EASINGTON. West Hartlepool, Durham. 29th. May, 1951.

The colliery was situated on the coast of Durham between the ports of Seaham Harbour and about nine miles North West of West Hartlepool. There were two principal shafts, both circular, 20 feet in diameter. The North Shaft, the downcast was sunk to the Hutton Seam at a depth of 1,130 feet. The South shaft, the upcast was 1,500 feet deep to the Hutton seam. Both shafts were used to wind men and materials. There was a third shaft, the West, 470 feet deep which was connected to the South Shaft by a drift at 164 feet. Sinking was started in 1899 but coal drawing did not start until 1910 because of difficulties encountered in passing through the water-bearing strata.

The mine was one of eight in the No.3 Area of the Durham Division of the National Coal Board. The principle officers were the Area General Manager, Mr. F.W. Fry, the Area Production Manager, Mr. J.P. Hall, the Group Agent, Mr. T.N. Sneddon, the Assistant Agent, Mr. H.E. Morgan, the Manager of the colliery, Mr. T. Hopkins, the Undermanager of the North Pit, Mr. H.E. Enery and the Undermanager of the South Pit, Mr. A Carr. At the time of the disaster, 2,235 persons were employed underground and 625 on the surface. The average daily output of the colliery was 3,600 tons.

The mine was worked in three shifts which was the common practice at the time in the Durham coalfield. The foreshift started at 3.30 a.m. and finished at 11.07 p.m., the back shift from 9.45 a.m. to 5.22 p.m. and the night shift from 4 p.m. to 11.37 p.m. In addition to these main shifts, a repair shift known as the stone-shift, consisted mainly of stone workers and coal cutter operators descended at 10 p.m. and came up at 5.37 a.m.

The workable seams at the colliery in descending order were the Five Quarter, the Seven Quarter, The Main Coal, the Low Main and the Hutton. Before the explosion, there were 14 producing districts in the North Pit of which five were in the Five Quarter, two in the Seven Quarter and seven in the Low Main. Bord and pillar working was usual and the pillars were formed by arcwall heading and extracting by lifts worked by the aid of either pneumatic picks or arcwall machines. Longwall on both advancing and retreating faces was also practised at the colliery.

The explosion occurred in the Five Quarter Seam in the New or West District, which was known as the Duckbill District. It lay to the north-west of the shafts and north of an area reserved for the protection of the colliery village. At the shaft in the Five Quarter seam, including three bands of stone totalling 13 inches, was six feet two inches thick, the roof was of shale seven feet thick, with laminated sandstone above. This was followed by about seven feet of alternate bands of coal and clay. In the Duckbill District, the seam was about six feet ten inches thick. The shale was thicker than at the shaft and the floor was fairly hard. The seam was 1,050 feet deep and dipped 1 in 32 to the northeast.

From the downcast shaft the main haulage road and intake airway extended in the Main Coal Seam for 380 yards to the north and then 640 yards along a road known as the West Level. At this point, a stone drift rose 1 in 6 to the north and after passing through the Seven Quarter Seam, entered the Five Quarter. The West Level and its companion roads in the Main Coal Seam continued for about 600 yards beyond the drifts. No coal was worked in this area but it was used for training new entrants and was known as the Training Section. In the Five Quarter seam from the top of the drifts, three roads, known as the Straight North places, with connecting stentons, continued north. From them, at about 200 yards from the top of the drifts, three roads, known as the First west materials, Belt and Return roads branched off and still further on to the north, were roads that formed the Second and Third West areas. From the Second West roads, a small area was formed into pillars which were then extracted. The Third West places were open but not working at the time of the explosion. It was from the First West Roads that the area chiefly affected was developed.

Up to the introduction of the duckbill machinery in 1948, all these roads were driven by arcwall machines. The coal was blasted down and filled into tubs. The First South places were then driven, using duckbill loaders, into the reserved area. Pillars were formed but faulted ground stopped further development. Full extraction was the attempted in the unreserved part, first by lifts off the pillars, and then by a modified form of longwall retreating using the duckbill loaders. as neither method was completely successful, it was decided to use duckbill machines for winning out retreating longwall faces to be worked by conventional machine cutting, blasting and hand-filling on to conveyors. The Second and Third South headings were driven by this method. The Second South headings, having been driven for their full distance in readiness for the opening of a longwall face, were temporarily idle at the time of the disaster.

