MILFRAEN. Blaenavon, Monmouthshire. 10th. July, 1929.

The Milfraen shaft was owned by the Blaenavon Company, Limited and was three miles north-west of the Blaenavon on Monmouthshire. The shaft was sunk to the Old Coal Seam nearest its outcrop in the north eastern extremity of the coalfield. It was 242 yards deep and the upcast for the workings that were developed in the Black Vein Seam which was the only seam that was in production at the time of the disaster. It was also the upcast for workings about a mile away that were reached by Kay’s Slope, which formed the intake for both sets of workings. The Black Vein Seam at the colliery lay at a depth of about 182 yards and was reached by means of cross measure drifts from the Old Coal Seam which lay approximately 60 yards below. The colliery mined bituminous coal

The supervision at the colliery was carried out by Mr. J.H. Jones, the General Manager of the Company, Mr. F. Kemp Cartwright, the agent, Mr. M.W. Lewison, the certificated manager and Mr. H. Daniel, the overman. There were also three firemen. The Company owned steelworks that had been idle for some years and Mr. Jones took no part in the active management of the collieries. Mr. Kemp Cartwright paid periodic visits to the underground workings and his last visit to the Black Vein workings prior to the explosion was on the 5th July. The Kay’s Slope and the Milfraen Pit constituted one mine under the Coal Mines Act, 1911 and were managed by Mr. Lewison. The Garn Slope was part of the mine and worked the Black Vein Seam. Mr. Daniel’s duties were confined to the supervision of the morning shift in the workings of the Milfraen Pit and the three firemen that were employed were responsible for one of the there shifts that were worked.

The total number of people employed in the pit was 1,189 of which 113 were employed at the surface. Of this number, only 176 were at the Milfraen Pit and of these, 35 worked at the surface. The group of mines produced 10,150 tons of coal per week of which 1,150 were raised at the Milfraen Pit on two daily drawing shifts. The third shift was a repairing and coal cutting shift. the day shift worked from 7 a.m. to 3 p.m., the afternoon shift from 3.30 p.m. to 11.30 p.m. and the night shift from 11.130 p.m. to 7.30 a.m. The inspection that was required under Section 64 (1) of the Coal Mines Act, 1911 had to be made within two hours of the commencement of any shift and it was made and reported on by the fireman of the preceding shift. The station required by the Act, was f150 yards from the bottom of the pit, inbye of a cross measure drift leading from the Old Coal Seam to the Black Vein. The districts that were assigned to the firemen were such that he would have ample time to examine them. No officials, other than the firemen, were appointed for the afternoon and night shifts.

The ventilation of the workings was produced by a Schiele, double inlet fan, placed near the top of the Milfraen Pit and this was capable of producing 75,000 cubic feet of air per minute at a water gauge of 3 inches. At the time of the disaster the fan was running at 120 r.p.m. and was producing 56,000 cubic feet at a water gauge of 1 inch. There were means to reverse the air current as was required by the Act. The upcast pit headframe at the Milfraen Pit was enclosed by a wooden casing in which sliding doors were operated by the movement of the cages in their ascent and descent of the pit.

The electricity produced at the colliery was supplied to a substation at the pit bank where 11,000 volts A was transformed down to 3,000 volts A and was again stepped down by an underground substation to 500 volts by two 100 K.V.A. transformers. The power for these were used to drive a pump, haulage gears, coal cutting machines and face conveyors in the mine.

The workings from Kay’s Slope were lit by naked lights but from the point in the return from these workings, open lights were prohibited, The workings of the Milfraen Pit were worked by locked safety flame lamps of the Davis (Derby) type and Oldham electric lamps. All the lamps in use in the Black Vein workings at the time of the explosion were accounted for and submitted for testing by Captain Platt, Superintendent Testing Officer at the Mines Department Testing Station and his report dismissed any possibility of the lamps contributing to the explosion.

The main and subsidiary haulages were operated through gears driven by electric motors. There were two haulages at the pit and the movement of trams on the haulage roads were controlled by a system of bare wire electric signals with bells of an approved type. Each circuit was powered by six, quart-sized Leclanch Ž cells but neither the bells nor the signal wires were under suspicion of causing the explosion.

