WERNBWLL. Penclawdd, Glamorganshire. 28th. November, 1929.
Wernbwll Colliery was about 2 miles west of Gowerton in the Parish of Llanrhydian Higher and was owned at the time of the disaster by the new Berthlwyd Gas and Coal Company but by the time the inquiry was sitting, it had been formed into a Limited Liability Company and the owners were then the Berthlwyd Colliery Limited. Two seams of good quality coal were mined, the Penclawdd and the Penlan Seams, and were worked separately by slants driven from the surface.
The West District was reached by a series of three slants to the Penclawdd Seam, the lowest of which was know as the Main West Slant which had an inclination of 34 degrees. The total distance from the surface to the bottom of the Main West Slant at the date of the explosion was 1,450 yards and the thickness of cover at this point was about 1,500 feet. The Penclawdd Seam was about 4 feet 6 inches thick with a conglomerate sandstone roof and a fireclay floor. There was a second district in the Penclawdd Seam, which was known as the East District and was reached by the East Slant. The workings in this district were the same in extent as those in the West District.
The supervision was carried out by the following staff. Mr. D.D. Williams, owner and agent of the colliery and also of the Berthlwyd Colliery working the same seams about one mile from Wernbwll. Mr. J. Phillips was the certificated manager of both collieries, Mr. W.J. Hughes, certificated undermanger, Mr. Llewellyn Thomas, overman and there were three foremen for each shift. The colliery employed 160 people underground on three shifts, 29 of whom were employed in the West District at the time of the explosion.
The coal was worked by pillar and stall which was known locally as the “Tophole” system in common with most of the mines working steep seams in the western area of the South Wales Coalfield. from slants driven to the full dip, levels 9 feet wide were sew away about 40 to 60 yards apart, of which top holes 14 yards apart and 9 feet wide were driven to the full rise. Crossings for ventilation purposes were driven 7 feet wide between the topholes. In the levels, about 3 feet 6 inches of floor cutting was taken up on the rise side and about 3 feet of ripping taken down on the dip side which made a road about 6 feet high and 9 feet wide. The seam was worked by hand and shots were fired. The coal from the topholes and crossings was thrown onto iron sheets, laid in the topholes and it slid down to the bottom of the topholes. There it was filled into trams by the trammers who took the full tubs to a double parting close to the slant.
The mine was ventilated by an electrically driven fan placed near the mouth of the return slant and it was capable of providing 35,000 cubic feet of air per minute at 3 inches water gauge. According to the records the water gauge stood at 2.1 inches at the time of the explosion. Records in the Air Measurement Book showed that the quantity of air passing into the East and West District of the Penclawdd Seam was 15,000 cubic feet at the top of the No.3 slant. At the inquiry it was stated that these could not be a correct idea of the ventilation at the working face of the West District since the ventilation supplied by the fan was supplemented by the exhaust from two compressed air engines in the Main West Slant, the discharge from compressed air pipes run into the faces of the slant and a 16 inch diameter Typhoon Turbine Fan driven by compressed air placed at a point midway in the ventilating district. At the time of the disaster the fan was installed at the top of a tophole in No.11 Level.
Firedamp had been found in the mine only in small quantities on four occasions over the past twelve months and as a result, naked lights, usually acetylene lamps but in some cases candles, were used throughout the mine until an explosion of firedamp on the 28th September 1928 burned a collier who was at work in a tophole extracting a pillar in the East District. Following this Special Regulations were established and an exemption from the use of safety lamps was granted by the Board of Trade under Section 32 91) (b) of the Coal Mines Act 1911. As a result 14 flame safety lamps of an approved type were constantly in use in the Penclawdd Seam and were used at the face of the No.13 level in No.1 and 2 topholes.
No stone dusting had been done in the mine prior to the explosion. The roadways were described by the manager and undermanger as being “naturally wet throughout.” Tests were made of the dust of the roof, floor and sides at intervals but bearing in mind the method of working where the coal was sent down chutes there must have been large quantities of dust in the mine. Mr. F.H. Wynne stated in the report:
In the face of these facts, I am not satisfied that the natural conditions in this mine were such as to make the application of stone dust or water necessary.
The explosion occurred in the No.13 level of the West District at about 7 p.m. on Thursday 28th November. Up to this time, work had proceeded quite normally. The day fireman, John Henry Daniel, had examined the workings within two hours of the afternoon shift commencing work at 3 p.m. and had reported everything in good order. The afternoon fireman, Henry Rees had completed his first round of inspection of the West District at about 4.30 p.m. and had found nothing to concern him. The shotfirer, Stephen John, had been round the third district and had inspected the face in the No.13 level where he fired a shot at about 5.30 p.m. and he too found everything in good order.