The Third South retreating face had been won by two headings driven southwards off the First Main West Materials Road. Originally the headings had been set 140 yards apart and the intention was to keep them parallel to form a face of that length, but the heading which afterwards became the return, struck a fault and was turned inwards to avoid crossing it and as a result, the two headings converged slightly. The heading joining them to form the longwall face was 90 yards long. On the 12th April, the longwall face then began to retreat by means of machine cuts four feet six inches deep. It had been decided to “cave” the roof in the waste so no packs were built but at the waste edge, a line of steel frame chocks, with mechanical releases, supplemented by wooden bars and props. By the time of the explosion, the face had travelled 37 yards.

The only other coal producing workings in the district at the end of May were three duckbill headings, Nos. 21, 22 and 24 which were being driven to open out a longwall face to the north of the First West return airway. a road conveyor system of 30-inch belts delivered coal to the central loading point on the West Level and the Main Coal Seam. The No.1 trunk conveyor extended up the intake drift to the junction with the First West Belt road where it was fed by a No.2 trunk conveyor, which extended the full length of the First West Belt Road. The conveyor was fed from the Second South and Third South belt conveyors and a belt conveyor in No.22 heading and scraper chain conveyors in Nos. 21 and 24 headings. All were linked by a system of sequence control. The district was highly mechanised and the whole of the cutting and part of the loading was done mechanically with all the plant being driven by electricity. Part of the north district was under the supervision of Mr. Emery and he was assisted in this district by a fore-overman, a back-overman and a master shifter in addition to deputies and shotfirers.

The ventilation was produced by a steam-driven Walker “Indestructible” fan 22 feet in diameter which was designed to pass 500,000 cubic feet of air per minute at six-inch water gauge. At the time of the disaster, it was producing 423,000 cubic feet per minute at 5.5-inch water gauge. An electrically driven Sirocco fan, 133 inches in diameter acted as a standby. Both fans were on the surface and connected by fan drifts to both the South and the West shafts.

The ventilation system of the mine was complicated by a very long leg, extending seawards in the Hutton Seam and going through a fault into the Low Main Seam for a distance of four miles from the shaft. This had to be balanced against the nearer districts in the upper seams. As a consequence, the airflow in these latter districts had to be closely regulated to ensure that enough ventilation reached the workings under the sea.

The ventilation in the Duckbill District was measured on the 16th. May at 23,200 cubic feet per minute was reaching the top of the intake drift. Of this 7,700 cubic feet travelled to the idle places in the Third West District. 11,000 cubic feet per minute and 3,900 cubic feet passed along the First West Materials and Belt Roads respectively. 5,500 cubic feet per minute was taken from these currents to ventilate the standing places in the First South District and this passed through the air crossings direct to the First West Return. the Second South places were ventilated by a current of 4,300 cubic feet per minute passing inbye on the main Materials Road and through two fans in parallel to the heading faces. This current then returned to the West Materials Road and most of it passed along the third South Materials and Belt Roads to the longwall face and outbye along the return. Some of the air may have reached the Third South intakes and the longwall face by passing along the West Materials Road and the extension of the Second South Materials Road to the West Belt Road.

On the 16th May, the quantity of air passing along the longwall face where the ventilation was restricted by a fall, was 3.200 cubic feet per minute. At the time the Nos. 21 and 22 headings were ventilated through breeches tube by an auxiliary fan situated on the Belt Road. Alongside this fan, there was a canvas door. Between the 16th May and the time of the disaster important changes occurred. The fall in the longwall face was cleared and the fan ventilating Nos. 21 and 22 headings was transferred to No.21 stenton. The door to the Belt Road was removed. Further along the Belt Road, another fan was installed to ventilate the No.24 heading and up to the time of the disaster, this had run only intermittently. On the 28th May, a second fan was installed in No.21 stenton, so that Nos. 21 and 22 were ventilated separately.

