Kinneddar Colliery Fire – Dunermline – 1895

KINNEDDAR. Dunermline, Fifeshire. 31st. May, 1895.

The colliery was the property of Fifeshire Main Collieries, Limited. There was a large furnace at the bottom of the Jersey upcast shaft which was always kept burning and for a few days before the disaster it was necessary to light more fires to clear large amounts of gas that had accumulated in the mine. The fires set fire to the wooden lining on the upcast shaft, the No.3 Pit, which fell down the shaft. At the time of the disaster, the workmen were out of the mine and underground operations were confined to repair work.

Two coal seams were worked at the colliery, the Jersey and the Splint and three shafts were in use. No.1 Pit was 12 feet by 5 feet and 22 fathoms deep and lay 500 yards to the rise of the Nos. 2 and 3 Pits. No.1 was used only as a downcast shaft and the air taken to the Jersey workings of the No.2 Pit. The strata rose one in five and a half to the North West. The No.2 shaft was the main shaft and was 21 feet by 7 feet and was used for drawing coal from both seams, the transport of men, pumping water and was the main downcast shaft. The Splint coal lay at 65 fathoms and the Jersey coal 11 fathoms above. There was only one cage used from both the Jersey and the Splint seams at the time of the accident and the other cage ran in the shaft to balance the engine. The No.3 shaft was sunk to the Splint coal and was used as the upcast shaft for the colliery. It was also the escape shaft and second outlet and it was in this shaft that the accident occurred.

The air that went down the No.2 Pit entered the Jersey seam and passed round the working faces in one current. The remainder of the air passing down the shaft divided into two currents at the bottom of the shaft, one to the east and one to the west of the Splint coal workings, entered the no.3 Pit and met the air for the Jersey where it all went to the surface. The total quantity of air passing through the pit was 20,000 cubic feet of air per minute. Naked lights were used by the miners and safety lamps were used only on necessary occasions. The ventilation was good but the weather was becoming warmer and this impeded the ventilation and more ventilation was required to clear away some blackdamp that was found at the extremity of the west level in the jersey seam.

The No.3 Pit was 12 feet by 6 feet with a wooden lining which was three inches thick and extended from the surface to the Splint coal with a break of 13 feet just below the Jersey coal where the crosscut entered the shaft. On the east level between Nos. 2 and 3 shafts in the Jersey seam there was a wooden door separating the intake and return currents. The sinking of the No.3 Pit had been completed only at the end of 1893.

Up to November 1894 a fire lamp and an open fire produced the ventilation and then a furnace, known as a “cube” in Scotland, was constructed and built to the manager’s instructions. This was 6 feet wide by two and a half feet with side constructed of 9-inch brickwork and the bed of iron plates which were open at both ends. The furnace burned 10 to 14 cwt. of coal in 24 hours. The flame was used after the furnace was finished but the fire was discarded. In order to deal with any fire that might be caused a sinkers kettle which held 120 gallons of water was kept nearby. It was the practice of the bottomers at the No.2 shaft to carry two pails of water to the No.3 Pit. The contents of one pail was thrown over the slides and a plank fence in the shaft and the other was emptied into the pail to keep up the water level. The timber exposed to these fires was never ignited but it was realised that it could do so. It was stated by the people who put the water on the planking that it steamed when they did so.

On the day shift the cube was visited by the day shift fireman Alexander Thompson and by the bottomers in the Jersey seam. During the afternoon and up to 11 p.m. the night shift fireman attended them and afterwards left a man in charge until the day shift fireman descended. The black damp issuing into the pit needed increased ventilation and Cooper, the undermanager with the help of Thompson, but on his own initiative, erected an open fireplace in the bottom of the No.3 Pit. It consisted of three-foot iron rails on bricks and crossed by other rails. A fire of about 3 cwt. of coal was kindled at about 7.30 a.m. and no precautions were taken to prevent the fire igniting the woodwork. When Cooper went to the surface for his breakfast he saw Mr. Calderwood, the manager and reported to him what had been done. Mr. Calderwood gave instructions to have the place watched.

On the day of the accident, 118 people descended the mine at 7 a.m. and all went well until the shift was nearly over. The bottomer at the No.2 Pit was not at work and his place had been taken by another. At 2.30 p.m. three small flames were seen in the packing just above the bars and attempts were made to put these out by using buckets of water. This was not successful and an effort was made to take down the timber but this was also not successful. The flame was carried forward in the shaft and the timber was soon blazing. It reached the surface and the framework and pulleys were set alight as well as the wooden building on which the winding engine was placed.

Shortly after the men had stopped work, the manager noticed great volumes of smoke coming from the Jersey Seam, upcast shaft. He went down at one and found that the furnace a mass of flames. Within half an hour the upcast shaft and the pit head were totally wrecked and flames rose sixty feet into the air, twenty feet above the winding drum. The manager quickly set about trying to stop the air to the fire and ordered men to go to the bottom of the pit to cut off all communications. He followed a little later to see how they were getting on with the work.

He had not been down in the lower seam for long when he heard cries coming from the Jersey Seam. He returned in the cage but there was a misunderstanding and he was not taken to the Jersey Seam but to the surface. He had passed the Jersey Seam and felt an intense heat. He lost no time in lowering the cage again to the mine. When it came up it contained four men who were terribly burned and in agony. The cage was sent down for a second time and returned with three miners in a similar condition as the first party.

