WEST STANLEY. Chester-le-Street, Durham. 19th. April, 1882.

The day after the Trudoe explosion there was an explosion at the West Stanley Colliery near Chester-le-Street, County Durham. The colliery was owned by Mr. John Henry Burn of Newcastle. There were four Seams worked at the colliery: the Shield Row at 39 fathoms, the Low Main at 93 fathoms, the Hutton at 97 fathoms and the Busty at 140 fathoms. There were two Seams at the colliery which were not worked since they were worked out. These were the Five-Quarter and the Brass Thill Seam.

There were four shafts at the colliery two of which were used to work the Busty Seam. They were the ‘Busty’ shaft which was the downcast and the ‘Lamp’ shaft which was the upcast. In addition to these, there was a third shaft sink to the Hutton Seam and a fourth to the Shield Row Seam. The Busty shaft was 12 feet in diameter and 140 fathoms deep and was used to draw coal from the Bust and Hutton Seams. The lamp shaft was 12 feet in diameter and 140 fathoms deep and was used to draw coal from the Low Main and the Shield Row Seams. The coal from the colliery was mainly used to make coke and gas.

The workings of the Busty Seam covered a limited area and the boundary had been reached on the north, northeast and north-west. They were divided into three districts, the ‘North Headways’, the ‘South Headways’ and the ‘West Narrow Boards’ with the branch districts called the ‘South and North Cross Cuts’. The workings covered about 70 acres and this included the goaves. At the time of the disaster, a drift was being driven from the West Narrow Board into the Tilley Seam to open that Seam from the Busty Seam. This operation was to avoid making another opening into the shaft and there were many faults which generally ran north. These varied from a few inches to 23 feet in height.

The ventilation for the mine was produced by a Guibal Fan in the Lamp shaft. The fan was 32 feet by 10 feet and ran at 42 revolutions per minute sending 27,000 cubic feet of air per minute into the Busty Seam. The air then divided to the North Headways, the South Headways, the West Narrow Boards and the stables. There was also some allowance made for leakage.

The officials at the colliery were, George Greenwell, consulting viewer, William Johnson, manager and resident viewer, William Anderson, overman and wasteman, Thomas J. Coulson, back overman and Robert Hunter, master shifter. The last two lost their lives in the explosion. William Johnson and been the manager for five years and had practical control of the mine. Mr. Greenwell visited the colliery once a month.

There were 200 men and boys employed at the colliery but there were only 18 below ground when the explosion took place and of these 5 were rescued and brought out alive but the remaining 13 where killed. All the ponies and horses in the mine were killed with the exception of one. There were two deputies and an average of twenty-five hewers on each shift.

Clanny lamps were used in the mine. This decision was made by the findings of the inquiry into a Welsh explosion some years earlier when Mr. Burns, the owner of the colliery had wanted to introduce Meusler lamps for the Clanny’s but the men did not want them because of the poor light that they gave. The Meusler had been improved and gave a higher standard of safety as the flame in a strong current of air and it went out in the presence of an explosive mixture. On the other hand, it went out if it was placed in a slanting position and it did not give a very good light.

The last report on the state of the mine on behalf of the men was on 23rd November 1881 and the report in the overman’s book read as follows:

We, the undersigned, have examined the intakes, main area, return and working places and find them in good working order.

We, the undersigned, have examined the Busty Pit and found it all right.

(signed)

ALEXANDER JOHNSON.

GEORGE ANDERSON.

The examination by the overmen and deputies on the day before the explosion showed nothing unusual in the mine. The ventilation was good and there was no gas discovered. The last report of gas was on the 18th. March but the report books were not complete. It was well known that in the east going bords in the West District there was generally a considerable amount of heaving and that a hissing sound was frequently heard from the fissures in the coal.

The effects of the explosion were confined to a small area in the Busty Seam. The North District was hardly damaged at all and the four men who were working there as shifters were uninjured and only met with the after-effects of the explosion when they were making their way to the shaft. this they did some time after they heard the report which one of them at first thought was caused by the firing of a shot. The South District was also not damaged and it was obvious to those who inspected the pit after the disaster that the explosion had occurred in the western workings.

Five men were found dead at the bottom of the shaft and it was thought that they were standing ready to ascend at the time they were struck down. The timbers of the main intake were blown about and the stopping and the air crossings were destroyed in the West Narrow Boards. The bodies of McCabe and Middlemass were found in the North Cross-district and form the evidence of the direction of the burning and the direction in which materials were blown, it was thought that this was where the explosion originated.

