Dillwyn Colliery

Near Seven Sisters, Dulais Valley (813072)

This mine was opened in 1884 by David Thomas and owned in 1896 by John Garbutt and Sons of Crynant it employed 53 men underground and 7 men on the surface with John Garbutt Junior being the manager. It was also known as Nant-y-Cafn. In 1900 it was owned by William Thomas and Sons with in 1902 the manager being John Howells.

On the 7th of September 1910, Rees Hopkins, a collier aged 42 years, died under a roof fall. This was followed by the death of Thomas Howells, aged 45 years, and a foreman, on the First of January 1913, when he was run over by wagons on the surface of the mine. Again, on the 6th of November 1914, another man died, this time Morgan Lewis, aged 36 years and a master haulier was run over by trams.

It was listed as the Dillwyn Slant in 1913, under the ownership of the Dillwyn Colliery Company whose sales agents were based at Merchants Exchange, Cardiff. This Company did not join the Monmouthshire and South Wales Coal Owners Association employed 144 men at the colliery in 1913 when it was managed by John Howells. Mr. Howells was also manager in 1908 and 1920. Originally served by the Neath and Brecon Railway until that company was absorbed into Great Western Railways. In 1923 the manager of the Upper Slant was H.S. Thomas and of the Lower Slant it was Thomas Morgan, the combined coal production for that year was 100,000 tons. In 1921 it is now listed as Dillwyn Anthracite Colliery and still owned by the Dillwyn Colliery Company until August 1928 when the receivers were brought in.

On the 7th of January 1925, Evan Jones, aged 20 years and a colliers helper, was killed when he preparing for shotfiring and the canister exploded.

The Dillwyn Colliery Company (1929) Limited of Seven Sisters was formed to run the colliery with Sir David Rees Llewellyn as the chairman of this Company with the other directors being; Lady Magdalene A. Llewellyn and H. Perkin. In 1932 it has the alternative name of Nantycafn, and in 1935 the colliery is listed as the Dillwyn Slant employing 37 men on the surface and 199 men underground, and the Dillwyn Lower Slant employing 29 men on the surface and 157 men underground.

The colliery had its own coal preparation plant (washery), with the manager at that time being J. Evans while the manager in 1943/5 was D. Jenkins and the colliery employed in the No.1 Slant 219 men and in the No.2 Slant 62 men, both were working the Red Vein seam. There were 81 men employed at the surface of the mine.

On Nationalisation of the Nation’s coal mines in 1947, Dillwyn Colliery was placed in the National Coal Board’s South Western Division’s No.1 (Swansea) Area and was then called the Dillwyn Nos. 1 & 2 Slants, the No.1 employed 209 men underground, the No.2 employed 299 men underground, with 85 men employed on the surface. The manager was M.R. Morgan. The No.1 Swansea Area was found to be too unwieldy to manage and the No.9 (Neath) Area was formed, Dillwyn Colliery was placed in the new area.

In 1955 out of a total manpower of 451 men at this colliery, 205 of them worked at the coalfaces. In 1956 these figures were 459/216 respectively, in 1958 the coalface figure had dropped to 198, and in 1961 out of the total manpower of 487, 185 of them worked at the coalface.

This colliery came under review in early 1966 with the NCB expressing their wish to close it. The area general manager for the NCB, Jim Evans, stated that he was extremely disappointed with the efforts which were far from reasonable, the outputs were atrocious and unless there was a substantial improvement he would have no recourse but to recommend closure.

The NCB then immediately cut the manpower from 446 to 216 with the rest of the men to be transferred to Treforgan when it was ready to receive them. This Colliery which worked the Red Vein anthracite seam was closed by the National Coal Board in April 1966.

Some Statistics:

• 1896: Manpower: 60.
• 1899: Manpower: 57.
• 1900: Manpower: 118.
• 1901: Manpower: 90.
• 1902: Manpower: 101.
• 1903: Manpower: 122.
• 1905: Manpower: 107.
• 1907: Manpower: 178.
• 1908: Manpower: 197.
• 1909: Manpower: 197.
• 1910: Manpower: 189.
• 1911: Manpower: 197.
• 1912: Manpower: 158.
• 1913: Manpower: 144.
• 1915: Manpower: 144.
• 1916: Manpower: 155. 1918: Manpower; 93.
• 1922: Manpower: 205.
• 1923: Manpower: Upper: 218. Surface: 28. Lower: 146. Surface: 7. Output: 100,000 tons.
• 1924: Manpower: Upper: 193. Lower: 117.
• 1927: Manpower: Upper: 233. Lower: 117.
• 1928: Manpower: Upper: 229. Lower: 125.
• 1929: Manpower: 340.
• 1931/2: Manpower: 380.
• 1933: Manpower: 400.
• 1935: Manpower: 422. Output: 120,000 tons.
• 1937: Manpower: Upper: 349. Lower: 113.
• 1938: Manpower: 534.
• 1940: Manpower: 471.
• 1942: Manpower: 230.
• 1944: Manpower: 295.
• 1945: Manpower: 363.
• 1947: Manpower: 393.
• 1949: Manpower: 399. Output: 75,000 tons.
• 1950: Manpower: 391.
• 1953: Manpower: 369. Output: 74,500 tons.
• 1954: Output 72,000 tons.
• 1955: Manpower: 451. Output: 85,036 tons.
• 1956: Manpower: 454. Output: 78,507 tons.
• 1957: Manpower. 488. Output 91,639 tons.
• 1958: Manpower: 486.
• 1960: Manpower 510. Output: 88,044 tons.
• 1961: Manpower 487. Output: 86,663 tons.
• 1965: Manpower: 494.

