Tudhoe Colliery Explosion – Tudhoe – 1882

TUDHOE. Tudhoe, Durham. 18th. April, 1882.

The colliery was the property of the Weardale Iron and Coal Company and was about 5 miles to the west of Durham in the western portion of the Durham Coalfield. There were three seams worked at the colliery, the Hutton at 45 fathoms from the surface, the Busty at 67 fathoms and the Brockwell at 87 fathoms. The coal that was produced was used principally for making coke but was also sold for the manufacture of gas.

The colliery was worked by three shafts, the East shaft, the West shaft and the “Success” or ventilation shaft. The explosion occurred in the Brockwell Seam and caused the deaths of 37 men and boys were confined to that seam and the shafts were damaged. The East and West shafts were about 58 yards apart with the Success shaft about 180 yards away from them. The Brockwell seam was worked from the East and West pits and the Hutton Seam was worked from the West shaft only.

The ventilation of the whole mine was produced by a fan, 40 feet in diameter which was at the Success shaft and was assisted by exhaust steam from three pumping and hauling engines in the East and West pits. The steam for these engines was carried from the pit bank by means of pipes. the workings in the Brockwell Seam were divided into the northern district including the Sunderland Bridge way and the branch districts call the Shieldfield way, the Croxdale way and the Coldstream way. The south district, which was not affected by the explosion and the western district, included the Main West was and Alma bank, with branch districts, called the No.6 way, new No.5 way and Old No.5 way. The North and South districts were worked from the East pit and the West district from the West pit. The Brockwell Seam was connected by a drift from the Croxdale way with the workings in the adjoining Croxdale Colliery, which belonged to the same company. There was a brick stopping placed across this drift.

The total air current passing through the workings was estimated at 174,603 cubic feet of air per minute with 89,000 going to the Brockwell Seam, 23,898 to the Sunderland Bridge way, 32,928 into the Main West way and Alma bank and 28,117 into the South District. In each district, the intake and return airways were distinct passages although they were separated by a single door in some places.

The coal was worked on the bord and pillar system and in the greater part of the West and North districts had been worked to the limits and the pillars were being withdrawn. The floor consisted of a hard seggar, and the coal, except in places, came away easily from the roof which was composed of a grey metal and post girdle. The rolley ways were watered nearly every day and this had been practised for the previous 10 to 12 years. The dust was occasionally taken off the timbers. Considering the character of the roof it had been sufficiently timbered.

Naked lights were allowed in the Brockwell Seam as far as to caution boards but after these points, only safety amps could be used. The lamps were mainly Davy lamps but a few Stevenson and Clanny lamps were used. The output from the seam at the time of the disaster was about 6,000 tons per week. The Brockwell was worked in shifts, each shift being composed of 220 hewers of whom 144 were employed in the north and South districts and the remainder in the West district. The staff of the North and South districts consisted of one fore-overman, one back-overman and 13 deputies and in the West district, of one fore-overman, one back-overman, one night shift overman and 9 deputies. It appeared from the evidence that in one or two instances the officials, whose duty it was as overmen, deputy or master shifter, to make a report on the state of the mine after inspection, were unable able to write and had a somewhat vague knowledge of the rules as applicable to the mine.

William Johnson was the certificated manager of the colliery and had worked in mines for over 50 years and had held every position in the mine except that of a putter. He had worked for the Weardale Company for over 30 years and had been the manager of mine for 9 years. At the time of the accident, he was also acting as manager of Tudhoe Grange Colliery and as the agent for the Croxdale Colliery. Until shortly before the accident Johnson had acted as sole agent and manager of Tudhoe Colliery but about two months before the explosion the managing director had appointed Mr. Crone, a mining engineer of Tow Law as a consulting viewer of the colliery. This position meant that Mr Crone was in a superior position to Johnson but he seldom went down the mine and Johnson stated in evidence that complete management of the mine was left in his hands. Mr. Bell, the Inspector commented:

In my opinion, William Johnson, from long experience in different grades of employment, had obtained a thorough practical knowledge of coal mining and in his position of manager took every precaution and spared no pains or trouble in order to successfully and safely to work the mine, but I think it doubtful whether he had not too much responsibility thrown upon him and whether he did not, upon matters of detail, rely too much upon his own personal supervision, and not sufficiently on overmen and deputies who were acting under him and by so doing loses the safety of the complete system of responsibility, which the different grades of overmen and deputies, each having their own department to supervise, was intended to give.

