WHITWICK. Coalville, Leicestershire. 19th. April, 1898.
Whitwick Colliery was the property of the Whitwick Colliery Company who had worked the mine for a long time. The colliery consisted of a number of shafts which worked two seams of coal, the Lower Main at 309 yards and the Upper Main at 249 years. The fire which caused the deaths of 35 men and boys occurred in the Upper Main Seam.
The Upper Main coal was drawn at the No.5 shaft which was 8 feet in diameter, 249 yards deep and was the downcast for the ventilation of this seam only. The shafts were sunk about 50 years before the disaster and a large area of coal had been worked. The day shift employed 140 underground and the night shift consisted of 30 to 40 men, some of whom were repairing the roadways and others were at work in the coal stalls. The seam was about 5 feet thick with a good roof. The coal was worked on the longwall system, with roadways that were packed through the goaf. The inclination of the strata was variable but in general, the roads were only slightly inclined.
The ventilation of the pit was produced by a Guibal fan, 30 feet in diameter and 10 feet wide which ran at 48 r.p.m. The air current in the Upper Main Seam was about 10,000 cubic feet per minute, and the air current passing along the intake of the district in which the fire occurred was measured as 9,600 cubic feet per minute a few days before the fire broke out. The min was worked with open lights as firedamp was unknown.
For many years, the Colliery Company had retained the services of Mr. George Lewis, a consulting mining engineer, who visited the Colliery about three or four times a month and who was the appointed agent. The certificated manager was Mr. Thomas Young Hay who lived close to the colliery and who supervised the workings of the two coal seams. There were an undermanager and a staff of deputies for each seam.
At about 2.30 a.m. on the morning of 19th April, the official in charge of the night shift, working in the South District, was travelling down No.88 bank into the main road when he found smoke passing along the intake and main roadway. Fearing that something was wrong, he sent a boy to tell all the workmen to make their way out along the return airway and he went to find the cause of the smoke. He went down the main intake which was also the haulage road and found that the smoke’s intensity was increasing as he approached the bottom of the No.47 bank. He got far enough to see that the timbers o the main road about halfway between No. 47 and the box-hole road were on fire near the roof. he had to go back and, by passing through the separation doors on No.47, he made his way into the return airway and reached the box-hole road with great difficulty.
When he got through the intake and the main road he was in the fresh air and on the outbye side of the fire. He saw two workmen some distance away, nearer the shaft and ordered them to go for the undermanager while he went towards the workings along the main intake. He had not gone far when he saw that the roadway was on fire and that some of the men had come out of the workings by passing under the fire. These men were exhausted and were lying on the floor of the roadway. It was then clear to him that the timbers along the roadway were well ablaze and with a strong current of air passing along the road, there was no chance of reaching the workmen until the fire had been extinguished.
Help soon arrived and means were taken to put out the fire but little progress was made. Soon the timbers gave way and there was a very heavy fall of the roof which completely blocked the roadway to and from the workings.
A telegraph message had been sent to Mr. A.H. Stokes, H.M. Inspector of Mines who had contacted his Assistant Inspectors. One of these, Mr. Hepplewhite arrived at the colliery at 3.15 p.m. and immediately went down the mine to see the seat of the fire. He found the officials attempting to enter the return airway by means of a brattice and a fresh air current from the main road. The smoke was very dense, and the attempt looked hopeless. Men were attempting to remove the fallen debris which blocked the main road and water from buckets was being thrown on the burning timber.
By 6 p.m. a double-acting portable hand pump with a short length of hose was put into service and in a short time, all fire that was visible at the intake hand had been extinguished. The fire had extended far above the falling debris and into the cavity of a previous fall. Falls of very hot stones were frequent from this cavity. The water was well applied but what was gained by extinguishing the fire was lost due to the heat and steam which caused further falls of the roof. Frequent inspections of the return air showed that there was no reduction, either in the intensity or in the noxious state of the smoke coming from the fire.
Mr. Stokes arrived at the colliery at about 7.45 p.m. and his other Assistant, Mr. Hewitt about 9 p.m. Mr. George Lewis, the Consulting Engineer had arrived some hours before. These men had a consultation and after a short examination of the plans, all descended the mine. When they arrived at the fire they found that the men were doing their best to get through or over the fall. Some of the timber was breaking into flames over the fall and there was no doubt that the timber ahead was burning and the fire was extending rapidly due to the good air current that was passing over the fall. That part of the roadway was dry and well-timbered for a considerable distance. The small hand pump was at work and was well supplied with water but, although the water extinguished the flames it was doing great damage to the roof.