The effects of the explosion were confined to a small area of the workings lying between Nos. 12 and 13 levels of the West District. Of the eight men employed in the No.13 level, of whom six were colliers and two were trammers, six were killed. the seventh man who was killed was Thomas Jones, a collier, whose working place was at the face of the main west slant but was in the No.13 level looking for timber when he was killed by the blast. The two men who escaped were Arthur Williams, one of the two trammers filling coal at the foot of the topholes and the face of the level and tramming it from there to the double parting at the slant, and David John Lewis, one of the colliers working at the face of the level. Lewis was very lucky to escape the effects of the explosion because at the critical time he was away from his place of work.
Arthur Williams was standing in the double parting in the No.13 level about seven yards inbye from the slant and Lewis was in the slant a few yards above this level, at a valve in the compressed air main, when there was a “tremendous blast of wind” which put out their lights and knocked both of them over. Williams noticed a small flame over his head and he was burned on the back and shoulders. Lewis in the slant felt nothing but the blast.
The four persons working in the slant below No.13 level made their way out as soon as they recovered from the shock. Their lights were out and they had to grope their way up the dark incline. One of them, Arthur Gwyther, a filler, was injured by a fall in the slant when the blast struck him and required assistance. On reaching the No.13 level shouts were heard and one of the party, John Sambrook, went into the parting and helped Arthur Williams out.
David John Lewis was in the slant a little higher up where he had gone to turn on more air at a stopcock which served the No. 13 level. He felt the blast and his light went out and he was thrown down. When Sambrook and the others reached him, he joined them and they all proceeded up the slant and finally out without much difficulty and reached the No.11 level when they met the fireman, Henry Rees, who had come from the East District.
At the moment of the explosion a set of trams was being drawn up the slant in charge of Trevor Guy, rider, who was riding on the haulage rope at the front of the set. Guy said that the set had reached a point about 15 or 20 yards from the landing at the top of the slant and had stopped for want of pressure of the haulage engine, when he felt a gust of wind which put his light out. He heard a noise but he saw no flame. He relit his lamp and went back to see if anything had happened to the set. He found nothing wrong and walked up the slant to No.11 level when he met John William Hughes, haulier. They were talking when they saw lights down the slant and Guy and Hughes went down the slant at No.12 level where they met Sambrook and the others coming up.
The engineman who was in charge of the Main West Slant haulage engine, David Davies, said that the set had stopped short of the landing at the top of the slant and that the reason for this was shortage of air at the engine. He heard a noise which he thought was a fall and restarted the engine but stopped it almost immediately as he received the signal to do so. He waited some time for a signal but none came and he went to the engine room to investigate. He found the door in the slant just below No.9 level open and concluded that the noise that he had heard was the door being blown open. He closed the door and returned to the engine. After a further wait he became anxious and was going down to the door again when he met Trevor Guy coming up the slant.
In the No.12 level, the effects of the explosion were less than in the lower parts of the district. The extinguishing of lights caused concern for a short time but after they were relit, the men proceeded to get their mid-shift meal and they only became alarmed when smoke appeared in the air. They immediately made their way out through the topholes to No.11 level and from there to the Main West Slant.
The fireman, Henry Rees, was the only official in the mine during the afternoon shift and at the moment of the explosion was on his way around the workings in the East District. He was with two colliers when he felt a peculiar sensation in his ears. At the inquiry he said, “My ears felt blocked”. He remarked to the colliers that there must have been a fall in the rippings and he went out to see what had happened. He reached the No.11 level at the bottom of the No.2 slant where he met Andrew Gwyther. Further in No.11 West he met more men and was informed that something had happened in No.13 level and that the men in there had not come out. He proceeded and met Sambrook and others at the Main West Slant as they were putting Arthur Williams into a tram. He gave instructions for Williams to be looked after and sent a message to the surface.
He tried to go down the slant but the gas stopped him at the No.12 level. He returned to the top and tried to go along No.11 level to the fan, but again, bad air barred his progress. He came back to the slant and gave orders to telephone for the manager and a rescue party and some lamps. The Inspector, Mr. Wynne, commented in his report:
It would have been better to have done this earlier and before attempting the exploration.
He then sent a party to put up a sheet in the East level so as to force as much intake air as possible into the West District. With two workmen, he then went up the slant to the No. 9 level and along to the tophole which was in the return airway for the West district. The air was good so he returned to the slant and tried again to go down to the No.12 level but they could not do so. A further unsuccessful attempt was made to get to the fan in No.11 level.
On returning to the slant, he met the manager, Mr. Phillips and other helpers. With some difficulty the fan was reached and was found not to be working due to an obstruction to the motor. The obstruction was removed and the ventilation to the workings below No.11 level partially restored. A party, led by the manager, went down the slant to No.13 level where the bodies of two men were lying in the parting, were recovered. Afterdamp was still hanging in the level and prevented further progress until the Rescue Brigade arrived. The Brigade, wearing breathing apparatus, soon recovered the remaining five bodies. All the victims had died from carbon monoxide poisoning.
