MICHAEL. Fife, Fifeshire. 9th. September 1967.

The colliery was in the Scottish Northern Area of the National Coal Board and was on the north shore of the Firth of Forth, near the village of East Wemyss, between Kirkcaldy and Leven. The Coal Board Area Officials were Mr. J.D. Skidmore, director, Mr. W. Rothwell, deputy director (operations), Mr. D.D. Shaw, chief mining engineer and Mr. J.S. Wilson, production manager. The manager of the colliery was Mr. G. Duncan, Mr. A. Nichol was the deputy manager and Mr. D. Wilson, Mr. J. Simpson, Mr. A. Robertson and Mr. J. Soutar were the undermanagers.

The Nos.1 and 2 shafts were begun in 1892 and both had a rectangular cross-section. they reached the Chemiss Seam at 136 fathoms in 1898. the No.3 shaft, 24 feet in diameter, lined with concrete, reached 300 fathoms in 1928 and in 1944 the No.2 shaft was enlarged to 20 feet in diameter and lined with concrete to 430 fathoms. In 1944 the No.1 pit was completely filled and the two remaining shafts were used to wind coal, the No.3 serving as the downcast and the No.2 as the upcast.

The top seam that was worked at the colliery was the Pilkembare and the bottom Seam was the Lower Dysart. There were 225 fathoms between these two seams and there were nineteen coal seams between them. The seams dipped south-east towards the sea at gradients varying between one in three and one in two. The coalfield was remarkably fault-free but there was one running roughly northeast where the measures were thrown about 50 fathoms to the north-east. At the time of the disaster, five seams were being worked, the Dysart Main, and the Four Feet in the No. 3 Pit and the Chemiss, Bowhouse and Branxton in the No.2 Pit.

The colliery employed 2,190 men, 1,874 underground and 316 on the surface. The average weekly output was 16,750 tons and was produced on fully mechanised shearer loader faces.

The checking system at the colliery had not been changed for years. A man reporting for work changed his clothes in the baths and then went to the lamp room to collect his lamp. He then went to the check office window, called his personal number, and collected two checks, one square and the other round, bearing his number. Ongoing underground, he dropped the square check into a container at the pit bottom and retained the round one.

At the end of the shift, each man dropped his round check into the check office window. The round check was then placed on a board with the corresponding square one indication that the men were now above ground. A lamp number was allocated to each man when he joined the colliery and there was no relationship between the lamp numbers and the check numbers. This system gave rise to confusion over the numbers of men still below ground at various stages in the incident.

The colliery was ventilated by a Howden 1,000 horsepower radial flow fan at the No.2 shaft which produced 310,000 cubic feet of air per minute at 3.5 inches water gauge. There was a stand by a fan, a two-stage Aeroto 400 horsepower 100-inch diameter with a capacity of 225,000 cubic feet per minute at 2.5 inches water gauge. There were no underground booster fans.

At about midnight in the early part of the night shift of the 8th-9th September, J. Izatt, a cable belt attendant, was cleaning the Cable Belt Road near the junction with the Loader Mine. He heard rumbling noises but he did not regard them as unusual and thought that they were the usual strata movement. At about 2.30 a.m. he travelled down the Loader Mine and went into the undermanager’s office on the low side of the Loco Level, where he saw A. Stirling, an overman. He told Stirling that he had heard a rumbling and that there had been one loud bang. As a result of this conversation, Stirling went to the Loader Mine and a few minutes later to where Izatt was working. He noticed nothing unusual and concluded that the bang had resulted from the breaking of the sandstone roof.

About an hour later Stirling returned to the undermanager’s office, smelt smoke coming through the ventilation pipes from the Loco Level. He went out of the office to the Loco Level where he saw a blue haze. He then turned right into the Loco Level and walked as far as the No.3 heading which he found clear. He came back and looked up the Loader Mine and saw what he took to be burning coal falling from the roof about 20 to 25 yards away. There was no smoke but amongst a small quantity of this material he particularly noticed, “one piece lying on the floor about six inches square and it was blazing it was black but there were fumes coming from it.”