Oldham Type G.W. Electric Cap Lamps were used throughout the mine. The flame safety lamps in general use by the workmen as gas detectors were the Patterson A.1. (magnetic lock) and Patterson A.3 (lead rivet lock), the latter being in the process of conversion to the first type by the lamproom staff as and when the necessary parts were available. The officials were provided with either Wolf Patterson (internal relighting) 7 R or Baby Wolf 7 R.M.B.S. flame safety lamps for gas testing.

The only means of dust suppression in the district were sprays, not enclosed, at the loading point and at the three transfer points. it was said that the sprays delivered about six gallons of water per hour. This method of keeping down the dust had been used in other parts of the mine with success but had not proceeded beyond the experimental stage in the Duckbill District. The cleaning up of coal dust and the spreading of stone dust was done partly by a stone dust team which visited all the districts of the mine and partly by the men regularly employed in the district. The team, under the charge of an official, the “stone dustman”, was made up of seven men and their duty was to clean the floor and sweep the girders and sides, filling the dust into sacks or tubs and then apply stone dust. On the fore shift, a man was employed to clean the conveyor structures and to spread stone dust, and on the back shift, a man dusted the roads near the face. On the stone-shift, eight men where wholly employed and others spent part of their time in clearing the spillage and stone dusting. They began at the loading point and at several transfer points and worked towards each other. Spillage was cleared by the men at the loading point. Forty tons of stone dust a month was used in the mine and a man was engaged to take samples. He took 102 samples every week.

The explosion occurred at 4.35 a.m. on Tuesday the 29th. May and by a tragic trick of fate this was the time that there were two shifts in the explosion district, 38 belonging to the stone shift and 43 to the fore shift. Only one of these men was rescued alive and he died a few hours later from his injuries. According to the medical evidence, all the others died almost immediately. Two members of the rescue teams also lost their lives in the recovery operations and the final death toll was 83. None of the 895 people at work in other parts of the mine was seriously affected.

There was no direct evidence as to what happened on that shift before the disaster. The men on the stone-shift, who were due to leave the district about 5 a.m., had been cutting coal on the retreating longwall face, erecting permanent supports in the duckbill headings, building and air crossing at No.22 stenton and in stone dusting. The fore-shift went underground at 3.30 a.m. and in the ordinary course of events, the fillers would have arrived at the face before the explosion but the fact that none had done so suggested that they were kept back because of the condition of the Third South longwall face, a condition which did not seem to have caused great alarm for those who knew about it since those outside the district received no appeal for help. The first intimation of the disaster was a loud bang followed by a cloud of dust.

Frank Leadbitter, a shaft wagon-way shifter, was just outside the shaft-bottom stables and he acted promptly, even though the place was filled with dust and he could not see. He led workmen with him to the shaft bottom and within a few minutes had telephoned a report to the undermanager, Mr. Emery at his home. Leadbitter then went inbye to the West Main curve and tried to get in touch with the Duckbill District by ‘phone and getting no response, telephoned a warning to the men at the South haulage junctions. Soon after he was joined by William Cook, fore-overman in the Seven Quarter and Old Five Quarter Districts, who had heard a sound like a heavy fall when he was at the Seven Quarter engine house and had come 500 yards through a thick cloud of dust to investigate. After hearing Leadbitter’s story Cook telephoned Mr. Hopkins, the manager, and arranged the withdrawal of the men from the rest of the mine.

The with courage, Cook and a head wagon-way man, D. Smith, went along the Main Coal West Haulage Road in an attempt to get into the Duckbill District. About halfway to the main loading point they heard what they thought was another explosion and felt the air current reverse. They started to go back but as soon as the ventilation resumed its normal course, they turned inbye again. The investigation pointed to what they had thought to be a second explosion was in fact a fall that they found shortly afterwards about 150 yards from the loading point and decided that it would be foolhardy to attempt to get over the fall. They returned to report and near the West Curve they met the undermanager Mr, Emery.