The general ventilation plan of the mine was good but there were two points that gave rise to consideration. At the north end of Sunderland Bridge way, a mile from East Pit, there was a slant to the Coldstream district. From that point, the ventilation was carried along the edge of goaf for 1,100 to 1,200 yards before reaching the last working in Coldstream district. This meant that the air that was carried to men must have carried gas swept from the goaf and in several places the ventilation of workings depended on single doors. This was the case in one point in the Croxdale way, at another in the Coldstream way and two places in the Alma Bank near the junction of old No.6.

The mine had been inspected on behalf of the colliers under General Rule 30 of Coal Mines Regulation At, 1872, the West Pit on 6th and 7th April 1882 by James Lindsley and Robert Blenkinsopp and on 11th 12th and 13th April by Charley Hetherington, Michael Mahedy and John Goulden when they reported, “We found all things in good order and free from gas.” Gas had been found in different parts of the workings but never in considerable quantities. When gas had been found in the working faces it had always been removed by setting brattice. The mine was considered as a safe mine but even so, it was treated as a fiery mine with inspections made under General Rule 2 of the Act and with special rules and regulations for safety lamps. The provisions of General Rule 2 did not seem to have been strictly applied. One of the witnesses at the inquiry admitted that he made no report or entry in a book when he found gas in any part of the mine when he was able to remove it by setting brattice.

The backshift men came out of the mine at midnight but stonemen and others were in the working preparing them for the next shift of miners. At a quarter past one on Tuesday morning, a loud report was heard which was felt some distance from the colliery. This was followed by a second report but not quite so loud. Immediately afterwards, voices were heard from the Busty Seam and when the cage was lowered, five men came up who reported that most of the men in the seam had made their way out by the Tudhoe Grange shaft. They also reported that they had encountered afterdamp.

William Johnson organised a party of explorers that included John Nesbit and William White, back overmen and descended the East Pit about half an hour after the blast. They succeeded in getting about half a mile into the workings when they found gas in large quantities. Nesbit and White then went forward about 10 yards and were overcome by the afterdamp. Before they could be got to the pit bank, White died and it was some time before Nesbit recovered.

The exploration continued until the parties got about 500 yards inbye when they encountered some very heavy falls. A number of colliery viewers from other collieries came to the pit to give their help and advice and the work of recovering the bodies was very difficult and 69 of the 86 horses and ponies in the mine were killed.

Those who lost their lives were:

• Michael Cairns, (Carnes), died of burns.
• Andrew Coldwell, died from burns.
• Joseph Faulkner, died from burns.
• Joseph White, killed by afterdamp.
• Peter Strong died from burns.
• Henry Warret Sloggart, died from burns.
• W. Thomas, died from afterdamp.
• James Rhymer, died from afterdamp.
• William Lambton, died from afterdamp.
• Robert Artus, died from afterdamp.
• James Marsh, died from afterdamp.
• Thomas Cook, died from afterdamp.
• William Smith died from burns.
• John Brown, died from afterdamp.
• James Whitter, died from afterdamp.
• Thomas Jefferson, died from violence and afterdamp.
• John Lawson, died from burns.
• George Stevenson, died from burns.
• Thomas Armstrong, died from burns.
• James Gair, died from burns.
• William Pinkey, died from burns.
• George Bowes, died from burns.
• Matthew Rutter, died from burns.
• Joseph Midgley, died from burns.
• Thomas Snowden, died from burns.
• Robert Cairnes (Cairns), died from afterdamp.
• James Shorn, died from afterdamp.
• William Pattison, died from burns.
• William Curry, died from afterdamp.
• James Richards, died from burns.
• Edward Robert Jones, died from burns.
• John Lambton, died from burns.
• John Cherry, died from afterdamp.
• Michael Rivers Jnr., died from afterdamp.
• Thomas Cavines, died from burns.
• Hugh Armstrong, died from burns.