He rushed along the Loco Level, up Bell’s Heading and back down the top end of the Loader Mine where, about 20 yards from the entrance, he met Izatt coming out in very heavy smoke. Izatt had returned to his work in the Cable Belt Dook, and had been cleaning out the back of the loading point when he had suddenly been enveloped in thick black smoke. The conveyors had been stopped for some time but they had been running earlier in the shift.

Stirling sent Izatt up Bell’s heading and told him to tell the onsetter at the No 3 shaft bottom about the fire. The onsetter, J.J. Teevan, sent for R. McIntyre, the pit bottom deputy, who saw Izatt in a state of collapse under the pit bottom clock at 3.50 a.m. Stirling went to the telephone at the bottom of Bell’s heading and tried to ‘phone the Dysart Dip Sections. He got no answer and sent to the Coronation Dipping and sent P. Ritchie, a back brusher, to warn the men in the Dysart Dip No.1 Section. He again tried to ‘phone Nos. 2 and 3 sections but could get no reply. He then spoke to T. Lister, a deputy in charge of the surface control room and told him, “There is a fire at the cable Belt Loader, get everybody concerned informed.”

Telephone calls were made and the alarm was raised. At the time there were 311 men underground, 45 in the No.3 Pit Bottom, 64 in the Dysart Dip Sections, 25 in the Four Feet Section and 177 in the No.2 Pit workings. It was remarkable that all but nine escaped the dense smoke and it was undoubtedly due to the rapid action that informed the men of the danger.

At the surface, Lister’s duty in the Control Room was to receive and pass on messages and information but he did not keep a complete log. Before he gave Stirling’s message to C. Webster, the senior overman in charge of the shift, he received a routine call from J. Tait, the overman in the Four Feet Section. Lister told him that there was a fire in the Cable Belt Book and he thought the trouble was confined to the Dysart Dip side of the pit.

W.Semple jur., an overman in the Branxton No.22 Section, who had heard of the fire rang the Control Room for more information. At about 3.45 a.m. Lister spoke to Webster and told him to get all the men out. Soon after Watson called to say that as the conditions were worsening, the Rescue Brigades should be called. There was some discussion on who was authorised to do this but Lister managed to contact Nichol, the deputy manager.

Nichol’s first reaction was “that it was one of those roadway heatings”. He left for the colliery immediately and, on arriving in the Control Room, he found that Lister could not give him any definite information of the situation underground. He was told that some men had been taken to hospital and he learned from men that had got out of the pit that there was a fire in the Loader Mine. He then thought, “he had a belt fire on his hands” and at about 4.35 a.m. He went to his office to make an action plan.

He instructed the telephone operator to contact the Rescue Brigades but this call was delayed because of the number of incoming calls from the police and the hospital. He arranged for the undermanagers, Simpson and Wilson and the general manager, Mr. Duncan to be called to the pit.

He spoke to Stirling who was in Bell’s Heading who told him he was putting up screens to fight the fire and was concerned about the safety of his men. Nichol decided to stop the fan but it was started a quarter of an hour later when Stirling sent a message that smoke was backing up Bell’s Heading and hampering the fire fighting.

Mr. Duncan reached the colliery at about 5.15 a.m. and took charge of the operations. He was told that there were possibly 60 men in the Dysart Dip and 30 in the Four Feet Section with a considerable in the No. 2 Pit workings. He realised that the only way to improve their possibility of escape was to reverse the ventilation in the Loco Level. Reports that the Dysart Dip and the No.2 Pit Sections were clear of men, attention was concentrated on the Four Feet and a decision was taken at about 6 a.m. to open the doors in the No.2 Heading to draw the smoke into the Dysart Main Return. These doors were opened at 7.15 a.m. by a rescue brigade but the smoke continued to flow into the Sea Mine for a further two hours.

Following a meeting of all parties concerned it was agreed that it was unlikely that three men who had not been found could be rescued but efforts continued for another 24 hours and finished at 3 p.m. on the 10th September.