At the surface emergency measures had been taken. A call was made to the Rescue Station at Houghton-le-Spring and at 5.30 a.m. the first rescue team arrived at the colliery. They went underground almost immediately to inspect the fall which they found it impassable and they returned and were sent to explore the West Main Coal Return. It was thought that operations by this route would not be possible and when Mr. Fry, the Area General Manager, arrived it was decided to employ the colliery workmen to make a road through the fall with the utmost speed and explore the airway from the Seven Quarter Second South District which connected with the Duckbill return drift. This road proved to be passable even though some props and doors had been blown out, and Fry, Emery and Station Officer Anderson reached the Duckbill Drifts without difficulty. The air was quite still, which indicated that the air crossing at the foot of the intake drift had been damaged. The separation doors in the stenton connecting intake and return had been destroyed and the air was so foul with afterdamp that the canaries carried by the party were overcome almost immediately.

Rescue operations had to be made immediately to deal with a disaster of this magnitude and a fresh air base was established in the Second South Seven Quarter airway about 100 yards back from the Duckbill District return drift. this was by no means an ideal sight as the materials had to be manhandled for considerable distance but there was no alternative until a passable road could be made over the fall on the West Main Coal Level. In spite of these difficulties, the first team left the base just after 8 a.m. to go along the intake drift. near the loading point, they found a datal hand, Matthew Williams, alive but so badly injured that he died in a few hours. They saw the bodies of several other men and found that the air crossing had been destroyed.

This team and others that followed reported that the stoppings between the intake and the return had been destroyed over a large area and it was decided to arrange two teams to operate simultaneously, one sealing off at selected points to re-establish the ventilation and the other to search for possible survivors. This worked well for a time and one of the teams penetrated to the end of the Straight North Headings, a distance of about 1,100 yards but tragically, J.Y. Wallace, the captain of a colliery rescue team lost his life in exploring the First West roads and it was decided that the brigades were penetrating too far into the poisonous atmosphere and both teams were them used to restore the ventilation.

Up to then, all the operations had taken place from the first fresh air base but by noon the following day, the ventilation had been established in the drifts up to the No.2 stenton, the Training Section in the Main Coal Seam sealed off and a road made over the fall on the West Main Coal level so the fresh air base was advanced to a point just inbye of the No.2 stenton. By midnight the fresh air base had advanced to the No.14 stenton on the First West Materials Road. Travelling on this road was easier than on the Belt Road.

No survivors had been found and since the atmospheric samples brought back by the teams were highly lethal, it was agreed by all parties that there was no longer any hope of finding anyone left alive. Before they could go any further, it was necessary to increase the quantity of fresh air reaching the fresh air base. The foul air in the First South District was sealed off and air crossings were erected to carry any seepage direct into the return. At this time a cover base was set up in the First West Materials Road junction. This meant that fresh supplies could be kept close to the fresh air base and allowed oncoming brigades to rest before going forward to action. At about 7.45 a.m. on 1st. June, the fresh air base was moved to the No.16 stenton and exploration along both belt and return roads reached the No. 25 stenton.

Some hours later H. Burdess, a member of the rescue brigade exploring the inbye end of the First West Roads, collapsed and died. At the time it was thought he might have been affected by having to pass a number of dead men and, although it slowed down the rate of advance, arrangements were made to bring put all the bodies on the line of travel. A further difficulty was encountered when it was found that the West Materials Road was blocked by a large fall of rock, ahead of the No.20 stenton. To bypass this, the fresh air base was moved to the Belt Road.

On 2nd June the base was advanced to the junction of the Belt Road and the Third South Materials Road. Rescue brigades erected stoppings at the entrance to the Second South Headings and built a tube air crossing over the Third South Materials Road so as to convey any afterdamp seeping from this area into the return airway at No.26 stenton.

On the 4th, June the base was advanced to the No.27 stenton and more bodies were recovered. Both Nos. 27 and 28 stentons were closed and although an attempt was made to clear a road through, it was soon apparent that little further progress could be made by men wearing breathing apparatus. Colliery workmen were brought in, but when the afterdamp began to leak into the Material Road it was decided to withdraw everybody and clear the afterdamp from the First and Second South Areas. By 8 p.m. the ventilation had been established and the rescue teams inspected the South, North and First West Materials headings and found them clear. At 9.45 p.m. on the 8th. June their task was completed and they withdrew from the mine.

The rescue operations covered a period of 257 hours and during that time 11 officers, 48 permanent corpsmen and 291 trained colliery rescue workers were employed in the grim task.

