GLEBE. Washington, Durham. 20th. February, 1908.

Washington Glebe Colliery was also known as Glebe Pit and had been established about four years before the accident when the shafts had been sunk through the surface deposits by the freezing method and was one of two collieries, the other much older was known as the “F” Pit. Both Pits were owned by the Washington Coal Company Limited with Mr. “F” Stobart, a mining engineer and a certificated colliery manager, who had taken part in the management of the “F” Pit as managing Director and Agent. Mr. Mark Ford was the manager for both collieries with Mr. John Cockburn the undermanager for the Glebe Pit.

There were two shafts at the colliery, both sunk to the Low Main Seam at 114 fathoms passing through the Maudlin Seam at 104 fathoms The downcast was the main shaft for drawing coal from the Maudlin Seam in two cages and was 14 feet in diameter. From the Maudlin Seam to the Low Main Seam, 10 fathoms below, the shaft was fitted with ladders. At the top of the upcast shaft, there was a fan, 12 feet in diameter and had a single cage with wire rope guides. A single cage ran between the surface and the Low Main Seam and it was by this that coal was raised from that seam and the workmen passed to and from their work. The top of the upcast shaft, above the level of the fan drift, was enclosed by a square wooden structure carried up nearly to the pulley and closed at the top except for hole through which the winding rope passed. A door in this structure at ground level gave access to the cage. Added to this there was a wooden porch, entered by an outer door in which the banksman worked and where men stood before they descended the shaft.

Four or five days before the explosion, a stone drift driven up from the Low Main Seam to the Maudlin formed a third connection between the seams. The explosion originated and was confined to the Low Main Seam. There were extensive workings in both seams and a road from the maudlin Seam connected the Glebe Pit underground with the “F” Pit.

The Hutton Seam lay 10 fathoms below the Low Main and had been worked many years ago from an abandoned colliery at Oxclose and these workings extended under the Glebe shafts. Two vertical boreholes from the bottom of the upcast shaft had been bored into them.

The workings on the bord and pillar system in the Low Main Seam commenced in October 1906; the operations were more for development than for obtaining a large output. The raising of the coal in a single cage in the upcast shaft was a temporary measure and was later to be replaced by a permanent engine haulage. This would bring the coal up a stone drift to the Maudlin Seam and from there to the surface by the cages in the downcast shaft.

The Low Main Seam at the colliery produced good quality gas and bunker coal. The floor was an inferior sagre clay followed by laminated sandstone and the roof was a good average roof, a layer of shale rested directly on the coal and above it was a laminated sandstone. There was an area to the south-west of the shafts that had been subjected to considerable heat and this had taken out most of the volatile matter from the coal. This area had been proved from the adjoining collieries, of Hylton to the east, Unsworth to the northeast, North Biddick to the south and Harraton to the west as well as the upper seams in the Glebe Pit where it was exposed in the Maudlin Seam. The coal in the Low Main Seam as it approached this area became softer and easier to work. The dip in the seam was about 1 in 12 to the east.

The leading of the coal was performed by five ponies, all of which were killed in the explosion, pulling wooden tubs which carried 10 cwt. The ventilation of the colliery depended on an exhausting Waddle fan, 25 feet in diameter and running at 40 r.p.m. near the surface of the upcast shaft. it had been running at its usual speed up to and for some time before the explosion. Before the completion of the stone drift, the ventilation of the Low Main Seam depended on the air directly descending the downcast shaft and entering the seam. The main split at the time of the disaster was through a hole about a foot square in the brick framework of a door placed in the roadway extending eastwards from the downcast shaft and then passed inbye by the left hand of three winning places extending to the south-east, returning to the upcast shaft by the right main winning except in regard to scales and leakage past canvas doors, returned to the centre road which was also the road along which the coal was transported. On the opposite side of the downcast shaft to the door already mentioned, there was a brick stopping and from it six 12 inch diameter air pipes were carried across the main road passing through another stopping on the opposite side which allowed an air current to pass to ventilate some temporarily abandoned workings and the stone drift to the west and north of the shafts. Only three of the 12-inch air pipes were used.

