ANCHINRAITH. Blantyre, Lanarkshire. 30th. August, 1930.

The colliery was the property of Messrs. Merry and Cuninghame, Limited. The manger of the colliery was Mr. David Chalmers Gemmell with Mr. William Paterson as undermanager and there was one fireman for each of the three shifts in each of the two sections, the Old and New Conveyor Sections and the Dunsmuir’s Section. During the morning shift in the latter a shotfirer, William Sprott and during the night shift the fireman, John Russell for that shift in the Ell Coal and the Virtuewell Section of the mine, came to Dunsmuir’s to fire shots.

The workings in the Blackband Seam at the date of the explosion were 750 yards from the shafts. The seam varied in thickness from 22 to 31 inches and the roof was of light flakes from 2 to 5 feet. Above the flakes there was a stratum of hard sandstone known locally as “kingle”. The floor was of fireclay and the workings were dry.

The coal was worked by the longwall system. The face, 300 yards long, consisted of four ordinary longwall machine cut places at the intake end, a conveyor face, 100 yards long which was known as the Old Conveyor Run, a second face 100 yards long, the New Conveyor Run and seven ordinary longwall machine cut places at the return end. These last seven places were known as “Dunsmuir’s Section” consisted of a main slope road (Dunsmuir’s Slope), a slope to the right, No.2 Right Slope from which branch roads 1, 2 and 3 led to the face. On the left was the Old No.12 level from which Jack’s Slope ran parallel to Dunsmuir’s Slope to the face. Off Jack’s Slope, two branch roads, known as N.1 Branch (Engine Road) and No.2 Branch were turned. The explosion was confined to the workings within Dunsmuir’s Section.

The coal was undercut by electrically driven chain machines, in the coal to an average depth of 3 feet 9 inches. On the two conveyor faces, the coal was conveyed to two main roads by electrically driven, shaker conveyors.

The mine was ventilated by a Guibal fan, 30 feet in diameter which delivered 55,000 cubic feet per minute for the whole colliery. In the Blackband Seam there was an auxiliary electrically driven fan in the intake airway about 270 yards from the face. 8,500 cubic feet per minute went into the Blackband Seam but about 4,000 cubic feet were lost through leakage. Some of the leakage was used to ventilate the stables which had been in use a few weeks before the accident but were unused at the time. The doors or sheets were placed to guide the air current were all single.

Flame safety lamps were used by the firemen and by the shotfirers. In addition they carried electric hand or cap lamps. Flame lamps were also used where electric machinery was installed and electric lamps, either cap or hand lamps were used by the workmen.

In addition to the shots required to bring down the brushing in the roads, shots were also fired in the coal, these shotholes being 10 feet apart. The holes in the coal were bored by the miners and charge stemmed and fired by a fireman. The stemming was plastic clay brought from the surface. Limestone dust, flue dust and ground blaes were used for stone dusting.

The explosion originated at the face of the No.3 branch road of No.2 right slope off Dunsmuir’s Slope and only firedamp was involved. Earlier in the year, in May, 1930 when the workings were crossing the five feet downthrow fault and being opened up, considerable amounts of firedamp had been encountered. The gas had been reported in the firemen’s books but as they made only one report per shift and the shifts were continuous, if there was gas at any other time it would not have been reported in the book. This could have been the explanation when ten days prior to the explosion, gas had been found and was not reported in the book. One of the fireman, Thomas Hegginson, stated that he found firedamp in Nos. 1 and 2 branch roads off Jack’s Slope during the afternoon shift before the explosion but this was not during his inspection for the next shift so he did not report it. Mr. Walker commented:

No doubt this was within the law at present, but been if the manager of any mine requires the fireman to send him direct written reports other than those required by the law, as the manager of this mine said he did, I still think that whenever firedamp is found by a fireman, the fact should be reported by him in the prescribed book.

The Blackband Seam was known to be gassy and the provision of single sheets and doors were a source of potential derangement to the ventilation. The remedy was to use double or triple doors and sheets.

Archibald Millar was the fireman in charge of the district comprising the New Conveyor Run and Dunsmuir’s Section during the night shift of 29th. August, the shift prior to the one on which the explosion occurred. His report of his inspection made between 4 and 5 a.m. on 30th August, about three hours before the disaster. The report read:

  • Noxious or inflammable gas – None.
  • State of ventilation. – Good.
  • Condition of roof and sides. – Roof heavy in parts of Conveyor Run, remainder in safe condition.
  • Supply of timber a) working places. – Sufficient.
  • Pass-byes, sidings etc. – None.
  • Other matters affecting safety and remarks. – None.

Millar said that he had not found firedamp in his section since the 15th August. During the night shift of 29th August, he had fired six shots, one of which was in the Engine Road and he noticed that the roof near the face of that road was on weight. He reported this to the oncoming fireman, William Anderson, on the morning shift of the 30th August when they met at the bottom of the shaft between 5 and 6 a.m. on that day.

In addition to the six shots fired by Millar there were six brushing shots fired during the same shift in Dunsmuir’s Section by John Russell, fireman in charge of the Ell Coal and Virtuewell Section of the mine. He was in Dunsmuir’s Section from 10.15 p.m. on the 29th August to 3 a.m. on the 30th August and did not find any firedamp between these times. One of the shots he fired was in the brushing of No.3 branch off No.2 right slope and he did not make the required examination for a radius of 20 yards around the shothole and did not stonedust the place. His explanation was that he thought that the place was already stonedusted.

