Cardowan Colliery Explosion – Stepps – 1932

CARDOWAN. Stepps, Lanarkshire. 16th. November, 1932.

The colliery was the property of Messrs. James Dunlop and Company, Limited and there were two shafts at the colliery. The No.1 was a downcast and the No.2 upcast. Each shaft was sunk to the Kilsyth Coking Coal Seam which was reached at a depth of 342 fathoms, the Main Coal Seam was struck at about 237 fathoms and the Wee Coal Seam at 242 fathoms, the output from the Kilsyth the Coking Coal Seam was wound at the No. 2 shaft and that from the Main Coal Seam at the No.21 shaft. The Wee Coal Seam was worked for a time but proved too thin and the workings were discontinued. The Main Coal Seam varied in thickness from 24 to 36 inches and there were three districts known as the East, South Heading and the West. The coal was worked by longwall method and coal-cutting machines, conveyors and gate-end loaders were driven by compressed air in each district. The seam was a very gassy one, dry but not dusty and the coal was fairly hard and brittle.

The ventilation was produced by a double inlet Sirocco fan and a total quantity of 220,000 cubic feet of air per minutes passed into the mine at a water gauge of four and three-quarter inches, of this quantity, about 100,000 cubic feet was circulated in the Main Coal Seam. Limestone dust was used for dusting the floor, roof and side of the roads with about half a pound of dust being used for every ton of coal produced. The fireman and the shotfirers were provided with two flame safety lamps and in addition, an electric cap lamp. Electric cap lamps were also used by the greater proportion of the workmen but some used electric had lamps and a small proportion had flame lamps. Mr. John Macdonald Williamson was the agent and manager and Mr. James Peacock the surveyor who was also responsible for collecting representative dust samples from the floor, roof and side of the roadways for analysis and for making practical tests for firedamp in the return airways by means of a McLuckie apparatus.

At the time of the explosion the West district consisted of a longwall face about 760 feet long which dipped at 1 in 6 to the North East. The face was divided by the main intake airway and haulage road into two parts, that o the rise was 480 feet long and that to the dip was 280 feet. It was on the latter part of this face that the explosion occurred. The seam was three feet thick with a blaes roof and a fireclay floor.

The ventilating current for the West district was measured at 22,800 cubic feet per minute in the main intake, 100 yards back from the face on the 2nd November. The current was the split right and left. The dip side split had two returns the 7 x 7 road, which was about halfway down the face and the “downset” road at the extra end. A check screen was hung in the 7 x 7 road about 200 feet from the face to prevent too great a proportion of the split from travelling that way.

Two days after the explosion the measurements were taken with and without this screen in position and the air passing on the dip side was measured at 7,080 cubic feet of which 6,720 cubic feet were passing down the “downset” road. Without the screen in position, 3,500 cubic feet passed to the “downset” road. Sail screens were erected at right angles to and about 3 to 3½ feet from the coal face and carried 12 to 16 feet into each dummy road. The air that was diverted from the face in this manner was found to be sufficient to ventilate the roads.

Tow chain-cutting machines which were driven by compressed air were used to undercut the coal to an average depth of four feet. Two shaker conveyors which were arranged in tandem, delivered the coal from the face to the rise of the main road on to a loader tub placed in the road. The coal got from the face to the dip was delivered on to the same loader belt conveyor. Work was carried on at the face on a 24-hour cycle in the West District. During the night shift, 11 p.m. to 6.30 a.m. coal-cutting, completion of brushing the roads and moving forward the conveyors was done by 35 people. The day shift, 7 a.m. to 2.30 p.m. there was shotfiring in the coal stripping and loading coal, boring shotholes in the brushings was done by 45 people and on the afternoon shift, 3 p.m. to 10.30 p.m. the conveyors were disconnected and moved forward, roads brushed and shot holes bored in the coal by 30 persons.