There was no shot firing in the Black Vein since the conditions did not render it necessary to fire shots. The roadways were generally damp and stone dusting was not necessary to dilute the comparatively small quantities of combustible material that was produced. The searching for matches and smoking materials was carried out in the mine in a haphazard and negligent manner and no regular system, or a system approved by the Inspector was in operation at the colliery.

The Black Vein was first opened at the Milfraen Pit in 1926 and was worked on a longwall system and later a mixture of longwall and stall workings and it was when stalls were being used that the explosion occurred. The seam was five feet ten inches thick with a roof of Horn Coal and a floor of rock. On the 10th. July, two conveyors were in operation which were known as “B” and “C” and there were 17 stall roads. The conveyor’s face was 80 yards long and it was operated by a jigging conveyor driven by an electric motor which dumped the coal into trams at the face of the man dip district. On the East side of the main dip, there were a series of ten stall roads and the “B” conveyor was outbye of this. The “B” conveyor face was 60 yards long and operated by an electric jigger conveyor which dumped the coal into trams on the “B” level. Between the “B” conveyor face and the return airway, there were five stalls and a range of workings places known as “Mapstones”. The haulage of the coal from these places was by a haulage gear situated on the main dip of the district which hauled the journeys on to a parting close by another haulage gear further outbye which took them to the shaft siding.

According to the ventilation records of the air current measured on 11th. June 1929, near the mouth of Kay’s Slope, was 13,579 cubic feet per minute. After passing round two districts in Kay’s Slope and through a series of inclined air shafts to the Winch Heading, the air current entered the Milfraen workings by roadways known as the Siskol Heading and the Buller Road which was constricted. There were three airlocks between the intake and the return and that between the Winch Heading and the return consisted of one door which was in a poor condition and two brattice sheets. The second was made of two doors and one brattice sheet and the third on the road known and the Crosscut was of one door, again in a poor condition. The result of these poor doors was that while the quantity of air entering the Winch Heading amounted to 12,896 cubic feet, the actual amount entering the workings was calculated to be 7,683 cubic feet per minute.

The night shift fireman, Jehu Morgan stated that he had to crawl through the Buller Road on his hands and knees on his second inspection before the explosion occurred. He also stated that he did not like to go over the fall because there were several ragged slabs and not enough room for him to get through safely, even though the ventilation was passing over the fall. The fireman on the day shift before the explosion, Edward Hobbs said it was not safe to pass over he fall on his inspection. There was also a fall on the “B” conveyor face. Jehu Morgan stated that it was eight or nine yards long with a space of about nine inches at the top on the morning of the 10th of July.

When Morgan made his full inspection before going off shift, he reported that everything was in good order for the following shift. The fall in the “B” conveyor face was so large that the management had decided to leave it and head out in the coal in front of it. To do this the Hopkinson Coal Cutter and men were permitted by the firemen to work on beyond its allotted time and continued to do so until the time of the explosion when the current was shut off. The Coal Mines Act required that:

An adequate amount of ventilation shall constantly be produced in every mine to dilute and render harmless inflammable and noxious gas to such an extent that all roads, levels, shafts, stables ad workings of the mine shall be in a fit state for working and passing.

The Black Vein Seam was known to be a fiery seam and gas had been found twice before in that year when the overman, Daniels, had had to withdraw men from the “B” face. The explosion occurred at 8.30 a.m. on Wednesday, 10th July. The two morning officials, Daniels, the overman and Mathews the firemen, were in the workings at the time and immediately told the manager, Mr. Lewison who was at Kay’s Slope, he was quickly on the scene and was soon joined by Mr. Kemp Cartwright, the agent.

Arrangements were made to get help and the Rescue Station at Crumlin was alerted. Before the Teams, under Superintendent, Mr. Wimbourne, arrived at the colliery, 51 of the 64 men employed in the pit, had come out themselves and it was realised that the only section affected by the disaster was Mapstone’s where 13 men were known to be working.

On the nine who lost their lives, four, Howells and Edmunds were at the coal cutter and Holder and Ricketts were at the face of Mapstone’s level. These men were killed outright. Parry, E. Williams, Barrel and A. Williams were found dead or dying some little distance out from their working places. Southcott made his own way out but died eight days later as a result of his injuries.

Due to the stagnant and foul air, the bodies were brought by rescue men wearing breathing apparatus and the last body was brought to the pit bank at 5 p.m.