While this was going an at the surface, underground McIntyre had seen Izart in a state of collapse at the No.3 Shaft Bottom and he went down Bell’s Heading to get the men out of the New Pumphouse. He was stopped by the smoke at the Loco Level but he went another way and met B. White, the pumpman in Tilley’s Alley. J. Duncan, the pump house greaser, had informed A. Watson, in the overman’s office that smoke was going from the Loco Level into the Sea Mine. After seeing this for himself, Watson warned the inbye sections and the pumpman in the Chemiss Inset who he told to go to the surface.

A.S. Todd, the overman in charge of reconstruction, hurried back to the No.3 shaft when he saw the fire and told J. Field, the reconstruction deputy, to withdraw all the men to the pit bottom section. After making several telephone calls to Todd and K. Buckley, another overman, he opened the doors to Davidson’s Mine in an attempt to drive the smoke from the Dysart Turn to the upcast shaft. After he had done this, he helped the men coming out of the Sea Mine. At about 5 a.m., the undermanagers, D. Wilson and J. Simpson arrived, one at the Sea Mine and the other at the Dysart Dip side. All the 45 men in the No.3 Pit Bottom Section reached the surface in safety.

In the Dysart Dip Section, after Stirling had sent Ritchie into the Dysart Dip No.1 section and spoken to Lister, he was able to speak to R.C.M. Frazer, a deputy in the Dysart Dip No.3 section and to J.H. Drummond, a deputy at the foot of the cable belt. He told them that all the men were to come through the return airway to the No.3 Dook. He spoke to J. Drummond, a shot firer, and J.M. Imrie, a development workman, and agreed with them that because of the dense smoke, it would be better for them to walk up the return rather than attempt to go up the intake on the manrider.

Stirling went with a deputy, D.C. Dryberg down the Dysart Dip No.2 Dook and opened the doors to the 1a dip connection. They found that this had little effect on the smoke and closed the doors again with some difficulty and went to the east Loco Level. Stirling was driven back when the fan stopped but he remained in his area throughout his shift and organised the men and the fire fighting. The manriding haulage driver, T. Barr lowered the train when he received a signal at 3.40 a.m. The journey took five minutes in each direction. On the way up, he stopped the train at the Dip No.1 and later heard some men get off at the top. He lowered it again and brought out J. McDonald, the pumpman. The train went down for the third time and while it was at the bottom the electric power went off. A. Robie, a foreman electrician, was with Barr, arranged the switches so that the train could be drawn up as far as possible.

Robie had come out of the smoke when the power went off up Bell’s Heading when he met Stirling who asked him to get the fan restarted. He was not able to find a phone free and he reported to W.L. Wilson, the colliery electrical engineer, who was going to the automatic exchange to find the breakdown. After getting permission from Nicol, the fan was restarted.

Of the 64 men in the Dysart Dip workings, all but two escaped. P. Thompson, a greaser was last seen at 3 a.m. near the motor house at the top of the No.1 Dook by J. Duncan who worked in the new pumphouse. the rescue brigade recovered his body from the Cable Belt Dook. J. McKay was also a greaser was with a number of men near the phone when J. Drummond was speaking to Stirling. The smoke was very thick and KcKay was not seen again.

Ritchie went in through the Dysart Dip No.1 Section where he found J. Culcross, the overman and J. Linden, the face deputy, at the roadhead. He returned with some men through the East Loco Level. Culcross phoned down the face and sent Linden out along the bottom gate where he met men coming out of other sections. He went with the last of these men to Bell’s Heading. W. Armour, the roadways deputy, was told by the workmen at 3.45 a.m. that smoke was coming into the section. He sent his men out through the face and he went along the bottom road to the dooks. The smoke was light grey at first but later it turned black and smelt of burnt wood that caught at the back of his throat.