This current passed to the north-west along the back main wining and split, one part to the left ventilated the workings from the point where it split and a fault and was regulated as it returned to the upcast shaft. The remainder of the current split again, one portion ventilated a few excavations in the coal in one of which some firedamp had been met and the air from which it was not thought wise to take up the stone drift and the current was therefore brought across the road near the bottom of the stone drift by an air crossing, formed of a single 12-inch tube and then passed directly to the upcast shaft. The other portion was carried up the stone drift by means of brick bratticing and joined the air from the single tube air crossing and passed with it to the upcast shaft.

When the third connection to the Low Main was made by the completion of the stone drift, the ventilation was rearranged. The main current remained as before but the split passing through the pipes was replaced by air descending through the drift from the Maudlin Seam and two wooden doors of the main road between the foot of the stone drift and the shafts supplemented by other doors and stoppings carried this current round the temporarily abandoned places to the north and west of the shafts.

It did not appear that the change had any effect of the origin of the explosion. The overman stated at the inquest, that the change was affected, he examined the working places on the morning of 20th February and found them well ventilated and subsequent reports from the deputies showed no change but no air measurements were made but on the day of the disaster the fan was working normally and the total quantity of air measured in the fan drift was 74,580 cubic feet per minute.

There were no difficulties in ventilating the Low Main Sean and the quantity of air could have been easily increased. The main split of air was carried along the left of the three winning places to the south-east by brick stoppings and when it arrived at the working face, it was carried around by canvas sheets and doors into the cul-de-sacs where necessary by canvas bratticing, returning along the right and centre main winnings to the upcast shaft. The air descending the stone drift followed the same course but did not ventilate any working places. In ventilating the places to the east and dip of the shafts, no difficulties were found.

The Low Main Seam was known to give off firedamp but no gas had been reported only once in the preceding month, on 28th January. The gas was found in the place where the explosion originated. The gas was reported to the undermanager who instructed the surveyor to make an examination of the evening of the 12th February. This he did and found the place clear.

The seam did not make much water and was, on the whole, dry, but the old workings in the Hutton Seam under the explosion area were drowned. The boreholes to the Hutton Seam were arranged to deliver water into the sump of the upcast shaft and from there it was pumped to the Main Coal Seam by two hydraulic pumps placed near the shaft and driven by columns of water taken from the delivery pipe of a steam pump in the Main Coal Seam which forced the water to the surface. Pipes fitted with cocks were wedged into the top of each borehole so that the water coming up from the Hutton Seam could be cut off at any time. At the time of the explosion, only one hole was delivering water.

The pressure of the Hutton Seam water at the Low Main Seam was 52 lbs. per square inch at the time of the explosion but it had been much higher. The water from the Hutton Seam had a smell of carburetted hydrogen but no firedamp had been seen with it. Three weeks after the disaster, the valve was opened after being closed for a considerable period and a little gas of some kind came up from one of the boreholes. The flow lasted for about half a minute and then was followed by water.

The seam was moderately dusty on the floor and there were probably deposits on the roof, sides and timbers of the intakes due to dust from passing tubs and from the screen at the surface. The manager did not consider the seam dusty.

The coal was moderately hard and was blasted by the permitted explosive, Bellite No.3 fired by an electric battery. The company provided the explosive but the stonemen who were on bargain work paid for it. No naked lights were allowed in the seam and the lamps used by the workmen were bonneted Clanny lamps with one gauze and cap, locked by lead rivets. Some of the officials used bonneted Davy lamps locked in a similar fashion.

From 4 a.m. to 4 p.m. the seam was occupied by the for and back shift hewers, about 12 altogether and these two shifts were overlapped by an ordinary haulage shift of three from 6 a.m. to 4 p.m. Two hewers worked from 4 p.m. to 10 p.m. followed by another two from 10 p.m. to 4 a.m., usually in the winning places.

