Llest Colliery Explosion – Pontyrhyl – 1899

LLEST. Pontyrhyl, Glamorganshire, 18th. August, 1899.

The colliery was near Pontyrhyl in the Garw Valley about seven miles from Bridgend and was the property of the Llest Coal Company, Limited. Messrs. Forster Brown & Rees of London and Cardiff were the consulting mining engineers.

Mr. Thomas Loughor was the certificated manager and Mr. William Rees the undermanager. Mr. Loughor succeeded Mr. Thomas Owen six to eight weeks before the disaster but he had been the undermanager of the colliery for several years. Over the previous three years, Mr. Thomas Griffiths of Cymmer, a colliery manager with about thirty years experience in both steam and house coal collieries had examined the colliery from time to time on behalf of Messrs. Forster Brown & Rees.

For many years the colliery had worked the house coal seam which was known as the No.3 Rhondda and for the two years before the explosion, the No.2 Rhondda had been worked. It was in this seam that the explosion occurred. The colliery had two shafts. The No.2 Seam was reached at the winding shaft at a depth of 117 yards and No.3 at a further 110 yards, making a total depth of 227 yards. The seams rose to the north and the workings in the No.3 seam were connected by a slant or dip drift from the outcrop of this seam. The other shaft was sunk about two years before the disaster when the no.2 seam was opened up to provide a separate outlet from these workings and also to provide a more convenient upcast from them when the No.3 seam was abandoned. However, at the date of the explosion, it was used as the downcast for both seams. The air current went down and entered the No.2 seam and after ventilating the workings, descended by means of the winding shaft to No.3 seam. The same current ventilated the No.3 seam workings and passed from there by way of the slant to the surface.

The ventilation was produced by a Schiele fan, five feet three inches in diameter which was sited at the mouth of the upcast slant. The fan ran at 400 to 800 r.p.m. and produced a current of about 10,000 cubic feet per minute in No.2 seam and about 12,000 in No.3 seam at a water gauge of 1.5 to 1.7 inches. The ventilation in both seams was by the same system and the shaft arrangements were peculiar. Although a portion of the winding shaft between Nos. 2 and 3 seams was the downcast for the No.3 seam, it was not isolated from the upper portion of the No.2 seam nor was the shaft closed at the surface. It was stated that radiated heat from the steam pipes in this shaft warmed the air which filled it down to the No.2 seam and maintained such an equilibrium in the shaft that was neither upcast nor downcast. Mr. Robson, the Inspector, noted that:

It should be observed that any cooling of the winding shaft would have the tendency to seriously interfere with the ventilation of No.2 seam but there was no evidence, nor have I reason to believe that this ever took place during working hours.

The workmen in the No.3 seam followed the custom of the district and worked with naked lights and in general, the workings in the house coal seams were damp if not wet throughout especially near the surface. Although the depth to No.2 at Llest was greater than in other places where it had been worked and the seam at Llest was no exception to the rule. At the time of the explosion, 160 gallons of water per minute which was equal to 1,028 tons in 24 hours had to be pumped to the dip.

As the workings developed, the upper portion drained into the lower portion. At the date of the explosion headings 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 were damp and even wet in parts. The workings to the rise, No.1 East and North headings were dry as were most of the faces and stall roads, were in the opinion of the Inspector, “dry and dusty”, an opinion that was not held by the officials at the colliery.

Until just before the explosion, the coal had been worked by pillar and stall. The pillars being 9 to 12 yards and the double row of stalls about 14 to 16 yards wide. the stalls were drive off single headings which were at intervals of about 55 yards. A few weeks before the disaster, the management had begun to change the method of working to a modified form of longwall working. Up to this time, it did not appear that the change had brought about any general subsidence of the roof which usually followed longwall working. the workings had been carried forward far enough to form larger “wastes” behind the faces than there had been under the previous method of extraction. The amount of rubbish formed in the working was not enough to completely full the wastes and so there was more space which required ventilation and more chance that gas could accumulate. On the other hand, the ventilation was becoming simpler as long as the doors and brattice sheets were kept in good condition as the air course became straighter.