THE DANGER OF ASPHYXIATION

Poor ventilation or the obstruction of roadways, preventing adequate air flow placed the miner in extreme peril. Apart from the danger of explosions, the release of gases, due to the drop in air pressure, caused many a death from asphyxia. The following highlights two such tragic occurrences:

Dillwyn No.1 Slant
In this incident, a deputy, aged 38 years, and a workman, aged 20 years, lost their lives.

Due to absenteeism among workmen and officials on Sunday night, 28th December, 1958, the normal programme of work, pulse blasting of the D Face was not carried out, consequently on the Monday morning, there was no coal filling carried out on the D Face. The colliers concerned were given alternative work, and the deputy in charge of X and D districts, which included the old E Conveyor, instructed four men to go on to the roadhead of the E supply road and bring out some Dowty props. As they were proceeding they were joined by another workman who had also been sent in.

The latter man was younger, and was soon in front and ultimately was about 20 yards ahead of his mates. After travelling nearly three hundred yards, members of the party found themselves becoming giddy and their legs were weak. They realised that something was wrong. The man in front was seen to the man behind him became faint and one of the others called on them to come back. The second man crawled back but the first man must have been overcome as he lay on the roadway with arms outstretched. After coming back some distance one of the other men was in a very bad state and one of the others went for help. He brought back with him two workmen who made an attempt to reach the fallen man but failed.

During this time the deputy, accompanied by a trainee deputy, proceeded in along the old E gate (which was the intake airway) intending to meet the men on the face. After proceeding for about 250 yards they came across something unusual, feeling giddy, but being in possession of oil flame lamps, they soon realised the seriousness of the position and immediately rushed out and back into the E supply road through the D cross cut. Reaching the E supply road they informed of what had happened, the trainee deputy was detailed to attend to the affected men and the Deputy went on with the two new workmen. On reaching the affected area they got on their hands and knees to keep as low as possible.

The deputy kept on crawling and telling them to keep low until, according to the workmen his words became a mumbling. By this time both workmen were badly affected, they shouted on the deputy to come back but they were in such a state that they were not able to recollect whether they saw the deputy collapse, but he was some distance in front of them and about 10 yards from the collapsed workman. They managed to crawl back and eventually were assisted to a place of safety.

Several further attempts were now made to reach the deputy but all were unsuccessful and could have resulted in further loss of life; the arrival of a senior official resulted in all being sent out to the entrance of the stall. In the meantime all interested parties were informed and, after a quick consultation at the surface, it was decided to use the services of a rescue party to retrieve the two men. After bringing them out, artificial respiration was applied until the arrival of two doctors who, after an examination, pronounced life extinct. The three men who had been overcome had already been taken out and after treatment at the medical centre by a local doctor, two were conveyed home, and one was sent to Neath General Hospital and detained.

An inspection of the area up to the affected parts was made by a party representing the NCB, HMI Inspectorate and the NUM, and both entrances to the E conveyor were fenced off and a sentry posted at the entrances. At the inquiry into the incident it was stated that the face was in the air circuit and was examined daily with a quantity of between 15,000 and 20,000 cubic feet per minute of air passing. The night shift deputy stated that he was in charge of the D and X faces but he did not examine E face on the Sunday night, and later said that he did not examine it normally and he never visited E face. When cross examined he said that he had seen the oncoming deputy and had told him that he had not examined the E face.

The colliery manager stated that the deputy should have examined it or reported that it had not been examined. Another deputy stated that the E face was not being examined on the afternoon or night shifts, but that he usually went up about once a week. He did not think that there was the quantity of air stated passing along the face he thought it was only to keep it fresh. He also added that he only signed for the D and X conveyors.  The under manager, stated that the district assigned to the night shift deputy included the E face.

A plan put forward by management showed the deputies districts in the No.1 Slant, and the D and X district, included the old E face with its two roads. Also from the report book, it was seen that the last inspection of the old E face was done on the 27th December 1958 by the deputy who had died, and it became clear that he was the only deputy who was examining the face, and that no pre-shift inspection had been done before the men were detailed to enter this part of the district.

Later, some of the workmen involved were asked for their story, and these were practically identical. They had no oil flame detector and were not aware that the place had not been examined, and had no idea of the conditions there until it was nearly too late.

It is fortunate that only two lives were lost, as several attempts were made by men to retrieve their comrades from the affected area, and it was with some reluctance that they withdrew from the roadway on the instructions of a senior official.

There can be no doubt that the workman lost his life through being allowed into a part of the district which had not previously been inspected and containing an accumulation of firedamp and not as reported by the press, a pocket of gas.

On Wednesday morning a rescue party, after extending the air tubes in the gate road went on into the face and found that there was a fall in the edge of the fault about 40 yards up the face which was obstructing the ventilation. A party with breathing apparatus was sent around along the supply road and to see whether some of the fall could be cleared to allow men to travel the face. They reported back in a short while and said that the extent of the fall was not as great as had been assumed and that a travelling way over it could be obtained in a short time. This was obtained and by Thursday morning, repairers were able to work on the face with a rescue party standing by, and normal ventilation was soon in operation. The Nos. 1 & 2 Dillwyn’s abandoned the Red Vein in 1966.

Information supplied by Ray Lawrence and used here with his permission.