As there was not much work for the deputies in the seam, their shifts were arranged by one descending at 6 a.m. and remaining until 4.30 p.m., who met the back shift hewers and the hewers in the fore shift of the night shift at the station which was at the bottom of the upcast shaft. The other deputy went down at 8 p.m. and remained until 4 a.m. He examined for and met the backshift hewers in the night shift and the fore shift hewers in the day shift. The stonemen’s places were examined by the deputy leaving the pit at 4.30 p.m. but he had usually got round all the places before 4 p.m. and they did not come down until 6 p.m. The report commented:

While this is specified in the Special Rules as regards hewers in compliance with the term of General Rule IV., it is no specified for other workmen. Attention has already been called to this defect in the Special Rules in connection with the explosion at Woodhorn and North Seaton Collieries in Northumberland.

The workmen at the colliery regularly inspected the under General Rule 38 and Robert Glendenning and Thomas Lavery found the Low Main Seam in a satisfactory condition of the 18th December 1907.

On the day of the explosion, the Low Main Seam had been occupied by two day shifts of hewers and the haulage shift. Two night shift hewers had gone down at 4 p.m. and Wood and Dixon, two stonemen, had descended at 6 p.m., Ashman, the night deputy at 8 p.m. and all went well until the moment of the blast. There were 108 men and boys underground in the Glebe Pit, 51 in the Main Coal, 42 in the Maudlin and 15 in the Low Main. No one in the upper seams was injured in the explosion.

In the porch at the top of the upcast shaft, two hewers on the 10 p.m. shift were about to descend to the Low Main and the waiter-on, who had just opened the door next to the shaft to allow two shafts men up from the Low Main, to get off. One of the shafts men was in the act of stepping out of the cage and his mate was in the cage behind him when the explosion occurred. The men heard a report but felt no heat and saw no flame. They saw no dust and their lamps were not extinguished. The outer door of the enclosure was blown open and they all ran out. Looking back they saw what appeared to be smoke ascending the shaft.

The upper part of the enclosure was slightly damaged. A skylight near the fan was broken and the doors leading to the fan drift were slightly damaged but the fan itself was unscathed. Immediately, the cage in the upcast shaft was run down in response to a signal which was probably caused by some material moved by the explosion striking the signal wire but it was not able to reach the seam as the framework had been disturbed near the bottom of the shaft.

The downcast shaft was not damaged and the first explorers went down to the Maudlin and climbed the ladders to the Low Main Seam. They found the ventilation disarranged and the air short-circuited and evident signs of an explosion. One of the victims, Oswald, was found alive near the upcast shaft but he died soon after. A man named Yeardsley was found near him and he survived.

It was decided to take the fresh air along the centre winning or haulage road. The speed of the fan was increased to 180 r.p.m. and considerable progress was made despite the falls of stone and blown out stoppings when word came that there was a fire at the foot of the stone drift. All the men were withdrawn until the manager and others, returning to the Maudlin by the ladders, had descended the drift and loose prop and a standing prop smouldering. The fire was extinguished without difficulty and the party the passed along the main road in the Low Main Seam to the shafts and then started to explore further in.

In the meantime, a canary had been brought in and used to test the air. The face had almost been reached and some bodies passed on the main road when some more smouldering timber was seen and extinguished and ore fires were seen smouldering. Later, it was found that the brattice had been on fire. As the party approached the face, some of the party, including the manager, found themselves affected by afterdamp and they had to retreat to the shafts.

Before returning to the district where the men had been working, the abandoned workings to the north and west of the shafts were examined and found to be clear of afterdamp but some firedamp was encountered.

Messrs. Philip Kirkup and W Blackett, mining engineers, joined the explorers and the whole party returned to the face and all the bodies were located and arrangements made to remove them, to the surface. This work was completed by 8 a.m. on the 21st February

Those who lost their lives were:

  • Edward Ashman aged 41 years, deputy,
  • Robert Cowan aged 44 years, stoneman,
  • Thomas McNally aged 48 years, stoneman,
  • Alfred Wood aged 50 years, stoneman,
  • William Edward Glendenning aged 32 years, stoneman,
  • James William Swan Wake aged 42 years, stoneman,
  • Charles Thomas Applegarth aged 33 years, stoneman,
  • John Dixon aged 42 years, stoneman,
  • William Henry Rollin aged 30 years, stoneman,
  • James Ambrose Madden aged 49 years, hewer,
  • John Thomas Clarke aged 29 years, hewer,
  • Charles Chivers aged 25 years, shifter,
  • Henry Oswald aged 35 years, waiter-on,
  • Thomas Agar Errington aged 18 years, putter,

 

  • James Yeardsley aged 29 years, pumpman was injured.

