GARTH MERTHYR. Maesteg, Glamorganshire. 11th. June 1897.

An overwinding accident occurred at the colliery about 5 p.m. when nine persons lost their lives. The Garth shaft was 260 yards deep and was the downcast and winding shaft at the colliery which was the property of the Garth Merthyr Colliery Company. James Barrow, the mining engineer, had been the general manager of the colliery for many years. The shaft was fitted with steel guide rails, two for each cage and was carried 32 feet above the level of the surface landing where they were bolted to cross beams which were fixed immediately below the pulleys. The pulleys were 12 feet in diameter and mounted on a frame at a height of 44 feet from the surface landing.

The winding engine was a double-acting horizontal type with cylinders of 25 inches in diameter connected directly to the crankshaft of the engine. Ropes one and one-eighth inches in diameter, of the best crucible steel, were used and they were attached to the cage chains by “caps” or sockets riveted and hoped in the usual manner. The engine was provided with the necessary gear for starting, stopping and reversing, a foot brake common to the class of engine and a disc indicator. Everything about the engine was in perfect working order.

The signalling arrangements were of the usual kind and the proper signal appears to have been given by the hitcher and the banksman at the time of the accident. The winding engine was not provided with an automatic apparatus to prevent overwinding but the 26th General Rule was complied with for the Special Rule 104 provided that:

When raising persons in the shaft of a mine, the engineman shall check the engine in due time, so that the speed of the lift shall not exceed 3 miles an hour at a point 10 feet below the surface and the lift shall not exceed that speed at the surface.

The distance fixed by this rule was fixed by arbitration in 1895.

On the afternoon of the fatal occurrence, Thomas Thomas, the engineman, change with William Lewis, the day shift engineman at 5 p.m. Lewis had worked from 7 a.m. and left everything in working order when he left the engine house. Lewis observed nothing the matter with Thomas and nothing except a “good night” was exchanged between the two men.

Thomas wound two or three cages, some with coal and some with men, and the men were waiting ready to ascend at the end of their shift. Among the men who had just ascended safely was Thomas Hopkins, the mechanical engineer at the colliery, and on leaving the cage he walked across the pit bank for about 20 yards and sat down on some timber. He was looking back at the pit head when the accident happened.

The first thing he noticed by those at the surface as that the cage, known to be winding men from the signals, was not stopped at the proper place but went against the cross beams were it stayed for a moment. The rope was them pulled out of the socket and the cage containing the men crashed won the shaft to the bottom. The banksman, who was holding the “fangs”,  seeing the cage strike the gate violently, left his post for fear the something would fall on him and the fangs not being arranged so that they could fall on their own were not in a position to hold the cage. It seemed to the Inspector that the fangs would have held the cage in any case. The cage would weigh about 1 ton 11 cwt and had fall 2 feet to that point.

Hopkins went immediately to the engine house and found Thomas there alone standing two or three yards from the handles. When asked what had happened, Thomas replied, “I do not know.”

The Daily News, 12th June 1897 reports that at 5.20 the engine driver wound the cage into the headgear.  The rope snapped and the cage fell 360 yards into the sump.  The bodies of:

  • ACKERMAN, George, 14
  • DAVIES, John, 29, Married two children.
  • GUEST, Lewis, 28, Married one child.
  • HOWELLS, Edgar, 14
  • HOWELLS, John Hughes, 31, Single.
  • LEWIS, David, 26, Single
  • REES, John, 16, Son of Thomas. Rescued but died later
  • REES, Thomas, Married nine children. Father of John.
  • THOMAS, John G, 14

The inquest was held before Mr. H. Cuthbertson, Coroner and a jury on the 14th June.

Thomas, the engineman, told the court:

I have been an engineman at the colliery for 32 years. I went on duty on Friday evening at 5 and changed with William Lewis. I first raised a tram of coal, then cages with men safely. It was, I think, the fourth cage that the accident happened to. The first thing I remember now is seeing Thomas Hopkins in the engine house after the accident. I did not see the cage go up into the sheaves. I found nothing wrong with the machinery.

Thomas did not make any attempt to blame anything or anybody for the accident but himself. He was a man of good character and the Inspector thought that the disaster was caused by a momentary loss of concentration by the man. Mr. Robson went on to say that there were no automatic contrivances to prevent overwinding fitted to the machinery although detaching hooks were available and continued:

Unfortunately, the hooks are not entirely reliable in their action in the manner expected and claimed for them. Moreover, their adoption entails some additional anxiety from a dread of the becoming detached in the shaft or by breaking. One such case has happened, where a hook broke when the cage was running in the shaft. They certainly require to be kept in perfect order if they are to act when the occasion arises. Even when in perfect order, or supposed to be so, it has happened that the impact due to an overwind was so great that the beam for the catching hook (when the rope is detached) had been broken, thus rendering the apparatus worse than useless, for in the event of an overwind without such apparatus the cage may not be separated from the rope at all.

Some engineers which use detaching hooks recommended in use, and as an additional precaution, a strong set of “keps” between the ordinary stopping place and the pulleys, so that in the event of an overwind and the failure of the hook to hold the cage from any cause, it shall be held by these keps. But even in a case of this description loss of life resulted, for the keps failed as well as the hook and the cage and men went to the bottom. It should be borne in mind that accidents of this nature are very rare, I believe this is due to the improved machinery in use, and to the exceedingly careful, steady class of engineman employed. For this reason, I do not advise the adoption of detaching hooks as a compulsory measure.

The jury brought in a verdict of “Accidental Death” and recommended that self-acting “keps” or “fangs” should be used.

 

Information supplied by Ian Winstanley and the Coal Mining History Resource Centre.

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