The Coroner’s inquest was opened by Mr. Dean when three theories were put forwards as to where the explosion originated but in no case was the evidence conclusive. One proposed a sudden escape of a large quantity of gas freed by a falling stone.

At the time of the explosion, a set of 50 tubs was being drawn in by the hauling engine near the bottom of the West shaft by a double rope which was fastened to the innermost tub and passed around a pulley at the landing some distance along the No.6 was and the tail rope being fasted to the outermost tub. This meant that the tail rope was being drawn in after the set. Six men were riding in the tubs and a naked light was being carried by one of the men. The fall of stone completely covered the last twelve tubs and four of the men were riding in them at the time. The other two men were found a short way in from the fall. All six bodies were badly burned. The tail rope was found broke off close to the tubs and one of the links of the coupling chain was found to have been forced open while the rope was not broken. The drum of the hauling engine which operated the tail rope was also broken.

The suggestion was put forward by the owners that the set of tubs was being drawn in, by some accident one of the timbers was knocked out and something happened to disturb the supports causing a fall which liberated gas which was ignited by one of the men carrying a candle. Mr. Bell did not think that this was the explanation as the bodies were burned and charred and under falls which indicated that the explosion took place before the fall.

It was thought that a shot fired in the Sunderland Bridge was the cause. Michael Rivers, the master shifter, was on his way out of the pit and had examined the district shortly before the explosion when he passed men who were preparing a shothole. The explosion occurred about half an hour later but he did not know whether the shot had been fired. An examination of the place after the explosion found that the shot had been fired and two bodies were found in the places where they would have been taking cover from the shot but it was difficult to say how there was gas in that place. It was suggested that there could have been an accumulation between two doors that were nearby.

It was suggested that a large accumulation of gas from the goaf at the western end of the Alma Bank forced its way down to a lantern at the caution bord on the Alma Bank. It was admitted that gas was given off from the goaves but the gas was taken along the return airway. The ventilation of this part of the workings depended on single doors and if these were damaged or let open, then gas could accumulate and pass along the Alma bank to the caution board where naked lights were permitted. There was evidence that Ralph White, the deputy blew out the lamp on the night of the explosion a few minutes before 12 p.m.

As a result of the inquiry into the disaster, the following conclusions were reached:

1) The mine was generally well and carefully managed with every desire to provide liberally for the safety of the men employed.

2) The general system of ventilation was good and effective, with exception of two points where too much reliance was placed on single doors and the length of goaf face along which the air current had to pass in Coldstream way before reaching the working places in that district.

3) More care should have been taken to ensure a thorough knowledge and understanding on the part of the overmen and deputies of rules applicable to their respective duties, especially with reference to reports of gas wherever found and however small quantities.

The jury returned the following verdict:

The jury is quite unanimous in the opinion that the cause of the explosion was through the fall of stone in the engine plane, but how or by what means the said stone fell there is no distinct evidence to show and we also find that the deaths of Andrew Cauldwell, Joseph Faulkner another, were purely accidental.

REFERENCES
The Mines Inspectors Report, 1882. Mr. Bell.
Colliery Guardian, 21st April 1882, p.623.
Report by Arnold Morley, Esq., M.P., on the circumstances attending a fatal explosion which occurred on the 18th April 1882, in the Brockwell Seam of the Tudhoe Colliery in the county of Durham.

Information supplied by Ian Winstanley and the Coal Mining History Resource Centre.