MARDY. Rhondda Valley, Glamorganshire. 23rd. December, 1885.

The colliery was the property of Locket’s Merthyr Steam Coal Company and was opened in 1878. Mr. Griffith Thomas was appointed manager in 1879 and Mr. W. Thomas as agent under the Act and exercised general supervision but there was no undermanager.

The downcast and upcast shafts were about 44 yards apart and were sunk to 366 yards. Five seams were worked, two from the upcast and three from the downcast shafts. These workings were known respectively as No.1 and No.2 Pit. The seams worked from the downcast were the Four Feet, the Six Feet and the Two Feet Nine Inch. The effects of the explosion were felt only in the No. 2 Pit the workings of which were arranged n five districts radiating from et downcast shaft towards the points of the compass which were named The N.W. Dip District, The Main West District, The S.W. District, The S.E District and the N.E. District. In the N.W. Dip District the workings were in the six Feet Seam only as the Four Feet was thrown up about 32 yards by a fault at about 300 yards N.W. of the downcast shaft. The workings were on the longwall system and the daily average output of the pit was about 1,200 tons. The colliery was worked on two shifts, one on the coal by day and one at night for repairs. These shifts consisted of 761 men on the day shift and 200 at night.

The colliery was ventilated by  Waddle fan, 45 feet in diameter which produced 250,000 cubic feet of air per minute at a water gauge of 2.5 inches. Of this amount of air, 145,280 cubic feet went to the No.2 Pit. The air in that pit was carried to the floor of the downcast shaft and then along two intakes which ran east and west for about 176 yards. The east intake was further divided into three levels running north-west, west, and south-west. The east intake was divided into two, to the south-east and the north-east.

The coal at the colliery was steam coal which was dry and dusty and gave off large quantities of gas. From the start of 1885 and the explosion, nineteen accumulations were reported but none of them were sufficiently serious to withdraw the men from the mine. In the three months preceding the explosion, gas had been reported as blowers in various parts of the mine and recorded in the Report Book. On the day before the disaster, four small blowers and sixteen strong blowers were reported.

The ventilation was described as the best in South Wales and the Inspectors were in general agreement with this statement but as the inquiry proceeded it emerged that the special rules under the Coal Mines Regulation Act, 1872 was not carried out in all cases. On the morning of the explosion, the manager admitted that he did not consult the barometer as he was in a hurry and had overslept. About three months before the disaster a fireman in the North West District fond what he called “a trace of gas” in a cavity above some arches but did not enter it in his report book and the lamps stations in the mine were at long distances from the downcast shaft. The reason for this was stated to be that it was necessary to have the lamp stations near the workings as the men might smoke otherwise the more reckless of them would smoke in the workings. There was also the danger to men passing down the engine planes from the ropes and wagons made it necessary for the riders to use lights which it was inconvenient to lock as they often blew out and the lamps of the repairers often suffered the same fate so naked lights were sometimes allowed.

The arrangements for the watering of coal dust were not systematic. No officer was appointed specially for this duty and no specific times were set. The water was usually applied by scattering it from a bucket or by holding a hand over a hole in a barrel and squirting water about. There were no regular orders issued to the firemen as to watering before a shot was fired.

The practice of firing shots in the mine was, in the opinion of Mr. Liddell, as being “full of hazard”. The dangers arose, not from the want of care but from a deliberate system founded on a strained interpretation of the Act so as to save trouble and time and was generally adopted in the collieries of South Wales. Shots were allowed during the night but were fired in hard headings during the day. In the stone heading in the North West District one or two shots had been fired during the day for several months before the disaster when there were 122 men in the district. It was considered sufficient if the five men at work in the heading were withdrawn 50 yards from the point where the shot was fired but no precautions were taken for the rest of the men.

The explosion occurred on the afternoon of the 23rd December, about 2.40 p.m. There was a loud report and a cloud of dust ascended from the downcast shaft and some slight damage to the mouth of the shaft but these were the only indications of what had happened above ground. The fan was not stopped and a rescue party headed by the agent and the manager were able to get down the pit almost immediately. By their efforts the ventilation of the mine was restored in about three hours and the afterdamp was cleared.

The effects of the explosion was found to be almost entirely confined to the main intakes. At the foot of the downcast shaft, considerable damage was done to the gear and severe injuries inflicted on the bodies of the men who were killed. From the foot of the shaft, the Main East and West levels ran in opposite directions. Along the Main East level, the effects of the explosion were visible for only 90 yards but along the West level, they extended for 350 yards. Down the South West heading, which was the first one off the main heading, the effects of the explosion were felt for about 666 yards and down the North West dip for about 400 yards. The total distance the explosion travelled through the workings was about one mile. At the bottom of the pit, in a place called the “arches”, there was no doubt that there had been a considerable flame. The blockhouse near the foot of the downcast shaft was on fire and the timbers on the intake below the arches were charred. Traces of flame were also found on the bodies that were found near the lamp station in the South West level and the end of the North West dip. This meant that the heat was greatest at the centre and the extremities of the area that was affected.