All the work on the face with the exception of shotfiring was under contract. Robert Kirkland, who held a Second Class Certificate of Competency, was the contractor. Supervision on each shift was by the fireman. The fireman on the afternoon and night shifts fired the shots in the brushings and the day fireman had two shotfirers who fired shots in the coal. The shot holes in the coal were bored 3½ to 4 feet deep, four to five feet apart in the top six to nine inches of the seam which was hard coal. The charge of explosive in each hole in the coal was limited to a single cartridge which weighed one and a half ounces which were stemmed with eight to ten inches of tough clay. In the brushings “Polar Ajax” was the explosion that was in use and “Rounkol” and “A.1 Rounkol” in the coal. The average number of shots that were fired for the three months ending 15th. November were 14 by the afternoon shift fireman and the night shift fireman in the brushings and about 70 by the day shift fireman and one shot firer and about 60 by one shotfirer in the coal. It was noted that there was an irregularity on the day shift as detonators were given to the firemen by the shotfirer to whom they were issued from the store.

Stone dust was stored in bags in the main intake and from there was taken to the roadheads as it was required. The most recent entry in the firemen’s reports of firedamp in the West District prior to the explosion was dated 7th April 1932 and that entry referred to firedamp found on the right side of the face. Gas did not seen to have been detected on the dip side at any time. The last test before the disaster was made on the 27th October by Mr. Sleight with the McLuckie apparatus and showed 0.2 per cent present in the return air from the dip side and 0.5 per cent in the return air from the rise side.

The explosion occurred at the face to the dip of the main intake at about 8.45 a.m. At the time the conveyors and gate-end loader had been standing for several minutes owing to a lack of empty tubs. Peter Lusty a miner, Andrew Murphy, the conveyor engine attendant, two loader attendants, James McVey and Michael Flynn, a putter, Patrick Johnson and the contractor Robert Kirkland were at work and John Whiteford, the shotfirer, and ten other men were also at work. Of these men who were actually on the face all with the exception of Lusty who was about 7 feet to the rise of the main intake were burned. Of the 12 who were burned, six came out of the face into the intake without help, two had to be assisted and four were found dead. Of the eight who came out of the face, five died later in hospital as did the two loader attendants, James McVey and Michael Flynn who were burned.

At the time of the explosion, Robert Kirkland, contractor, was standing on the main intake about 30 to 40 feet from the gate-end loader with his back towards the face. He heard no noise but felt a slight heat on the back of his neck and a blast of air which raised a thick cloud of dust. he turned around and saw Michael Flynn with his shirt of fire. Kirkland and Patrick Johnson tore the shirt off and Johnson took him outbye. Murphy and Rae, then Sharpe and then Bradley and Watt came out from the face. Lusty came next and he was immediately followed by Whiteford, the shotfirer. Kirkland asked Whiteford what had a happened and Whiteford replied that he had been firing a shot. Lusty, who was uninjured, took Whiteford outbye.

Patrick Johnson was just going to have something to eat as the conveyor was still. He left the loader and walked about 15 yards outbye and was stooping down and in his own words:

I heard a loud report, a sort of dull report, and then, in the position in which I was, you see I was half bent at the time, well, it blew me down just on my hands, then when I looked around I saw a flame practically in the full head of the working, in the roof. After that, the dust came, and you could hardly see your hand.

At the time of the explosion William Horn was near the top end of the rise side face. Alexander Barton, shotfirer, and 17 other workmen were also at the face. Their first impression was that one of the compressed air hose had burst, but then smoke and dust began to come up the face. They went outbye by way of the return airway and some of them came out of the return by the doors at the air crossing over the West Main Intake and others by the doors at the air crossing over the South Heading and returned inbye to give assistance.

After sending Lusty outbye with Whiteford, Kirkland went to the dip side of the face with some of these men. They found George Mullen about 30 to 40 feet down the face and Peter Fratti near the top corner of the 7 x 7 road and took them out. Ongoing beyond the 7 x 7 road, Kirkland, who had not got a flame safety lamp, felt the air was not good so he went back and waited until the fireman William Horn arrived. Horn made tests but did not find any firedamp and Kirkland and he went forward. They found John McNab and James Reynolds further down the face, both dead. Horn made another test for gas in the gob and told Kirkland to be careful as he went further down the face to the end of the conveyor where he found the bodies of William McAllister and Richard Maroney. They had been severely burned but their immediate cause of death as carbon monoxide poisoning.