Those who died were:

  • Evan Howells aged 40 years, coal cutting machine man,
  • Clifford Edmunds aged 20 years, collier’s assistant,
  • Ernest Holder aged 57 years, collier,
  • David Ricketts aged 35 years, collier,
  • David John Parry aged 37 years, collier,
  • Evan James Williams aged 20 years, collier’s assistant,
  • Albert James Williams aged 21 years, collier’s assistant,
  • Ernest Southcott aged 20 years, collier’s assistant.

The inquiry into the causes and circumstances of the explosion was conducted by J. Macleod Carey, H.M. Divisional Inspector of Mines and was conducted concurrently with the inquest into the men’s deaths by arrangement with Mr. W.R. Dauncey, H.M. Coroner for the Abergavenny District of Monmouthshire at the Co-operative Hall, Blaenavon on the 19th August and was completed on the 22nd.

The conditions in the district after the explosion were similar to those before with no signs of any great violence or material damage except at the entrance to Mapstone’s Level where at ram was stripped over and its sides blown inwards. The doors and the brattice sheets had suffered no damage and appeared to function as they had before the disaster. There was a difference as far as the falls were concerned. A fall had occurred between Powell’s and Gunter’s stall roads. Which, if it had happened prior to the explosion as was suggested by the manager, might have made a considerable difference to the ventilation current; Powell stated that there was no fall before the explosion. The rest of the airways suffered no damage.

The inquiry came to the conclusion that the point of origin of the explosion was near the cavity containing firedamp on the “B” conveyor face and that the surrounding atmosphere contained firedamp. The movement of the air carried the explosive mixture towards the workings of Mapstone’s and past the electrical coal cutting machine. It could have been ignited by sparks from the machine or from a spark produced by a pick striking a rail and the state of the machine when examined after the event was regarded as the most likely source of the ignition.

The inquiry found that there had been a breach of the Coal Mines Act, 1911 and the General Regulations.

The Coroner summed up and submitted the following questions to the jury:

1) Was the explosion of gas or coal dust or both?

2) Where did the gas come from or accumulate?

3) By what means was ignition produced?

4) Was the explosion purely accidental?

5a) Was the explosion a result of the negligent acts or acts, omission or omissions of anyone?

b) What was or where were the acts of omission or omissions which conduced to the explosion?

c) Who is responsible?

6) Do you wish to make any recommendations? If so specify them.

The jury answered the first four questions as follows:

1) The explosion was one of gas.

2) The gas was given off and accumulated at the fall at the top of the “B” conveyor.

3) The ignition of the gas was caused by a defective Hopkinson Coal Cutting machine.

4). The accumulation of gas was caused by the inadequate ventilation resulting from the falls of the roof on “B” and “C” conveyor faces.

The jury answered question 5 by extending question 4:

That the inadequacy of the ventilation was known or should have been known to the responsible officials That the accumulation of gas should have been ascertained by the fireman Jehu Morgan when he made his examination at or about 6.40 a.m. on the morning of the explosion.

That on the morning in question the conditions in the said Mapstone section were such as they have rendered it unsafe for the men to be admitted to the working places therein.

That the condition of the said Hopkinson Coal Cutter machine was such the “opening spark” within the meaning of the General Regulations as to the installation and use of electricity in the mine could not take place.

That No.123 (ii) and (v) of such General Regulations observance of which would, or might, have prevented the explosion was not complied with.

The jury returned that the men met their deaths by misadventure and not otherwise and made the following recommendations to the Coroner:

There should be a better system of packing the gobs.

There should be an oil lamp in every working place.

The coal cutter should be examined more often

There should be better searching of the men before they went to their working places.

Those men who behaved heroically at the rescue attempt were O. Barson, timekeeper, Jesse Davies, mechanic, Herbert Daniel, fireman and D. Simmons, fitter.

 

REFERENCES
The report on the causes and circumstances attending the explosion which occurred at the Milfraen Colliery, Blaenavon, on the 10th July 1929, by S.J. MacLeod Carey, H.M. Divisional, Inspector of Mines.
”And they worked us to death” Vol.1. Ben Fieldhouse and Jackie Dunn. Gwent Family History Society.

Information supplied by Ian Winstanley and the Coal Mining History Resource Centre.

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