Those who lost their lives were:
- William Arnold Bennett aged 29 years,
- David Davies aged 34 years,
- Henry Griffiths aged 34 years,
- Edwin Harry aged 61 years,
- Thomas Henry Harry aged 33 years,
- Thomas Luther Hughes aged 32 years and
- Thomas Junes aged 54 years.
Mr. Wynne thought the explosion was one of firedamp which was extended by coal dust and he came to his conclusions on the evidence presented, the positions of the bodies and the nature of their injuries. He said:
With respect to five of the deceased, there is no room for doubt as to where they were and what they were doing. Commencing with the No.2 tophole, T.L. Hughes was working at the face his body was found on the level at the bottom of the tophole he had died from carbon monoxide poisoning and was otherwise uninjured. Thomas Henry Harry was working at the face of the crossing in No.2 tophole his body was found alongside that of Hughes his death was caused by carbon monoxide poisoning and he was otherwise uninjured. Henry Griffiths was boring a shothole at the face of the level his body was found in the parting not many yards from the slant he died from carbon monoxide poisoning and was otherwise uninjured. William Arnold Bennett had completed the filling of a tub at the foot of the No.1 tophole and had trammed it to a point halfway between Nos.2 and 3 topholes his body was found quite close to the slant a few yards further outbye than that of Griffiths his death was due to the effects of carbon monoxide poisoning but he had been severely burned about the hands, chest arms and face and marks on the arms and chest suggested he had been struck by small stones. Thomas Jones was somewhere in the level inbye of the parting. Although there is no direct evidence as to how far he had gone along the level, I think it is reasonable to assume that he was near the No.2 tophole, for, where he was more likely to find the timber he was seeking than near where other colliers work? His body was found about halfway between Nos. 5 and 6 topholes he died from the effects of carbon monoxide poisoning but he had been burned about the face, head, neck and chest and there was wound on the back of his head.
It remains to consider Edwin Harry and David Davies, both of whom, it was generally agreed, were working at the face of the No.1 tophole at any rate until Bennett had completed filling the tub already referred to. The body of Davies was found in the level some distance outbye and a few yards behind Jones. His death was caused by carbon monoxide poisoning, but he had been severely burned about the face, neck, chest, arms and hands and was otherwise knocked about the right side of his head was bruised his right knee was swollen his left forearm was cut and bruised and there was a cut on the left foot which had gone through the boot. The body of Edwin Harry was found lying in the level at the foot of the No.1 tophole. Death in his case again was due to carbon monoxide poisoning but he had been severely burned about the head, face, arms and hands.
The skin of the deceased persons in every case was covered with a coating of black dust, and in this respect, there was nothing to differentiate between them. On the other hand, it is to be observed that the three who were definitely at work in the cul-de-sac, viz. the face of the level, No.2 tophole and the crossing were not burnt at all, whereas the four who suffered by burning two at least, viz. Bennett and Jones were definitely on the level and in the case of Bennett also definitely close to the bottom of No.2 tophole when the explosion occurred.
It is evident that Bennett, Jones, Griffiths and Davies travelled outbye a considerable distance along the level after the explosion before they were overcome by afterdamp. Hughes and T.H. Harry could get no further than the foot of the tophole in which they were working, while E. Harry, who was over 60 years of age and comparatively feeble, probably fell when the explosion struck him and was unable to move afterwards.
If the explosion originated, as was suggested by Messrs. Lewis Kane and Phillips, in the No.1 tophole, it is conceivable to my mind that Davies and E. Harry, whom they assumed to be at work there, could not have been so badly burned as they were and that no other traces of burning or even heating should have been found in the tophole. Even in the level itself immediately at the foot of the tophole the indications of heating were almost negligible.
How then was the burning of these two men accounted for? The explosion occurred at or about 7 p.m. or just about the time when, in the ordinary course of things, the men would suspend work to take their food. now, it was known that Edwin Harry acted as timekeeper for this purpose (his watch was in fact, found undamaged in a pocket of his waistcoat in No.1 tophole after the explosion). Again, and it is not unreasonable to assume that, Bennett had just filled a tub, Harry and Davies would consider it to be a suitable time to withdraw to the level, where their coats were later found hanging with food untouched in the pockets thereof, and have their meal. In my opinion, this is what happened.
The inquest into the deaths of the victims was held by the Swansea County Coroner, Mr. C.J Wilson at Penclawdd on the 14th and 15th January 1930 and the jury brought in the following verdict:
- That death in each case was due to carbon dioxide poisoning.
- That the explosion took place in the vicinity of the No.1 tophole.
- That the nature of the explosion was unknown.
- That no one was responsible and there was no negligence.