Blasting was carried out mainly in stone in the headings and ordinary compressed gunpowder was used, which was not a “permitted” explosive. Blasting was in the hands of the workmen who fired their own shots by means of a fuse. The Inspector commented:

In my opinion, this use of gunpowder was a violation of the Explosives in Coal Mines Order under the conditions which applied at the date of the explosion and probably for some time previously.

The No.2 Rhondda had a strong roof of cliff, 6 to 8 feet thick and about 5 inches of shale. The coal was between 3 feet 4 inches to 3 feet 6 inches thick and there was a shale floor. Because of the comparative thinness of the seam and the pushing forward of the single headings by a double shift, the workings had been developed rapidly. This together with the fact that the seam was solid between the point where it was opened and the outcrop, resulted in more inflammable gas being encountered than was usual in et seam which, for the most part, had been opened at or near the surface and developed downwards.

During 1897 there were three cases of men being burned by the ignition of firedamp in the No.2 seam, in 11898 one case of burning was reported in the No.3 seam and in 1889 there were four cases in the No2 seam. The examination of these incidents showed the same cause in all cases, a small quantity of firedamp had been ignited at a naked light. They were all caused by a small derangement of the ventilation which caused a failure in the air current to reach the extreme point of the face. The general ventilation was found to be adequate and no accumulated firedamp was ever found on inspection.

Mr. Gray usually made the inspections and on 11th January he reported to Mr. Robson that the No.2 seam did not produce much gas and told the manager. Mr. Owen said that he could not depend on keeping the places free from gas and he must use safety lamps. On 10th April, Mr. Gray again inspected the colliery and reported that the ventilation was adequate and he could not find any gas but he added “a good deal of gas is given off from a “rider” just under the seam.” After the burning incidents, Mr. Robson wrote to the owners on the 24th. July and brought to their attention what appeared to be a violation of the 8th General Rule. At the inquest, it emerged that the letter had not been received nor had its contents been forwarded to the owners as the manager had taken on the responsibility himself for the matter.

Mr. Loughor was the manager at that time and he appeared to have provided a few safety lamps and given instructions that these were to be used in any place where gas was found. This was done on one or two instances for a shift or two. Mr. Robson commented that the 8th. General Rule was not wholly satisfactory as it allowed “mixed lights” in districts.

Naked lights were in use in most of the house coal collieries in Garw and the neighbouring valleys of Glamorganshire. There had been small incidents but no explosion resulting in a large loss of life had taken place in the seam for many years. The Inspector commented:

There can be no doubt that the general wetness of these seams is deemed a safeguard against any large explosion in them, and that this wetness is considered a good reason for continuing the use of naked lights, when otherwise the same amount of gas met with would suggest the use of safety lamps exclusively.

Forty-nine persons in the charge of David Morgan, fireman, went to work in the No.2 seam at 7 a.m. on the night shift of the 17th August. About twenty-four others under the supervision of another fireman went into the No.3 seam. These men were made up of colliers, repairers, labourers, hauliers, riders and hitchers. The fireman’s examination of the No.2 seam before the shift half-revealed nothing untoward and everything went on as usual until 2 a.m. when the alarm was raised at the surface that something was wrong. The banksman noticed a puff of air come up the winding shaft and the hitcher came up the shaft saying that he had felt a rush of wind.

David Morgan, the fireman along with William Thomas and Fred Ashton were going down the dip with a “journey” when they felt a puff of wind from behind. They were between Nos.2 and 3 East and realising that something unusual had occurred, Morgan went up the dip to the No.2 heading and found that the first main door there had burst outwards ii the middle and the second door had been blown outwards off its hinges. Passing inwards, Morgan encountered the afterdamp and after passing two labourers who were in the dark, he met James Edwards, a haulier coming out. Edwards volunteered to go with him and they passed through strong afterdamp to reach two other labourers who were in the dark. Morgan told them to go out and then went towards the face. He reached purer air opposite the airway from No.1 to 2. He found two men and a boy in a cross-heading near the face, at work and apparently unaware that anything had occurred.