Those who were killed were:

  • Thomas J. Coulson, back overman.
  • Robert Hunter, master shifter.
  • John Westgarth.
  • Riley.
  • John Clark.
  • James Clark.
  • Curry.
  • Turner.
  • Jobson.
  • James McCabe.
  • W. Middlemass.
  • R. Hutchinson.
  • John Douglas.

The inquest was opened by Mr. John Graham the coroner for the district but adjourned until 10th May after the evidence of the identification of the victims was heard. At the resumption, it was resumed on the 25th, 26th and 27th May 1882.

It was said in the Inspectors Report that the management of the mine was defective and there were irregularities in the provisions laid down by the Mines Regulation Act. Gas had been reported during the four or five months before the explosion but the manager would not admit that the mine was a firey one with all the attendant regulations and less care appeared to have been taken in the Busty Seam.

There were two theories as to where the gas was ignited. The first was put forward by the owner of the mine and supported by expert witnesses was that the explosion originated at the face where two men McCabe and Middlemass were working. At the head of this bord and not far from the face a large stone measuring five yards long and two feet broad and from ten inches to one foot in thickness had fallen. When this was examined after the explosion it was found that there was a large hole running several yards in the strata above the coal. It was suggested that the fallen stone released quantities of gas which was confined in this space and was later ignited by the lamps of the men who were working there. The position of the bodies of the men supported this theory. They looked as if they had been struck down when they were retreating from where they were when the gas escaped. Their cans and their food was lying some little way up the bords if the men had been eating at the moment of the accident. Two lamps were found in the place and they were both locked but there was a considerable amount of gas in the bord when it was examined.

The theory put forward by the men was that the explosion occurred in the South Cross-cut where a shot had been fired in the stone near the face, not many yards from where Hutchinson’s body had been found. The shot had been fired and the stone brought down but there were inconsistencies in the evidence. The first man into the place said he found a cracket or stool and a pick on top of a heap of stone which must have been placed there after the fall of stone and before the explosion took place. This testimony could not be shaken and Mr. Bowey on behalf of the men gave up the theory that the explosion had occurred in the South Cross-cut.

The question as to how the gas collected and how it was ignited, there was no doubt that there was gas in the coal and in McCabe’s and Middlemass’s place and hissing and bubbling noises had been heard in the place, gas could have collected in the space in the roof left by the stone and this was what the Inspectors thought had happened.

The gas could only have fired at one of the lamps of the two men as no other source of ignition was in the area but it was possible that the flame could have passed through the gauze of the lamp when the men ran away against the current of air.

The lamps that were found after the explosion were thoroughly examined and tested. Two miners were appointed on behalf of the men, Mr. Berkley and Mr. Colquhon for the owners and Mr. Atkinson for the Inspectors to conduct the investigation. The lamps were numbered and the men’s names were attached to them. The number of revolutions that were required to open them was noted and the same number was to be given in screwing them up after they were cleaned so that they were tested in the same position as they were found. The lamps were then tested in a box into which gas was slowly admitted.

REPORT OF THE EXAMINATION OF LAMPS.

Lamp No.55. John Westgarth.

Unlocked but screwed close. 2 poles over the glass had been taken out. Apparently uninjured. No washer. Takes two complete turns to unscrew the oilpan. 1st. Stood the test and went out. 2nd. Closed the windows and tested again. Went out.

Lamp No.67. Riley.

Found locked. two and a quarter turns to unscrew. Leather washer both top and bottom of the glass. Screwed full up.

Lamp No.12. James McCabe.

Locked. Saturated with oil. One and one-eighth turn to unscrew. Washer top and bottom. Cleaned and put together again. Screw was tight when unscrewed, but when put together again took about one eighth more turn to screw tight. tested and found all right and went out. screwed only with one and one-eighth turn as found.

Lamp No.2. W. Middlemas.

Locked. Screwed up very nearly tight. One and three quarters to unscrew. Washer top and bottom. Lamp dusty and oily. Sent out to be boiled. Gauze had slight indentation but wires were all good. Took one and a quarter to screw on. Stood the test all right and went out, one pole slightly bent.

Lamp No.28. R. Hutchinson.