Mr. Stokes came to the conclusion that any attempt to push through the fire, either over or by the side of the fall was useless. The men working there had put in great efforts but had advanced about 4 feet in eighteen hours. To enter the return airway at the box hole would have been fatal as the atmosphere there was full of carbon monoxide. It became evident that the men beyond were caught in a death trap. Mr. Stokes commented:
I had been at the front and had clearly seen the hopelessness of getting to the entombed men through the fall and fire, but what had given me intense anxiety was the safety of the party of workmen acting under our instructions. I had not forgotten the Baddesley disaster in the neighbouring county when 23 lives were lost on trying to rescue 9 persons entombed under similar conditions, and, to add to this anxiety, I heard ominous sounds over my head when at the fall, which I feared, indicated small explosions of gas generated by the fire. this conjecture was strengthened a short time afterwards by one of my assistants, and an official of the mine, who, without knowing what I had heard, and the conclusions I had drawn reported to be the opinion as to the sounds and the checking of the air current, and that the men working at the fall, were alarmed at the repeated heavy falls which were taking place. Some of the officers in charge intimated that explosions were taking place, and therefore instructions were given to commence the erection of a strong stone dam so that we might be ready to cut off the air if necessary.
It now became a question of sealing up this part of the mine and Dan with it all hope of rescuing the entombed men, or an attempt to reverse the ventilation and to enter the mine by way of the return airway. the responsibility of such a serious step, and the difficulties we had to encounter, were so great that it was thought advisable to withdraw the men working at the fire, call together all the colliery managers within a few miles radius, and have a consultation as to the steps proposed to be taken. Men were dispatched in the early hours of the morning to various managers, and to ask them to meet at the colliery offices at 8 a.m. At the time named every manager requisitioned (16 in all) willingly appeared, some of them at much personal inconvenience.
The working plans were produced and sketches were made of the exact position of affairs and every detail necessary for a decision placed before the meeting. After a long and exhaustive explanation and discussion, I put the following question to each manager separately, viz. Is it probable that any person is alive beyond the seat of the fire? The answer was a unanimous No! I then put a further question, viz. Is it possible for any person to be alive beyond the seat of the fire? and each individual manager again gave the same answer, No!
After this dramatic meeting, instructions at once went out to complete the dam in the main intake which was called stopping No.1, to prepare to cut off the ventilation to the fire. This was finished without incident and by 2 p.m. on the 20th, a stone dam, 6 feet thick, was constructed across the roadway and had been lined up with a brick stopping and flue-dust to within 115 yards of the edge of the fire. Two rows of iron pipes, 12 inches in diameter had been built into the stopping so that air was still passing to the fire which enabled men building the stopping to work in the fresh air and also prevented the products of the fire from backing up on the flames and perhaps exploding before the stopping was complete. While the work was going on, the question of reversing the air was considered. This proved to be difficult.
It would have been quick and easy to reverse the air at a point 370 yards from the shaft but this would have lost the use of 1,200 yards of the main haulage and the prospective rescuers would have had to use a long airway which could be used only for men to travel. It would have cut off access to the main road dam, and made the work of exploration and recovery very difficult and dangerous. Furthermore, the mine could not have been re-opened until the air current had again been reversed.
It was clear that there would have to be reversed at the box-hole slit or the opening between the main intake and the main return road which men and materials could travel. A detailed plan had to be devised to carry this out but during Wednesday night a plan was drawn up which catered for every anticipated emergency and it was decided to carry it out by gently diverting the air into a figure 8 path. Another dam was built in the intake airway, leaving a space of 5 yards between it and the dam nearest the fire. Two pipes were built into the dam similar to those in the first but neither connected nor in line. In the event of an explosion behind the first dam, it was hoped that the space would absorb the blast.
An explosion was anticipated not from firedamp but from the products of combustion from the fire. The pipes from the last stopping were continued down the main intake, through the box-hole slit and into the return airway where a door had been made through which passed the pipes. The door was a regulator about 18 Inches Square with a chain attached, supported by props and passing to the intake corner of the box-hole slit. The aim was to make an immediate diversion of the main current through the slit. An observation box with a glass door was fixed in one row of pipes so that the air current coming from the fire could be tested. Only one row of pipes was used the other being sealed near the front of the stopping.
At about 2 p.m. on Thursday, all was ready and the door was gently closed and the ventilation reversed. The effect was soon seen in the observation box and in about 15 minutes, the foul gasses from the fire started to pass through showing that the current had been reversed. The reversal was done so gently that there was no explosion. All persons left the mine at about 5.30 p.m. except those who were required to watch the return air from the fire and report on its state from time to time. The temperature rose slowly through the night until it reached 81 degrees Fahrenheit.
By 11 a.m. on Friday Mr. Hepplewhite, Mr. Lewis Jnr., Mr. Hay, the manager and A party of volunteers started up the return airway. They found it clear of noxious gases and a current of about 600 cubic feet per second was flowing but the temperature in the return air pipes was as high as was the temperature in the old return airway that they had to travel. They had not gone far when they found Clamp’s body. They pushed on and arrived at No.47 Road. This was the point where the first smoke would have entered the return and it was important for them to know if the doors separating this return from the main intake were open or closed. Some of the party ventured down the roadway and found both doors closed, but beyond the second door, a heavy fall had blocked the road. It was clear that the noxious gasses from the fire had been passing into the workings.