In the Dysart Dip No.2 face, J. Drummond, a shotfirer, was firing shots at the bottom of two roads that were being driven to develop the Dysart No.2 face. He smelt smoke that was coming through the ventilation tubes and went to the phone near the pumphouse where he spoke to Stirling and warned McDonald. The black smoke was coming down the dooks when he joined the men from the development headings and J. McKay, the greaser. They went back to the return airway, through the doors at the top of the no.2 section and made their way outbye through the smoke in several parties. McDonald went to the bottom of the No.1 Dook and stopped the pumps and then made his way up the No.2 Dook, to the top of the road doors where he saw J. Watson and R. Bernard, both deputies and then went to the manriding train. He was hauled to the top and signalled the bogies down again to fetch Watson and Bernard Watson, Bernard and R.C.M. Frazer all deputies, were at the top of the No.3 Section when they got the message from Stirling that the men were to go through the No.3 Dook. Frazer went down the face and met E. Moore, the overman, and they travelled along the bottom road together where they met J.H. Drummond and checked with him that all the men further inbye had been warned of the danger. Drummond went down the face keeping pace with the smoke, taking the workmen with him. This party travelled in the smoke up the No.3 Dook to the stairs at the top where visibility was down to ten feet. Several of them were distressed and required help.

By this time the smoke had travelled along the East Loco Level and the men had to get out by way of the Dysart Main Return. There were alternative routes from the top of the Coronation Dipping and the No.3 dook and J. Linden went back into the return at 4.30 a.m. to guide any men that were trying to find a way out. They travelled in small parties and some, finding the smoke very thick at the doors in the No.2 Heading, came through roads which they did not know to the 300 fathoms lateral. Others came through the 1 in 1 Drift and Davidson’s Mine. One group tried to come out through the Lochhead Level but were stopped by smoke. They went back to the return airway and eventually came through the overcast to the Lower Dysart Manriding Dook.

Many messages were sent to the Four Feet Workings to tell the men to get out but J.E. Nowak, a belt maintenance man, was standing near the Dysart Turn and saw the black smoke in the Sea Mine. He told Tait, the overman and J. Arthur a greaser to come out through the return. Eventually, all the men except McArthur and J.C. McEneamy, a belt man, accompanied part of the way by A. Taylor, a deputy walked out by the shortest way, through the Sea Mine which was filled with black smoke before they entered it.

Hunter, the roadways deputy, received an urgent message and came outbye sending his men ahead. he met a haze 150 yards from the face as he rode up the Four Feet Dook on the conveyors. At the top, he phoned the 750 Branxton pumpman, H. Gallacher and stayed to keep the conveyors running for a few minutes. He then tried to get to the top of the 750 Branxton Cable Belt Dook where some of his men had been working but he could only go 40 yards because of the smoke. Fortunately, the men had already seen the smoke and escaped. He went along the Sea Mine to the Dysart Turn where he saw Buckley, McIntyre, Todd and others. He told them to start the conveyor and shout into the Sea Mine to see if there was an answer. After a while, they heard a voice and in zero visibility, Hunter went into the smoke and found C. Cunningham, the pumpman lying on the ground. He carried him back to the Dysart Turn, a distance of 50 to 60 yards, with the help of some other men.

In the meantime, Tait had sent messages up the No. 31 Face to warn the men and he had telephoned Taylor who was at the face return roadhead. All the men, except Taylor, came down the face and walked out through the Sea Mine. D. Wilson, an apprentice fitter, set off from the face with J. Smith and A. Thompson. They rode up the first of the two conveyors but when they reached the top of the second, Thompson was not with them. About 50 yards from the Dysart Turn, D. Wilson found A. Grieve, a maintenance man, lying on the floor and told him to get up and keep walking. When Wilson found that Grieve had not followed them, he lifted him to his feet and helped him into the fresh air. Several of the men came out of the Sea Mine vomiting and most of them suffered dizziness, coughing and loss of movement to their legs. of the 25 in the workings at the time, 18 were able to escape.