Not locked but screwed up. One and three quarter turns to unscrew. Small coal dust slightly coked on gauze and saturated with oil, one and three quarters turns to unscrew. Washer both top and bottom. Lamp gauze boiled. Took a little more than one and three quarters to screw on. tested all right. Lamp went out.

Lamp No.124. John Douglas.

Not locked but screwed up. One and three quarter turns to unscrew. Small coal dust coked and saturated with oil. One washer at bottom of glass, none at the top. A little fine dust on the cap of gauze. One and three quarters turns to screw tight. Tested and found all right. Lamp went out.

The Inspector was critical of the condition at the colliery before the explosion:

1). No certified copy of the rules could be found and some doubt appeared at first to be entertained as to which of two sets of special rules were in force in the Busty Seam but afterwards it was stated that the Lamp Pit special rules were in force, they being the rules applicable to firey mines. Mr. Johnson, the manager, admitted that he had never seen any certified copy of the rules since he became manager five years before and no certified copy was produced.

2). One of the deputies, John Mossom, who gave evidence stated that he was unable to read and that he had never had the special rules applicable to his particular duties, as deputy, read over to him. He admitted that Mr. Johnson had told him to enter gas in his book whenever he saw it, but he stated that as a fact he never did so in cases where he was able to remove the gas by altering the position of the brattice or by other means. This appeared to be the usual practice in the mine, and although it was certainly not approved that it was done with the sanction or even the knowledge of the manager, Mossom himself gave as his reason for not having reported on one of the occasions on which he found gas, that the overmen William Anderson, had told him that it was not necessary. In other instances, the officials had a very imperfect knowledge of the rules and did not appear to appreciate the responsibility of their positions in the mine.

3). By the general and special rules in use at the colliery, the reports made by the overman and deputies should have entered in separate books kept for the purpose, but this was not done, and all the deputies, the fore-overman and the back overman, made their reports in the same book, which was kept in the colliery office, in the manager’s house, at some little distance from the pit mouth. It was provided by the special rules that the master wasteman should report upon the ventilation in a book kept and signed by him and that a copy should be sent daily to the manager or the under viewer. The master wasteman’s duties were, however, performed by William Anderson, in addition to his duties of overman but no suck book was kept by him. No copies were sent to the manager and any reports which he made as master wasteman were entered together with the overmanÕs and deputies reports in the book already mentioned.

4). General rule No.30 provides for the inspection of the mine on behalf of the persons employed, and that a book shall be kept at the mine, in which the reports shall be recorded and signed. No suck book was kept at the mine, and the reports of the inspections made and signed in the overman’s pocketbook.

5). No register of the thermometer was kept, as provided by the special rules and the readings of the barometer at the bank only were registered and this was done on a sheet almanack hung up in the office. No register was kept of the barometer underground and no such barometer appears to have been in use.

6). No record was kept of the names of men who were authorised to carry keys or to fire shots and no written licences were given in accordance with special rule No.3 under the head of ‘Safety Lamps’. The manager stated that the number was so small that he could remember the names without any list, but admitted that it might be better if a list was kept. Two of the four lamps found at the South Cross-cuts, where four men were working at the time of the explosion were unlocked and only one of the four men was stated to have been authorised to carry a key, so either the lamp had been passed by the lamp man in an unlocked condition or the men themselves had transgressed the special rules with reference to the use of safety lamps.

 The jury returned a verdict in the form of answers to questions submitted for the coroner to consider:

Question. 1. What was the cause of death?

Answer. 1. As stated in each case by Dr. Benson.

Question. 2. Was the Busty Seam in safe working order when the deceased men were allowed to go down on the 18th April?

Answer. 2. We consider it was in perfect working order.

Question. 3. In what place did the explosion take place?

Answer. 3. In McCabe’s place.

Question. 4. . How was the explosion caused?

Answer. 4. By a quick movement of the lamp.

Question. 5. Who, if anyone, is or are, and in what respect culpable?

Answer. 5. No one.

Question. 6. (If necessary) was the explosion the result of causes beyond human control?

The Inspector commented that greater care should be taken to carry out strictly the provisions of the Mines Regulation Act and the special rules that were in force at the time.

 

REFERENCES
The Mines Inspectors Report, 1882. Mr. Bell.
Colliery Guardian, 21st April 1882, p.623, 2nd June 1882, p.864.

Information supplied by Ian Winstanley and the Coal Mining History Resource Centre.

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