Some of the exploring party became affected by the fumes in the road and others, finding No.47 a good travelling road, decided to press on. They went to the top of the road where they found eight bodies in an old road, laying a few feet from the entrance to the return airway. The man appeared to have got into this place to get out of the direct current of foul gas. The exploring party then retired and picked up the men who had been stationed along the roadway for verbal communication. They returned along the airway to the entrance to the box hole and the main intake. Many of them were in a state of exhaustion and required the attention of Drs. Burkitt and Griffen, who had accompanied the party and whose presence gave confidence to the explorers.
Nine dead miners were brought to the surface, a short time after they had been discovered and the last body arrived at the pit bank at about 6 p.m.
A list of those who lost their lives was included in the official report.
Bodies recovered 22nd April:
- Charles Beresford Clamp aged 27 years, onsetter,
- Joseph Shaw aged 21years, holer,
- William Davis aged 30 years, dataller,
- John Elliott aged 40 years, dataller,
- Albert Edward Limb aged 20 years, holer,
- Thomas Gresley aged 29 years, stallman,
- Joseph King aged 30 years, stallman,
- John William Platts aged 23 years, holer,
- William Belcher aged 36 years, stallman.
The return air passing through the dams and air pipes was carefully watched and the temperature began to increase. All the bodies had been recovered from the top of No. 47 and it was evident that they had been dead for some time. There was no chance of any of the entombed workmen being alive. Mr. Stokes stated in his report:
After careful consideration of the matter, it was decided to seal up the old return roadway and completely dam off all access to the workings by the intake and return and hermetically seal the fore.
Under these circumstances, it was deemed advisable to re-open two old roads which had been abandoned for many years and leave a considerable distance between the fire and the nearest road for the future entrance of the workings. It is hoped that no unforeseen difficulty may arise to prevent the workings from being reached and recovery of the bodies now lying in the mine.
Bodies not yet recovered:
- Pat O’Mara aged 45 years, stallman,
- Thomas Timpson aged 30 years, stallman,
- William Bostock aged 47 years, dataller,
- Edward Edwards aged 27 years, dataller,
- John William Tugby aged 16 years, driver,
- Albert Gee aged 15 years, deputy’s boy,
- John Skellington aged 31 years, dataller,
- Henry Springthorpe aged 45 years, dataller,
- John Moore aged 46 years, dataller,
- James Evans aged 57 years, dataller,
- Benjamin Wileman aged 46 years, dataller,
- Samuel Stacey aged 22 years, holer,
- James Wright aged 30 years, stallman,
- Joseph Brooks aged 30 years, stallman,
- James Wyatt aged 35 years, stallman,
- Henry Wyatt aged 41 years, stallman,*
- Thomas Beniston aged 43 years, stallman,**
- Joseph Wilson aged 43 years,
- William Curtis Moon aged 32 years, stallman,***
- John Richards aged 29 years, stallman,
- William Percival aged 28 years, stallman,
- William Gresley aged 60 years, stallman,
- Lewis Smith aged 24 years, holer,
- William Bradshaw aged 63 years, stallman.
At the inquest and inquiry into the disaster. It emerged that the mine had previous trouble with gob fires. On the 14th of December 1893 there was an entry in the Report book that stink was observed the return airway at the top of Old 94 and men filled the hot stuff out and a brick stopping was put in. On 23rd January 1894 a fire was thought to be in the Old 81 and a brick stopping was put in and there were subsequent reports up to the disaster.
The jury returned the following written verdict:
We agree that the men were suffocated by carbon monoxide gas, from a fire which originated in the main road on No.5 Pit at the Whitwick Colliery, on April 19th 1898, in consequence of the faulty nature of the strata. The fire travelled to the timber in the roof from the gob.
We agree that we have not had sufficient evidence before up to prove culpable negligence on the part of any one person. we agree to recommend greater precautions to be exercised by the more regular attendance of the head officials upon any site wherever gob fires exist, and that steel girders be used instead of timber wherever practicable. Also that all dangerous places in any main road be encased by brick inverted arches. Also that all return airways be traversed more frequently by men and boys.
REFERENCES
Mines Inspectors Report
Reports to Her Majesty’s Secretary of State for the Home Department on the circumstances attending an underground fire which occurred at the Whitwick No.5, Colliery, Leicestershire, in the month of April 1898 by Chester Jones, Barrister-at-Law and by A.H. Stokes, F.G.S., one of Her Majesty’s Inspectors of Mines.
The Colliery Guardian, 20th May 1897, p.889, 27th May, p.954, 3rd June, p.997, 11th November, p.888.
Information supplied by Ian Winstanley and the Coal Mining History Resource Centre.
* This name has been suggested by a visitor, the original name in the document is Jacob Wyatt aged 41 years.
** This name has been suggested by a visitor, the original name in the document is Thomas Berniston aged 45 years.
*** This name has been suggested by a visitor, the original name in the document is William C. Moore aged 30 years.