Those who died were:

  • John Anson aged 64 years, shifter.
  • William Armstrong aged 55 years, datal.
  • Mark Smart Bedding aged 38 years, filler.
  • Matthew Blevins aged 27 years, filler.
  • George Brenkley aged 20 years, filler.
  • Thomas Brenkley aged 32 years, filler.
  • Louis Brennan aged 49 years, stoneman.
  • George Miller Brown aged 50 years, datal.
  • Bertram Burn aged 25 years, filler.
  • Emmerson Cain aged 63 years, stoneman.
  • Frederick Cairns aged 23 years, filler.
  • George Calvert aged 50 years, stoneman.
  • James Calvin aged 51 years, conveyor maintenance man.
  • Frederick Carr aged 50 years, electrician.
  • George William Carr aged 45 years, timber drawer.
  • James Carr aged 38 years, timber drawer.
  • John Edwin Challoner aged 53 years, deputy.
  • Richard Champley aged 43 years, cutter.
  • Albert Kerr Chapman aged 44 years, stoneman.
  • Joseph Charlton aged 42 years, master shifter.
  • John Clough aged 57 years, shifter.
  • William Arthur Dryden aged 27 years, filler.
  • John Ellison aged 19 years, datal.
  • Charles Fishburn aged 54 years, shifter.
  • Henry Fishburn aged 32 years, filler.
  • Thomas Garside aged 20 years, datal.
  • Joseph Godsman aged 41 years, cutter.
  • George Gouldburn aged 57 years, mason’s labourer.
  • Albert Gowland aged 51 years, deputy.
  • Ernest Goyns aged 60 years, stoneman.
  • Herbert Goyns aged 56 years, stoneman.
  • John Harker aged 53 years, shifter.
  • John William Henderson aged 56 years, shifter.
  • Thomas Heppell aged 31 years, filler.
  • Daniel Hunt aged 54 years, datal.
  • Stephen Hunt aged 24 years, filler.
  • William Hunt aged 43 years, datal.
  • Arthur Chambers Hutton aged 42 years, filler.
  • Frederick Ernest Jepson aged 68 years, shifter.
  • Lawrence Jones aged 36 years, filler.
  • Thomas Edward Jones aged 35 years, deputy.
  • Herbert Jeffrey Jopling aged 57 years, shifter.
  • John Kelly aged 57 years, datal.
  • William Kelly aged 28 years, filler.
  • John Edward Armstrong Lamb aged 43 years, datal.
  • Jesse Stephenson Link aged 44 years, datal.
  • Joseph Fairless Lippeatt aged 37 years, filler.
  • Peter Lynch aged 20 years, filler.
  • Denis McRoy aged 23 years, filler.
  • William James McRoy aged 31 years, filler.
  • Robert William Milburn aged 26 years, filler.
  • Harold Nelson aged 49 years, stoneman.
  • Albert Newcombe aged 67 years, stoneman.
  • Norman Nicholson aged 29 years, filler.
  • Robert Noble aged 45 years, shifter.
  • William Parkin aged 24 years, filler.
  • William Edward Forbes Parks aged 62 years, shifter.
  • Robert Pase aged 63 years, shifter.
  • Stanley Peaceful aged 37 years, stoneman.
  • Alexander Penman aged 42 years, cutter.
  • James Porter aged 32 years , filler.
  • John Thomas Porter aged 32 years, filler.
  • Thomas Valantine Rice aged 53 years, shifter.
  • John Robinson aged 50 years, stoneman.
  • John George Robinson aged 25 years, filler.
  • George Scott aged 53 years, datal.
  • Albert Seymore aged 52 years, shifter
  • Frederick Sillito aged 52 years, shifter.
  • George Henry Stubbs aged 60 years, shifter.
  • Hugh Bell Surtees aged 36 years, datal.
  • Matthew White Surtees aged 61 years, shifter.
  • Lawrence Thompson aged 54 years, datal.
  • Thomas Thompson aged 28 years, underground bricklayer.
  • Thomas Trisnan aged 43 years, stoneman.
  • Robert Turnbull aged 64 years, master wasteman.
  • George Wilkie aged 63 years, shifter.
  • Reginald Wilkinson aged 40 years, stoneman.
  • Robert Willins aged 45 years, fore overman.
  • John Wilson aged 62 years, hauling engineman.
  • Stephen Wilson aged 60 years, shifter.
  • Matthew Williams aged 18 years, datal, who was injured who died the same day.
  • John Wallace Young aged 26 years, back overman and rescue worker who was overcome by noxious gases and died the same day.
  • Henry Burdess aged 43 years, a deputy and rescue worker who was overcome by gas and died 1st. June 1951.

