presence of pipes or matches in the mine. No keys were found on any of the bodies.

After hearing all the evidence, the Coroner summed up:

Gentlemen of the jury, In now congratulate you on coming to an and of this long inquiry. You have paid very great attention to it, for which I am obliged. The greater part of the inquiry, and particularly the latter part, has been more for the Secretary of State than for you because there is nothing in the management of the colliery that you can take any notice of unless you can prove direct neglect and certain neglect which cause this explosion. You might have three things to inquire into: first of all, the cause of death of this poor man and if possible how this explosion took place and whether there is neglect. As for as the neglect goes, gentlemen, on the evidence here given today, I really cannot point out one single instance of it. It seems to me that the pit has been managed exceedingly well, and everything done that possibly could be done to secure the safety of the mine. Therefore, I tell you now that I could not point out one single neglect that you could recognise in your verdict.

As to the explosion, how it took place is still a mystery you will never hear it. You have heard these gentlemen examined today, buy it is really and truly a matter of opinion of their only. The mouths of those who could have told you how this explosion took place are sealed forever and therefore you will never come to a conclusion except for the opinion which you have from these learned gentlemen on the subject.

Now with regard to the third, the cause of death, there is no doubt at all, gentlemen, what the cause of death was. The cause of death was in consequence of this explosion in this colliery and, therefore, there is not a single doubt upon that. It seems to me that the only possible verdict that you can give would be that this poor man died from an explosion in the Risca Colliery. You may, if you please, use the word accidental but it will be a matter amongst yourselves. I do not know that you require any more assistance, gentlemen, therefore will you consider your verdict.

The jury retired and returned the following verdict:

That Thomas Bawden was killed by an explosion at the Risca Colliery what caused the explosion we have no evidence to prove but the jurymen are all of the opinion that the colliery was well managed.

 

REFERENCES
Mines Inspectors Report, 1880. Mr. Cadman.
Minutes of Evidence taken at the Coroner’s Inquest and Report by R.S. Wright.
The Colliery Guardian, 16th July, p. 104, 23rd July, p.141, 27th August, p.347.
”And they worked us to death” Vol.1. Ben Fieldhouse and Jackie Dunn. Gwent Family History Society.

Information supplied by Ian Winstanley and the Coal Mining History Resource Centre.

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