The effects of the blast were not great. In the North West dip, there was a large fall about 170 yards from the parting. The doors in all the headings affected were blown towards the return which indicated that the explosion started in the intakes. William Williams, the rope changer at the South West parting, who was found alive after the explosion, told the rescuers that he saw fire coming from the North West dip and on three occasions before his death added that “the fire trundled him towards the pit.”

Those who lost their lives were:

  • Edward Thomas aged 23 years, rider.
  • Philip Hitchins aged 35 years, hitcher.
  • Arthur Boozey aged 2 1years, shackler.
  • John Powell aged 23 years, hitcher.
  • Ephraim Hughes aged 20 years, shackler.
  • Henry Pullen aged 20 years, hitcher.
  • James Perry aged 20 years, hutcher.
  • John Spiller aged 22 years, shakler.
  • Thomas Hughes aged 33 years, shackler.
  • Daniel Williams aged 43 years, overman.
  • Daniel Phillips aged 50 years, mason.
  • Lewis Davies aged 32 years, mason.
  • Griffith Scourfield aged 19 years, attending masons.
  • John Evans aged 55 years, attending masons.
  • Joseph Jones aged 40 years, stoneman.
  • Edward Edwards aged 52 years, contractor.
  • Owen Tudor aged 32 years, stoneman.
  • Edward Edwards jnr. aged 17 years, stoneman.
  • Mike Stokes aged 17 years, haulier.
  • David Thomas Ward aged 19 years, haulier.
  • John Lewis aged 19 years, collier.
  • Messeck Phillips aged 32 years, haulier.
  • David Rowlands aged 27 years, collier.
  • William Griffiths aged 16 years, collier.
  • Evan Pugh aged 17 years, doorboy.
  • Thomas Watkins aged 17 haulier.
  • Morgan Watkins aged 14 years, doorboy.
  • David Jones aged 27 years, rider.
  • Joe Baker aged 17 years, collier.
  • James Thomas aged 27 years, collier.
  • John Davies aged 17 years, collier.
  • Richard Evans aged 24 years, collier.
  • Owen Powell aged 29 years, collier.
  • Thomas Thomas aged 24 years, collier.
  • John Herd aged 22 years, collier.
  • Evan James aged 21 years, collier.
  • David Jones aged 27 years, collier.
  • William Thomas aged 19 years, collier.
  • David Lake aged 35 years, collier.
  • John Jones (Bevan) aged 23 years, haulier.
  • Evan Davies aged 19 years, collier.
  • John Jones aged 42 years, collier.
  • William Jones aged 13 years, collier.
  • John Edwards aged 13 years, collier.
  • William Jones aged 13 years, collier.
  • Isaac Jones aged 20 years, collier.
  • Thomas Phillips aged 20 years, haulier.
  • David Bowen aged 18 years, collier.
  • Richard Lewis aged 46 years, collier.
  • Philip Richards aged 66 years, labourer.
  • John Collins aged 40 years, haulier.
  • Isaac Davies aged 33 years, repairer.
  • Thomas Evans aged 26 years, haulier.
  • Evan Roberts aged 28 years, ropeman.
  • William Davies aged 25 years, collier.
  • John Evans aged 45 years, fireman.
  • Evan Davies aged 29 years, collier.
  • David Lewis aged 40 years, collier.
  • Thomas Jenkins aged 25 years, cogman.
  • William Harris aged 29 years, collier.
  • J.D. Jones aged 50 years, airwayman.
  • David Evans aged 16 years, collier.
  • Levi Williams aged 40 years, roadman.
  • Thomas Evans aged 28 years, collier.
  • James Lockstone aged 27 years, labourer.
  • John Williams aged 23 years, collier.
  • Edmund Morgan aged 27 years, collier.
  • David Jones aged 59 years, cogman.
  • John Morgan aged 16 years, haulier.
  • Robert Griffiths aged 34 years, haulier.
  • Thomas Davies aged 49 years, collier.
  • Thomas Davies aged 12 years, collier.
  • John Evans aged 24 years, collier.

Those who were rescued alive but died later:

  • David Martin James aged 20 years, rider.
  • John Henry Thomas aged 23 years, engineman.
  • William Williams aged 33 years, rope changer.
  • Gomer Morgan aged 20 years, haulier.
  • Henry Isaac aged 21 years, haulier.
  • John Williams, hitcher.

Those who were rescued injured but alive:

  • Essex Hughes engineman.
  • Thomas Thomas, master haulier.
  • William Davies (Gof), ropeman.
  • Gomer Rees, haulier.
  • Richard Davies, haulier.
  • John Jones, hitcher.
  • William Henry Lewis, doorboy.