William Anderson left the shaft bottom about 6 a.m. At the outbye end of the No.6 road, he left his jacket and flame safety lamp and after collecting his shotfiring battery or exploder, shotfiring cable and a stemmer and carrying an electric hand lamp, explosives and detonators, he went towards the face of Jack’s Slope. On the way down he remembered that he had left his flame lamp behind but. Knowing that there would be a lamp hanging at the motor of the new conveyor, he did not go back for it.

He went into engine slope and had a look at the roof because Millar had told him that it was low over the conveyor and took the lamp that was near the conveyor motor. After this he fired eight shots in coal and then returned the lamp to place near conveyor motor. Whether he used it to test for gas was not known. Some of miners working in the places where Anderson fired shots swore that he had not got a lamp with him and some of these men told the inquiry that it was customary for the firemen to leave the flame lamps outbye and go to the face with their electric lamps only. Anderson admitted that he did not spread any stone dust before he fired shots. He had been a shotfirer at the Auchinrath Colliery for three and half years prior to explosion.

During the morning shift of 30th August, the shotfirer in Dunsmuir’s Section, William Sprott, was seen by a pony driver, John Copland aged 25 years, at No.12 level putting detonators into cartridges for primers. Copland told Sprott he was wanted in Regan’s place to fire shots. Sprott replied that he was going into Paterson’s Road first. Alexander Paterson said that Sprott arrived in his place. Paterson saw him charge the shothole in the coal opposite the left side of that place. As the shot was fired the explosion immediately occurred. Paterson said that only lamp that Sprott carried was an electric cap lamp and this was recovered after disaster. It was quite possible that before the shot was fired there was no test for firedamp. The manager expressed surprise at what he had heard about testing for gas while using shots and the lack of stone dusting when a shot was fired.

The size of the return airway gave cause for concern. It was about 200 yards long and was a crawling road about two feet high and two and a half feet wide. For about two weeks before the explosion, a return airway was available for the air but it was not in a fit state for men to travel. Subsection 3 of Section 36 of the Coal Mines Act, 1911 required that every part of the mine in which ten or more persons were employed should be provided with at least two ways of egress to the surface and so arranged that, in the event of either becoming impassable at any point, the other will afford means of egress to the surface. The manager said that he had given instructions to the undermanager and his own son, William Gemmell who was described as the assistant to the undermanager, to pay special attention to this part of the return airway and to travel it twice a week. The undermanager told the inquiry that the manager told him to travel from the end of Kelly’s old airway up to No.2 Pit bottom twice a week and Mr. William Gemmell said that they were told to travel the return airway from No.2 Pit to the intake at the centrifugal pump. Neither of these interpretations on the instructions was the restricted part of the return airway included.

Those who lost their lives in the explosions were:

  • George Shorthouse,
  • Joseph Regan,
  • Richard King,
  • William Sprott, shotfirer,
  • Andrew Kalinsky,
  • Richard Dunsmuir died 31st August 1930.

Those who were injured:

  • John Smith,
  • William Stoddart,
  • John Copland,
  • Alexander Paterson,
  • James Russell,
  • Robert Buchanan,
  • John Wailes,
  • William Fox.

The men who were not injured were:

  • John Wildman,
  • Peter Scullion,
  • Robert Inglis,
  • George Rhodes,
  • Robert Lowden,
  • William Anderson, fireman.

After the explosion, very little damage was found in the district. The effect of the shot which Sprott had fired was to bring down the coal but not as much as usual but there was no evidence that the shot had blown out. George Elliott, a member of the Rescue Corps from Coatbridge, found Sprott’s body on the right hand side of a tub at the roadhead of No.2 branch. The battery of Sprott’s electric cap lamp was attached to his belt and the lamp was still alight and in his right hand was the key of the shotfiring battery and exploder.

The ventilation was quickly restored and Messrs. Dominy, McKerril, checkweigher at the colliery, John Littlejohn, overman in the No.2 Pit and Archibald Millar were searching for the flame lamp which Sprott should have had with him, found some firedamp off Jack’s Slope.

The inquiry was held at the Justiciary Buildings, Jail Square, Glasgow by Sir Henry Walker, H.M. Chief Inspector of Mines and lasted nine days. All interested parties were represented.

A full examination had been made of the possible causes of the disaster when the lamps, exploders and cables were investigated. It was found that the explosion was caused by firing a shot of Polar Dynobel in the presence of inflammable gas but whether the gas was ignited by flame from the explosive or by a spark across the conductors of the shotfiring cable was in dispute.

Commenting on the fact that firemen did not always carry flame lamps, the manager said that the firemen had been supplied with flame safety lamps fitted with an internal relighter. The men did not like them because, as they were longer than the normal lamp, they trailed on the ground when they were crawling to the face with the lamp slung around their neck. One of the fireman stated that the lamps with relighters were not easy to relight and often went out when shots were fired.

Sir Henry concluded his report with an acknowledgement of the Coatbridge Rescue Station on their prompt actions at receiving the call for help.

 

REFERENCES
Report on the causes and circumstances of the Explosion which occurred at Auchinrath Colliery, Lanarkshire, on the 30th August 1930, by Sir Henry Walker, C.B.E., LL.D. H.M. Chief Inspector of Mines.
Colliery Guardian, 14th November 1930, p.1801, 21st November 1931, 28th November, p.1987.

Information supplied by Ian Winstanley and the Coal Mining History Resource Centre.

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