The inquiry into the causes of, and circumstances attending the explosion which occurred at Easington Colliery, County Durham on the 29th May 1951 was conducted by H.C.W. Roberts, C.B.E., M.C., H.M. Chief Inspector of Mines at the Easington Colliery Welfare Hall, Easington, on 30th. October and finished on the 15th November. The final report was presented to the Minister of Fuel and Power, the Right Honourable Geoffrey Lloyd on the 31st July 1952.

The investigation and inspection of the mine went on as the rescue workers were in the mine and made their reports but it was not until the 9th. June that a full inspection of the Five Quarter Seam could be made. The Training Section in the Main Coal Seam remained closed until August. A detailed inspection for aspects of the passage of the flame and sign of coking in the residual dust was made by Dr. Tideswell, Dr. Woodhead and Messrs. Shaw and Bradshaw of the Safety in Mines Research Establishment. Dust samples were collected by the Inspectors of Mines and all the electrical plant examined when they had been taken to the surface.

The inquiry also heard details of the deaths of the two rescue men. John Young Wallace was a fully trained rescue man aged 26 years. He was an overman at the Easington Colliery and was acting as captain of the team when he met his death. Half an hour after leaving the fresh air base with a team exploring the West Materials Road, he suddenly sank to his knees, said a few words from the side of his mouth about sweating and fell over unconscious. It was thought that he died almost immediately as his jaw sagged and the mouthpiece fell out letting the poisonous gasses past. The team had been walking rather more quickly than usual but they had travelled about 700 yards from the base and no other member of the team became distressed. His apparatus was tested afterwards and found to be in perfect order.

Three days later, Burdess died in similar circumstances. Thirty-five minutes after leaving the fresh air base, Burdess signalled to his captain that he was in distress. His breathing bag was inflated and working normally and his nose clip and mouth piece were in place. The other team members were comfortable but he was sweating heavily. His captain and another man tried to help him out but after going only twelve yards he collapsed. Eventually, he was carried out on a stretcher and on arrival at the fresh air base, was found to be dead. Examination of his apparatus showed that the automatic relief valve was set to 2.6 inches water gauge and not to 3.5 inches water gauge and that one of the teeth grips in the mouth piece was torn. Otherwise the apparatus was in good order.

There was general agreement as to the direction of the blast. It was outbye an all roads in the First West area east of No.21 stenton and down the West Level. In the light of the evidence presented at the Inquiry it was agreed by all parties that the point of origin of the explosion was at the retreating longwall face. Electricity was not accepted as a source of ignition and no contraband was found. All mechanical apparatus was examined and ruled out as a source of ignition. There was no shot firing at the time and the maintenance of the lamps was very high at the colliery.

There was the possibility of sparks being caused by a fall of the roof but at the time coal cutter picks were moving at the time of the explosion and they were cutting through pyrites. Mr. Roberts said:

I have no hesitation in finding that the ignition was due to sparks caused either by the cutter picks striking pyrites.

As to the origin of the firedamp it was probable that the movements and collapses in the waste would create channels through which the gas could pass from the thin seams 136 to 185 feet above. The Inspector rejected the thesis that a large outburst of gas suddenly occurred.

After a full and searching inquiry the report came to the following conclusions:

1). The initial cause of the explosion was an ignition of the Third South longwall face caused by the friction of coal cutter picks on pyrites.

2). The main issue of firedamp was from an accumulation in large cavities in the waste behind the longwall face and that it was forced out during a roof weighting.

3). The firedamp accumulated because the cavities were left when the roof in the waste failed to cave satisfactorily, and as the face was retreating and had solid sides, there was not the ventilating pressure difference across the waste which, with leakage through the packs into the return, leads to the gradual drainage of firedamp from the waste of an advancing face.