Those killed in the explosion:

• Richard  Maroney,
• William  McAllister,
• James Reynolds,
• John  McNab.

Those who died 17th November 1932:

• John  Watt  Jnr.,
• Peter  Fratti,
• William Bradley,
• George Mullen,
• James  McVey.

John Whiteford died 18th November 1932 and Michael Flynn died 19th November 1932.

There were three others who were in the explosion area and were injured:

• Peter Lusty,
• Robert Kirkland,
• Patrick  Johnson.

The inquiry into causes and circumstances attending the explosion which occurred at the Cardowan Colliery, Lanarkshire on the 16th November 1932, was conducted by Sir Henry Walker. C.B.E., LL.D., H.M. Chief Inspector of Mines in the Justiciary Buildings, Jail Square, Glasgow on the 10th to the 17th January. All interested and parties were represented and the report was presented to Ernest Brown Esq., M, M.P., Secretary for Mines on 24th. March 1933.

Kirkland gave evidence that the air in the dip end of the face was nearly clear and quite breathable 20 minutes after the explosion. Tests were made by the undermanager James Peacock when the bodies had been removed and the only firedamp that was found was at the face of the brushings in the “downset” road where about 2 per cent as found. Signs of heat were found in the timber lagging behind the steel arches at the gate-end loader and on the compressed-air hoses, the upper surfaces of which had been softened and made sticky. Similar signs were found in the timber lagging behind the steel arches in the 7 x 7 road but these were not as marked. Here, pieces of paper had been singed. The props at the face showed little signs of heat and there was no coking to be seen.

Mr Arthur Stoker, senior Inspector of Mines and Mr. John Masterson, Divisional Inspector of Mines, inspected the face and found a shotfiring cable in two parts with the leads of a detonator attached to the end of the two shots which had evidently been fired. The shotfiring battery was not seen at the time but it had been seen near the cable by two miners John Ford and Thomas Timlin who went with the fireman, Horn down the face shortly after the disaster. Timlin also saw a flame safety lamp with its light extinguished on the floor near the battery. He picked up the lamp and handed it to the lamp cabin at the surface without making a report.

Dust samples were collected and analysed, as were the lamps and the shotfiring battery by Captain C.B. Platt at the Mines Department Testing Station at Sheffield. He reported that none of the lamps could have caused the explosion but the cable which had been found in two lengths to which one of the detonator leads was attached was in a dilapidated condition with the conductors close together and uninsulated.

All parties agreed that the cause of the explosion was the firing of a shot. Mr. William Buchanan, the General Manager of the Kilsyth group of Collieries and Coke Ovens of Messrs. Baird and Company Limited had made an inspection the day after the explosion and he thought it was purely an explosion of firedamp fired by one of two shots. The one that had been fired first cause fissures and breaks so that the second shot had ignited the gas that came from these breaks. Sir Henry Walker came to the conclusion that:

I have no hesitation in reporting that the explosion was caused by the firing of a shot in coal which had been loosened and broken by a shot fired immediately before that the firedamp thus ignited had been contained in the undercut and amongst the coal already brought down by the previous shot, and that the flame was extended throughout the face and the intake road by coal dust.

Sir Henry made reference to the following specific points that had arisen during the inquiry, namely the examinations that were made for firedamp, the application of stone dust before shots were fired in the coal, the number of shots that were fired by the fireman and the two shotfirers during the day shift and the firing of two or more shots in the same place simultaneously.

REFERENCES
The report on the causes and circumstances attending the explosion which occurred at the Cardowan Colliery, Lanarkshire on the 16th November 1932, 20th January, 1933, p.117, 19th May, p.907.

Information supplied by Ian Winstanley and the Coal Mining History Resource Centre.