In a short time, all the men and boys were got out with the exception of William Thomas, one of the riders. Thomas had volunteered at once to go and warn others of their danger and as he did so he was overcome by the afterdamp. He was found dead and although everything was done to revive him by two doctors who had gone down the pit, Doctors Parry-Jones and J Arthur Rees, he died. The others suffered the effects of the gas but later recovered.

The manager, undermanager and fireman of the colliery assisted by several of their workmen and the managers of neighbouring collieries, temporally restored the ventilation and reached the working so of the No.1 east and the North heading. Here they found all the dead.

Those who died were:

• William H. Jones aged 44 years, repairer.
• Samuel Rees aged 26 years, repairer.
• Frank John aged 38 years, labourer.
• James Jones aged 23 years, labourer.
• Herbert Bisset aged 19 years, haulier.
• Owen Owen aged 37 years, collier.
• David Hopkins aged 23 years, collier.
• Hugh Davies aged 13 years, collier.
• Evan Davies aged 33 years, collier.
• Tom Jeremy aged 24 years, collier.
• Thomas Jones aged 18 years, collier.
• David Thomas aged 41 years, collier.
• Abednego Williams aged 33 years, collier.
• John Mort aged 28 years, collier.
• William Daniel aged 29 years, collier.
• Fred Evans aged years, 24 haulier.
• William Lewis aged 44 years, repairer
• Thomas Williams aged 25 years, labourer.
• William Thomas aged 22 years, rider taken from the pit alive but died later.

Those severely injured were:

• J. Davies,
• James Edwards,
• David Morgan, fireman,
• Edward Rich,
• John David Thomas.

Mr. Robson received a telegram informing him of the disaster and took a train, arriving at the colliery at noon. by this time all the bodies had been recovered. He made a full inspection of the area and found that there was little damage to the fabric of the mine. He came to the conclusion that the gas had ignited in the first working stall off No.2 East due to the temporary absence of two colliers, David Thomas and Abednego Williams, who worked there and the gas was ignited by David Thomas when he returned to the face. Mr. Robson went on to say that:

I think there must have been some derangement of the ventilation to cause the accumulation of gas but as nearly every sheet in the district and the main doors had been destroyed by he explosion, it is impossible to form any conclusive opinion.

Ashton, the rider, was the last to pass out of the No.1 East and he gave testimony that the doors were closed after him. There was no evidence to doubt this.

The adjourned inquest was held on August 28th, 1899 when all interested parties were represented and lasted for three days when the jury returned the following verdict:

The jury are of the opinion that the 19 persons who met their death at the Llest pit on Friday, August 18th, 1899, were suffocated as a result of an explosion of gas.

They are further of the opinion that gas had accumulated in the stall of Abednego Williams owing to some derangement of the ventilating current during the men’s temporary absence, and that it was ignited by the introduction of a naked light. The jury regrets that safety lamps were not in use at this colliery previous to the explosion, and consider that the management, unfortunately, committed an error of judgment in not introducing them.

Mr. Robson commented that he was glad to report that safety lamps were introduced on 28th August when the colliery resumed operations.

REFERENCES
Mines Inspectors Report
Reports to Her Majesty’s Secretary of State for the Home Department on the circumstances attending an explosion which occurred at the Llest Colliery Pontyrhyl on the 18th August 1899 by Chester Jones, Barrister-at-Law and J.T. Robson, one of Her Majesty’s Inspectors of Mines.
”And they worked us to death” Vol.1. Ben Fieldhouse and Jackie Dunn. Gwent Family History Society.

Information supplied by Ian Winstanley and the Coal Mining History Resource Centre.