Immediately McArthur, who was at the top of the Four Feet Dook, received the message to escape through the return, the black smoke appeared. He phoned McEneamy at the bottom of the Dook and arranged to meet him at the top. They went through the doors to the No 31 Section top road and saw Taylor coming towards them. After Taylor had been through the doors and seen how thick the smoke was in the intake, they set off down the return airway which was signposted. They turned left at the first junction for a rest at the ladder and they saw signs of smoke in the return.

Taylor had been alone at the top of the No.31 face and he did not know that his men had gone down to the bottom road. In spite or protestations from the other two men, Taylor decided to go back to make sure that they were all out, particularly, Gallacher, the pumpman. He arranged with the others, that if he was not back in a few minutes they should look for him and if they did not find him quickly they were to go on through the return following the signs. After about five minutes, they went back down the return but they could not see Taylor and went on. At the top of the ladder they turned right and following the signs to the “Escape Pit”, they came to the junction of Walker’s Dook and Steven’s Brae, up Steven’s Brae to the inset n No.2 Shaft at the Bowhouse Level. By this time, the smoke was quite thick but it cleared towards the shaft and they stopped at a fence where there was “no road” sign. They spent some time in the old workings to the north of the shafts and returned to the No.2 inset. McEneamy started to strike an old rusty bell plate with a brick and they shouted when they saw the cage go by. Later, a second cage with rescue men blowing hooters passed them.

When A.D.H. Smith, an overman, came up the shaft at about 7 a.m. he heard and saw nothing but W. Shaw, acting as a rescue brigade captain, heard voices at 10.35 a.m. Shaw’s brigade went down the shaft but was unable to find the Bowhouse inset but L.M. Irvine, the workmen’s inspector deduced that the voices must be coming from the inset and a rescue party under G. Pratt went down at 11.30 a.m. but because of signalling difficulties the attempt was unsuccessful. McArthur and McEneamy were eventually brought out of the No.3 shaft at 2.50 p.m.

Webster, the senior overman, was in the Bowhouse No.40 Section bottom road when he was told of the fire in the Cable Belt Dook at 3.45 a.m. He told T. Inglis, an overman, that he was going outbye to see about it but he made no mention of withdrawing the men from the No.2 Pit workings. He rode on a locomotive along the 360 fathom Lateral and found a blue haze at the Compressor House and smoke at the turn halfway between Nos. 1 and 2 crosscuts. He came back and made arrangements to withdraw the men. He spoke to Nicol at the surface and got the impression that he was as much in the dark about events as he was.

In the inbye sections Nowak had spoken to W.K. Paterson, a deputy in charge of mechanisation, and advised him to send the men out through the Lower Dysart Manriding Dook. A. Watson, at the No.3 Pit Bottom had told some workmen in the 360 fathom Lateral to warn everyone to go to the No.2 Shaft by way of the 430 fathoms Mine. These messages were passed on and all the men in the No.2 Pit workings were safely withdrawn. The men from the inbye workings made their way to the Compressor House through the 430 fathoms Lateral where they were checked out by their deputies. Some of them were taken out on locomotive trains to the bottom of the Lower Dysart Manriding Dook but the majority of the men walked u the Dook. Some required assistance on the steep gradient.

At the No.2 Pit Bottom A.D.H. Smith left the Coal More Turn at about 4.40 a.m. and walked along the 430 Mine towards the shaft. He was passed by two fitters who told him that there was fire and that the men should withdraw. at 5.10 a.m, near the pit bottom M. Blankenstein, a deputy, told him had gone up the shaft and it was closed. After a delay, Smith got through on the phone to Nicol and told him that he had a stretcher case to send up and that the atmosphere was getting hazy. By 5.40 a.m. all the men were out of the pit save about six and there were signs of carbon monoxide at the shaft bottom.

Smith went to the bottom of the Lower Dysart Manriding Dook to satisfy himself that all the men were out and he finally rode up the No.2 shaft at 7 a.m. leaving the acting onsetter and pumpman at the pit bottom to wait for their reliefs. Their services were required and the pumps had to be kept running and he kept in touch with them by phone.