4). In the existing conditions adequate caving was unlikely to occur in the early stages of a face opening from a narrow heading and strip packs should have been built until the roof was caving satisfactorily.

5). Due consideration was not given to the risk of firedamp accumulation and of roof weighting when deciding on the method of work.

6). Whilst the explosion was of firedamp up to the point at which it blew through the intakes at the connections with the First West Materials and Belt Roads, it was thereafter continued by coal dust.

7). The coal dust was mainly derived from the conveyor belt and structures, from the vicinity of the transfer points and from the stentons.

8). There were defects in the system of dust sampling and in the measures taken to prevent, suppress and treat coal dust.

9). Insufficient consideration had been given to the system of ventilation, particularly in regard to the use of the auxiliary fans.

10). As a result of weakness in the organisation, there was a lack of effective supervision and control.

The Inspector made the following recommendations:

1) Caving should not be practised unless the natural conditions and the method of waste edge support as such that the roof in the waste falls regularly to a sufficient height and in a suitably fragmented state.

2) All existing systems of ventilation employing multiple fans should be reviewed and new systems studied to ensure that:

a) The volume of air circulating is large enough not only to avoid the possibility of re-circulating in any place ventilated by an ordinary fan, but also to provide for the adequate ventilation of all other working places:

b) No fan is stopped unless there is alternative means of providing adequate means of ventilation and

c) If it is necessary to regulate a fan it shall be done in such a way as to prevent unauthorised or inadvertent alteration.

3) The emission of firedamp from wastes of retreating faces and means of draining firedamp there from should be investigated.

4) All parties concerned should co-operate to ensure the proper use of firedamp detectors. Also, an attempt should be made to develop a combined cap lamp and gas detector that is reliable, gives a good light and is easy to wear.

5) Pending the findings of the Working Party the following precautions should be taken:

a) Wherever coal cutters are in use to are to be used, a survey should be made for the purpose of selecting a cutting horizon, as far as is practicable, clear of any material from which sparks may be struck

b) The general policy in gassy seams with no clear horizon should be to adopt one of the alternatives to cutting or to adopt measures such as stowage or drainage of the wastes to prevent accumulation of firedamp at the waste edge.

c) Steps should be taken to ensure that only sharp picks are used.

d) Water hose with an ample supply of water should be provided within easy reach.

e) Having regard to the dust and sparking dangers, it should be the general policy to avoid dry cutting.

6). Everything possible should be done to accelerate the progress in the direction of preventing the formation of dust and of suppressing such dust as is unavoidable produced as close to the point of production as is practicable. in particular investigations should be undertaken a) with a view to extending the applicability of water infusion and to developing its possibilities fro working coal and b) to hasten the development of coal getting and loading machines operated by slow moving forces.

7). A Committee representing the various interests should be appointed to investigate the use of roadway conveyors with a view to determining the limits within which they may be safely and advantageously employed.

8). Research should be expedited on the use and development of improved types of dust barriers and water barriers. In the meantime, shelf type dust barriers should be installed on conveyor roads.

9). Test should be made to determine the deposition of dust deposits in roadways, and experiments should be carried out for the purpose of evolving an improved sampling technique.

10). Colliery management should consult with scientific staff about the organisation of their sampling and stone dusting arrangements colliery dust samplers and men in charge of stone dusting should be given a course of training under the supervision of the scientific staff and should work as a team and to a plan under responsible supervision. From time to time, the management should call upon the scientific service to make check surveys and to advise in precautions desirable at special points.

11). The assessment of dust samples should be speeded up by the more widespread introduction of optical methods.

12). The requirements regarding the medical examination of rescue workers should be reviewed.

The report concluded:

Those recommendations on which prompt action is possible have been discussed with the National Coal Board, and I am glad to report that appropriate action has been initiated.

 

REFERENCES
The report of the causes and the circumstances attending the explosion which occurred at the Easington Castle Colliery, County Durham on the 29th May 1951 by H.C.W. Roberts, C.B.E., M.C., H.M. Chief Inspector of Mines.
Colliery Guardian, 25th September 1952, p.377, 20th October, p.405, 9th October, p. 440, 454.

Information supplied by Ian Winstanley and the Coal Mining History Resource Centre.

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