Mr. Atkinson arrived at the colliery of the 21st February and made a detailed inspection of the Low Main seam with mining engineers and representatives of the management of the colliery and the Durham Miners Association. They established the course of the explosion and noted that coked coal dust was deposited on the props and was present in all the area covered by the explosion.

Oswald and Yeardsley had been found alive but burnt at their usual posts. Rollin had been coming outbye with a tram laden with drilling gear on his way to drill a hole in a place on the 1st. South district when the explosion overtook him. He was burned and his skull was injured. His lamp was not found and was probably under a fall of stone.

Wood and Dixon were working a few feet apart, drilling holes in stone which was to be shot down on the right side of the main road where an engine landing was to be situated. The heaps of drillings lay below the holes and were blackened by coal dust. They had finished drilling and were working 16 yards from the holes. Beyond them, through a canvas door, Chivers and Errington had been driving two ponies’ outbye with loaded tubs of coal. They were found a few yards inbye of the ponies, burned. Their lamps were found close by and at the moment of the blast, they had probably they had been sitting on the limbers and carried them out in their hands. A few yards further in, Madden had been taking off coal on the right-hand side where he was found with his lamp close by.

Clark was hewing at the face of a stenton going from the centre to the right winning. He had run 50 yards on to the main road where his body was found. Wake and McNally had been riddling a shot at the face of the right hand winning. They had run into the last holed stenton, A distance of about 40 yards. One of the lamps was found where they had been working and one had been brought out. Applegarth and Glendenning had been riddling a shot at the face of the place at an angle to the right of the main winning. They died from carbon monoxide poisoning and their lamps were found at their working places.

Three ponies in the intake airway near the shafts were killed by after damp. Ashman, the only authorised shotfirer in the seam, was found with his lamp overturned near a shot firing battery. the outer end of the cable was not connected to the battery and lay about 7 feet inbye of it and the cable, 30 yards long went inwards past a loaded tub to within a few feet of the bottom of the caunch and then turned away to the left. The inner end of the cable was wrapped around a pick shaft.

A shot had been fired in the pavement of the seam and the stone lifted had not been disturbed and there were no tools nearby. Ashman and Cowen were burned and attached to Ashman’s belt was a leather case containing 20 detonators fitted with wires. He usually brought from 26 to 30 with him. Cowen’s jacket was hanging on a prop at the entrance to the place and his pocket contained two 8 oz. cartridges of Bellite No.1. A shot box containing three cartridges was found damaged near Rollin’s body and this led to the conclusion that there had been a contravention of general Rule 12 (b).

In the headways at the bottom of the caunch, about 16 inches thick, had been shot up on the right side and the stone stowed on the left side. In this board the caunch had been continued in the centre of the place for three yards, to within five yards of the face, the stone being stowed on each side and the shot was fired to extend this bottom caunch. The shothole was drilled by machine in the centre of the caunch and seemed to have been following a parting for about three feet ten inches. The thickness of the stone was about 17 inches. the shot had done its work well but no stemming remained in the hole. The face was blackened by raised coal dust and coked coal dust was seen on the props and sides.

The inquest was opened in the Wesleyan Hall near Washington Station by Mr. A.T. Shepherd, Deputy Coroner for the Chester Ward when all interested parties were represented. After hearing the evidence, the jury returned the following verdict:

That on the 20th day of February within the Low Main seam, Glebe Pit, Washington Colliery the men died from such as a result of an explosion of gas and dust and was accidentally caused by the firing of an overloaded shot in the Low Main seam.

 

REFERENCES
Mines Inspectors Report.
Report to Right Honourable Secretary of State for the Home Department on the Explosion which occurred at the Washington Glebe Colliery, in the County of Durham, on the 20th February 1908 by W.B. Atkinson, M.Sc., H.M. Inspector of Mines.
Colliery Guardian, 28th February 1908, p.412 27th March, p.590.

Information supplied by Ian Winstanley and the Coal Mining History Resource Centre.

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