Cull, a deputy, went down the No.3 shaft at 8.50 a.m. with the day onsetter and pumpman. They walked down the Lower Dysart Manriding Dook and found thick smoke on the inbye side of the doors to the 430 Mine. After leaving the doors open for a while, it cleared and they went on to the No.2 shaft bottom condition deteriorated and at 10.45 a.m. wearing short period breathing apparatus, they were brought up the No.2 shaft by a rescue brigade.

In the report Mr. Stevenson commented:

I can not conclude this necessarily brief account of the escape of the men from the mine without referring to their general behaviour. That the evacuation was completed in extremely difficult conditions in such a commendably short time in itself a tribute to the very high standard of self-discipline exercised by all. Under-officials displayed their concern for the safety of the men in their charge and the men an equal concern for the welfare of their workmates. There was at times some confusion, is in the circumstances which obtained, quite remarkable. There was at no time the slightest degree of panic is remarkable. Had there been, the death role in this incident would have undoubtedly have been much higher.

Those recovered 9th September 1967:

  • Alexander Henderson aged 41 years, a power loader operator,
  • Johnstone Smith aged 36 years, a power loader operator,
  • James Tait aged 41 years, overman,
  • Andrew Thomson aged 55 years, a power loader operator,
  • Philip Thompson aged 64 years, a greaser.
  • Henry Morrisonaged 36 years, a power loader operator.

There were three bodies that were not found:

  • Hugh Gallacher aged 61 years, a pumpman,
  • James McKay aged 59 years, a greaser,
  • Andrew Taylor aged 43 years, a deputy.

The inquiry into the disaster was conducted by H.S. Stephenson, B.Sc., C. Eng., M.I.Min.E. H.M. Chief Inspector of Mines and Quarries and D.G. Wilde, a Principal Scientific Officer in the Safety in Mines Research Establishment of the Ministry of Power described a series of experiments that were carried out at the Establishment’s Buxton Station. These experiments centred upon the behaviour of polyurethane foam when it was burnt. The hazards on the foam came to light. There was little doubt from the experimentally generated fired, that a P.V.C. belt within range of the fire would be consumed by it and it was found that the P.V.C. belting and the foam produced thick black smoke and poisonous gasses.

As to the cause of the fire, there was no evidence produced at the inquiry to show that it was from spontaneous heating and it was conjectural how sufficient air got behind the lining to sustain heating. It was difficult to be more precise than to say that the heating occurred in the roof coal somewhere in the Loader Miner that was lined with polyurethane.

The Inspector recommended that:

1) (a). polyurethane foam as at present constituted, whether or not treated with a fire-retardant coating, should not be used underground at any mine, or  at the surface of any mine in such a situation that the products of its combustion would be likely to enter the mine

(b). any foam which has been placed in moving ground or in a situation where there is a spontaneous combustion hazard shall be removed immediately, or sealed off, or be given adequate fire-retardant coating and removed within 12 months

(c). any foam which has been placed in a situation other than in (b) above shall be given an adequate fire-retardant coating and be removed as soon as practicable or sealed off.

2). The National Coal Board should review the present procedures for implementation of the Emergency Organisation (including charts posted in offices) and give specific instructions to managers that the senior official at the mine available at the time of an incident should be authorised, without prejudice, to call on the Rescue Station services and to declare an Area emergency.

3). The Board and H.M. Inspectors should examine the possibility of improving the checking systems.

4). The methods of signposting all means of egress should be examined and a standard method instituted.

5). Overmen and deputies shall at least once every month inspect and report on the state of every means of egress from the parts of the mine assigned to them.

The recommendations were submitted to all interested parties in February 1968.

 

REFERENCES
The report of the causes and the circumstances attending the fire which occurred at the Michael Colliery, Fife, on the 9th September 1967 by H.S. Stevenson, B.Sc., C.Eng., M.I.Min.E.,  H.M. Chief Inspector of Mines.

Information supplied by Ian Winstanley and the Coal Mining History Resource Centre.

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