The inquiry into the causes and circumstances attending the explosion which occurred at Wernbwll Colliery, Penclawdd, on the 28th November 1929, was held by F.H. Wynne, B.S, H.M. Deputy Chief Inspector of Mines, on the 18th and 19th February and the 18th and 19th March 1930 at the Llewellyn Hall, Swansea. All interested parties were represented and evidence taken from twenty-five witnesses.
The scene of the disaster was extensively investigated after the event and signs of intense heat were observed from the evidence of partially coked coal dust, charred wood and singed clothing. The force of the explosion had derailed trams in the parting near the slant and an empty tram was lying on its side at the top of No.3 tophole, pieces of stone were found embedded in timber supports and a bar at the entrance to the crossing that was being driven from the No.2 tophole to join the No.1 tophole was displace. The brattice stopping at the topholes outbye of No.2 tophole was displaced and it was thought that this had resulted in a build-up of gas which extended from the face to the tophole, a distance of 15 feet. This firedamp was quickly dispersed when the brattice was replaced.
There was a divergence of opinion as to the point of origin and the immediate cause of the explosion. Messrs J. Dyer Lewis and John Kane, mining engineers, who were called as expert witnesses by the owners of the mine thought that the explosion had started in the No.1 tophole and it was caused by a cloud of coal dust coming into contact with the flame of an acetylene lamp and they were confident that firedamp played no part in the explosion. Mr. D.L. Davies, Miners Agent gave evidence of behalf of the South Wales Federation and was unable to rule out the possibility that firedamp was ignited but he thought the main explosive agent was coal dust. He placed the point of ignition in the level between Nos.1 and 2 topholes. Messrs. Lea, Waldin and Finney, H.M. Inspectors of Mines agreed with Mr. davies as to the point of origin but they thought the initial cause was firedamp on the high side of the level between Nos.1 and 2 topholes and that this explosion, which was probably small, was extended by coal dust in the level and the Nos. 2, 3, and 4 topholes.
Mr. F.H. Wynne came to the following conclusions:
I am of the opinion that this explosion originated in the No.13 level somewhere between Nos. 1 and 2 topholes and that it was caused by the flame of an open acetylene lamp coming in contact with an explosive mixture of firedamp which had accumulated at the rise side of the level which was thickly timbered. The volume of the explosive mixture was probably small, but lying on the timber there must have been very fine and very pure coal dust with which the gas was in very close contact and this dust was the cause of the explosion spreading along the level and into the No.2 tophole.
No precautions were taken against the dangers of coal dust. Some parts of the mine were undoubtedly extremely wet on the ground, according to the evidence given by the mine officials; they did not consider it was necessary to take precautions against coal dust. In my opinion, the levels and the crossings between the topholes should have been treated with stone dust, in accordance with the provisions of the General Regulations of 30th July 1920 and amended 20th November 1924. It is probable that had this been done the explosion would have been confined to narrower limits and fewer lives have been lost as a result of it.
The method of ventilating the faces of the levels and the immediate adjacent topholes by compressed air is no doubt much more convenient than the use of either bratticing or air pipes for this purpose. But, although there is nothing in the Coal Mines Act to preclude its use and, apparently, until the day of the explosion it had been proved to be an adequate means of ventilation, in my opinion, it is not to be recommended, the supply, especially where, as in this case, quite a number of machines depend upon it for their motive power, it is apt to be spasmodic and irregular. For this reason it is unreliable and if, as I consider was the fact here, firedamp is being emitted constantly, even if only slowly, a temporary cessation or interruption of the normal air supply of compressed air is likely to result sooner or later in contamination of the atmosphere.
I have already discussed the possibility of the ignition of coal dust at the flame of an acetylene lamp and given my reasons for thinking that such an occurrence is extremely unlikely under mining conditions.
At an early stage of the investigation of the explosion the Miners Agents, Messrs. S.O. and D.L. Davies, raised the question of the possibility of the explosion having been initiated by the explosive mixture of acetylene and air, produced by the escape of acetylene from the burner of an extinguished lamp or from a defective generator coming in contact with the flame of another lamp. Apparently, suspicion was aroused by a damaged lamp which was said to have been found attached to clothing on the body of Thomas Hughes at the foot of the No.2 tophole. A seam of the generator of his lamp had split open part of the way around and carbide inside was exposed. It is, of course, not known when or how this defect in the lamp developed, but there is little doubt that Hughes came hurriedly down the tophole probably in the dark after the explosion and if, which is not at all certain, he was carrying this lamp it is not unlikely it was damaged in the descent or by falling from the chute onto the floor of the level. I do not think acetylene had anything to do with the explosion. There remains however the general question of the possibility of the danger of acetylene lamps in mines.
REFERENCES
The report on the causes and circumstances attending the explosion which occurred at Wernbwll Colliery.
Information supplied by Ian Winstanley and the Coal Mining History Resource Centre.
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