On eye witness said:

I hope I’ll never live to see such another scene as you. The cage came up, the men fell out of it anyhow, screaming and roaring with the pain. We could do nothing to help them, for the flesh came off where we touched them. It was an awful sight. The rest of the men were crying like bairns.

Doctors were sent for and the men were tended at the pithead for the blisters on their hands and faces and their bodies were badly scorched. It was not thought that their condition was serious but it was realised the following morning that seven men had died. All the men who died were working at the stopping that were being erected to try to put out the fire. They did not realise the danger they faced as burning material fell down the shaft and filled the workings with smoke and fumes.

Lockhart Bellock was the only man to get out alive and he gave a firsthand description of the conditions in the mine:

I went down the pit at half-past six in the morning and worked as usual until a quarter past two o’clock. I had occasion to come to the bottom of one of the shafts at that hour, and on passing the upcast shaft, Alexander Thompson, the pit inspector, said to me, “Come here the woodwork of the upcast shaft has caught fire.”

There is a big tank of water at the bottom of the mine and we at once got pails and commenced to pour water on the flames.

We very soon found the work was no use and I really began to think we had got into a bad job. Seeing that we could do no good, I stopped pouring water, and rushed to the workings and told the men to run, because the upcast shaft was on fire. All the men in that section put on their clothes and we rushed to the bottom in the hope of getting to the surface.

When we reached the level leading on the Jersey Seam bottom of the upcast shaft, we met the manager and asked Thomas Sharp and me to go and build an air-tight stopping to cut off the draft. We worked for about half an hour and gradually the air became so bad that it was with difficulty the lamps could be kept in. At this stage, the manager came along and asked us how we were getting on. We replied that we should require assistance and he sent old Frank Sharp to give us a hand.

I had my side of the stopping built and old Frank had almost finished his when a terrible crash took place in the upcast shaft and the flames burst upon us. The air for this point turned and our lights went out. We saw it was no use in doing any more and began to rush for the downcast shaft. We found it a difficult matter to pilot out in the darkness down the incline, and we got hold of the signal wire and by this means got into the roadway leading to the bottom of the shaft.

As we went along we found the heat near the roof so intense that we were compelled to crawl on our hands and knees. Before we had gone far this was I heard Tom Sharp cry out, “I am choking!”. I replied, “Come away we are nearing the bottom and we may get up.”  Tom Sharp seemed to make a determined effort after this for I found the both striking up against my heels. Here I became faint and confused that I have only a faint recollection of what happened.

I remember, however, that, on hearing the bottom, I struck against my clothes and pick where I had laid them down when I was called away to the stoppings. I then knew that I was going right into the mouth of the pit, and ran a danger of falling from the Jersey to the Splint seam. I made a turn and went around the back of the pit, and on groping about; I could not find the Sharps. I suppose the poor men had gone straight on, and had fallen to the bottom of the shaft where they were found.

On getting a faint glimmer of light, I found Thompson signalling for the cage to come down. When it came, we got in and were carried to the surface. I then realised for the first time the struggle I had had for life. I soon recovered my strength and I an now suffering more for a stroke with a stone which fell on me from the roof than from the burns.

It was thought that all the men were out of the pit when it was discovered that two were missing. The manager called for volunteers to descend the pit and two men came forward. They searched for some time but found nothing and returned to the surface thinking that a mistake had been made but those on the pit bank were positive that Frank and Thomas Sharp were still underground. The rescuers and a second and a third descent when they went to the bottom seam and found the bodies of the two Sharps at the Splint coal. They had tried to escape from the Jersey Seam and had fallen down the shaft in the smoke and fumes.

Those who were burned:

• Alexander Thompson aged 31 years, fireman,
• Alexander Sharp aged 42 years, miner,
• William McKenna aged 42 years, miner,
• Thomas Hunter aged 41 years, miner,
• George Hunter aged 31 years, miner,
• John Hunter aged 28 years, miner,
• George Bell aged 28 years, miner.

Those who fell down the shaft:

• Frank Sharp aged 52 years, miner,
• Thomas Sharp aged 23 years, miner.

The disaster left eight women widows and left forty fatherless children and the inquiry was held at the Court House in Dunfermline on the 15th July and all interested parties were represented. The inquiry found that the actions of Cooper and Calderwood made an error of judgement in making the fore but found that no one was to blame for the seven who were burned to death. As to the men who fell down the shaft, it was found that the rules had been breached. The inquiry finished with the following comments:

The evidence was led to the superiority if a fan over furnace ventilation, but as regards safety and efficiency, and it was admitted by the manager that the furnaces were only a temporary expedient and that the erection of a fan was contemplated. There is nothing dangerous in the Coal Mines Regulation Act 1887 forbidding the use of furnaces for ventilating purposes and their use at the present time is not uncommon, nor are they dangerous if the proper precautions are taken. We do not therefore think it necessary to make any recommendations on this head beyond the obvious suggestion that were furnaces are employed, it should be placed in such a situation and under such conditions that adjacent inflammable material can not be set on fire by it.

REFERENCES
The Mines Inspectors Report, 1895. Mr. Ronaldson.
Report to the Right Honourable The Secretary of State for The Home Department by Sheriff John Comrie Thomson and J.B. Atkinson, Esq., H.M. Inspector of Mines on the Accident at Kinneddar Colliery Fifeshire.
The Colliery Guardian, 17th January 1896, p.119.

Information supplied by Ian Winstanley and the Coal Mining History Resource Centre.