Mr. Liddell concluded that the explosion originated in the North West dip beyond the fall. He went on to say:

With the view suggested by the management that the blast began at the bottom of the shaft, I do not concur for the following reasons,

i).  The chief force of the explosion would have been felt in the East and West main levels which run in a straight line on both sides of the shaft.

ii).  Very slight traces of the blast were found to the east of the pit bottom.

iii).  The effects of the explosion were felt to the greatest distance in the South West heading and the North West dip. The chief volume of the blast must, therefore, in order to support this view, have, after a course of about 176 yards, been suddenly diverted, without meeting any obstacle, at right angles to the right and left from its original course, viz., at the partings where the South West heading and the North West dip leave the Main West level.

iv).  The evidence points to the North West dip as the quarter from which the explosion came.

About 500 yards from the bottom of the downcast, the Four Foot Seam went up in the fault. About four months before the disaster a stone heading was started from the North West dip towards the Four Foot seam. Just inbye of this point there had been a large fall due to the disturbed character of the strata which left a cavity about 30 feet high and 9 feet wide at the top. this was a place where gas was likely to accumulate and the management ordered it to be packed with masonry and to secure the packing below by 24 feet of arching.

This work was started in August or September and on 23rd December a length of about 7 feet of arching, measuring 16 feet under the crown, had already been built across the intake from the point where the heading left it and another six-foot section was in the course of construction. The crown of the arch was three feet thick with six feet of packing above which left a space of about four feet between that and the roof. When the arches were started, an airway had been made from, the upper part of the cavity above them, which descended into the intake about 15 yards inbye. The airway was continued as the work progressed, forming a trench on the top of the packing, 26 feet from the ground. The air was turned upwards into the cavity by half a canvas sheet hung in the intake and reaching to within three feet of the ground.

On the day of the explosion, three mason and two assistants were working on the arches. A stage had been erected for them under the cavity about six feet high. Access to this was by a ladder which went to the head of the roof arch and was six feet below the cavity above the packing. The assistants to the masons were allowed to use naked “comet” lights. The authority for this was given by the fireman after consultation with the manager with the provision that these lamps were not to be taken above the intake. On the morning of the explosion, the “comet” lamp was seen hanging on one of the timbers at the side of the heading. It was not produced at the inquest but was said to have disappeared at the time of the explosion. The masons at work on the staging were ordered to use locked lamps.

The stone heading, the entrance to which was immediately inbye for the finished part of the arches, on the south side of the North West dip, was started between two and three months before the explosion. It was driven through rock and by the 23rd December, it was about two chains long with the height at the mouth about six feet six inches and nine feet wide. The heading had been driven by blasting with ordinary shots fired on the orders of the fireman. On the night before the explosion, four shots were fired in the heading. Gas had never been found there and locked lamps were always used by the workmen. There was a slight deposit of coal dust in the heading.

There were two main theories as to how the gas was ignited. Mr. Wales thought that it was caused by the ignition of coal dust in the North West dip by the comet lamp and that the dust was raised by the firing of a blown out shot in the stone heading. Mr. Randall and Mr. Galloway thought it was caused by an accumulation of firedamp in the cavity above the arches and ignited by one of the masons raising the comet lamp into the gas.

There were traces of three shot holes of which two had been fired and had done their work but the sides of the other were unbroken. There was strong evidence that this had never been fired. The bodies of the four men in the stone heading were all found in the heading and one of them was seven to eight yards from the face where the shot would have been fired. It was not possible to suppose that the men would have remained in the heading when the shot was fired and had they been outside the heading they would have been at the point where the explosion began and killed instantly. A truck full of rubbish was standing close to the face, a canister of powder containing four loaded cartridges was within two or three yards and boring tools were found just under the hole. All this was inconsistent with the state of things when a shot was fired. The face of the heading was 50 yards from the intake and it was extremely doubtful whether a shot which blew out at the face could have raised sufficient dust in the intake to fired at a naked light.

The management was clearly aware of the danger of the gas in the cavity above the arches and the place was regularly tested by the fireman and sometimes by the manager. There were no signs of violence in the place where the explosion must have begun. The ladder was left standing and the staging was not disturbed. Mr. Galloway and Mr. Raddell explained this as follows. The gas in the cavity was probably a tin layer with too little air above and too much below to fire an explosive mixture, so until the gas got from the intake it would cause a flare or blow out rather than an explosion.

The explosion was opened by Mr. T. Williams of Merthyr, Coroner for the district and lasted for six days. The jury returned the following verdict:

We find that an explosion of gas occurred in the Rhondda District of the Mardy Colliery on the 23rd December 1885 whereby Daniel Williams, overman, lost his life, but how or where the gas ignited, sufficient evidence has not been produced to enable us to determine. We are, however, convinced that it did not occur from shotfiring in the hard heading.

The jury also made the following suggestions:

i. That efficient means be taken to allay and them remove coal dust from mines generating explosive gas.

 ii. That boys attending the elementary school of the colliery district be instructed in the rules of the colliery or collieries in the vicinity of which the school is situated.

 

REFERENCES
The Mines Inspectors Report, 1885. Mr. T.E. Wales.
Report on the Mardy Colliery Explosion by A.G.C. Liddell, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.
“And they worked us to death” Vol.1. Ben Fieldhouse and Jackie Dunn. Gwent Family History Society.

Information supplied by Ian Winstanley and the Coal Mining History Resource Centre.

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