GRASSMORE. Chesterfield, Derbyshire. 19th. November, 1933.

The colliery was the property of the Grassmore Company Limited. Mr. E.L. Ford was the Agent and manager. The colliery worked the Tupton, Blackshale, Deep Hard and Waterloo Seams. Coal was raised from Nos. 1, 4, 8 and 12 shafts. Nos. 1, 4 and 12 were downcasts and No.8 was the upcast. Mr. H. Curry the Undermanager in the Deep Hard and the Waterloo Seams. there were two other undermanagers, Mr. G.A. Sellars for the Blackshale seam and Mr. R.H. Swallow for the Tupton Seam. All the undermanagers held First Class Certificates of Competency and Mr Ford had an assistant, Mr. J. Austin who held a Second Class Certificate.

The explosion occurred in the North District of the Deep Hard Seam shortly before 2 a.m. on Sunday, 19th November. The North District consisted of a face about 200 yards long which was approached by three roads. The road at the right-hand side of the face, the right tailgate, was the intake and the road on the left, the left tailgate was the return. The third road was midway between the intake and the return and was an extension of the main haulage road. In effect, the face was divided in two, the right-side bank and the left side-bank. In each side there was a shaker conveyor which delivered onto a belt conveyor in the middle of loader gate.

The seam consisted of about one foot eleven inches of top coal, nine inches of thin layers of bat and coal and one foot seven inches of bottom coal. Above the top ten inches of hand coal were left unworked. Over it was about 20 to 25 feet of blue bind overlaid by sandstone.

During the afternoon shift the face was undercut to a depth of five and half to six feet in the nine inches of thin layers of bat and coal by two electrically driven coal cutters, one in each bank. During the night shift, the conveyors were moved forward, the packs extended and shotholes bored by a Siemans-Schuckert electric drill. During the day shift, the coal was filled onto the conveyors. Shots were fired in the coal during each shift but usually the greatest number were fired during the day shift. The work of getting, filling, packing and repairing was all done under contract let to six contractors, two of whom worked on each shift.

The last recorded measurements of the air passing around the face were made by William Stewart, the day shift deputy, on 4th November when the quantity passing in the right tailgate was 4,510 cubic feet per minute and in the left tailgate, 2,750 cubic feet per minute; the difference between these two measurements, passed outbye by the middle gate. No attempt was mead to prevent so great a leakage and there was but one screen, a board mad of brattice sheet, across the middle gate. The leakage was deliberate so that a current of air might pass the electrical gear situated in the middle gate. The highest point of the district was at the face opposite the left-hand tailgate and there was a gentle rise across the face from right to left. The left tailgate rose towards the face at a gradient of 1 in 13.

The workmen used electric safety lamps, either hand or cap and the deputy and the shotfirer on the night shift and the deputy of the afternoon shift carried electric cap lamps in addition to their flame safety lamps. Stewart, the deputy on the morning shift, carried flame safety lamp and the men on the ripping gate had similar lamps which the hung about four feet from the ripping and six feet from the floor. On the afternoon shift, Charles Edwin Staples, the deputy of the shift said that the chargeman in the left bank, W. Coley and the men working in the two headings near the foot of the left tailgate, also had flame lamps.

Before 5th November, there was no evidence that firedamp had ever been found in the district except on one occasion about eight or nine months previous when deputy Stewart found gas in a crevice in the roof at the ripping. during the afternoon of the 4th November, a heavy fall of roof, about 13 yards long, occurred in the right bank, with the result that the ventilation was obstructed and towards the end of the afternoon shift on the following day, firedamp was found in the left bank by Staples, the deputy of that shift. He made two inspections of the left bank, the last one between 8.20 and 8.50 p.m. he did not find any gas but at 9.15 p.m. he stepped into the left side to allow a workman to take an eight-foot prop up the right end bank and detected gas. He put a fence at the entrance to the bank and later in the left tailgate. he reported with reference to flammable gas:

Yes. 5’s left side fenced off for gas due to a fall on the right side impeding ventilation.

In a reference to the ventilation he said:

Good except in left side.

Similar reports were made by all deputies on all three shifts until 10th November when W. Coley, the acting deputy, reported, with reference to inflammable gasses, “None. Fences removed left side.” and the state of the ventilation, “Good”. For the same shift Staples reported the state of the ventilation as being, “Slack, due to the fall on the right bank”. After this it was reported on all shifts as being good with no gas present.

Continuous efforts were made to clear the fall in the right bank but during the night of the 12th, a heavy fall of roof occurred at the entrance to the right-hand bank from the middle gate. Part of this fall extended into the middle gate but it was cleared by the 15th and the roof secured. Coal cutting in the left bank was resumed on the 16th and was continued until the explosion. The undermanager made a further inspection on the 17th and found the district to be free of gas.

The deputy and men on the afternoon shift on the 18th November were all out of the mine before 8.30 p.m. The night shift deputy and the men of that shift descended the No.4 shaft just after 11 p.m. These two shifts did not succeed one another so that work was carried on without any interval and therefore could not in the words of Section 64 sub-section 94 of the Coal Mines Act, 1911, “be deemed to be one shift.” No inspection was made prior to the night shift on the 18th November and the men were allowed to pass the station.

The night shift consisted of 31 men in addition to the deputy, Albert Wheatcroft and the shotfirer, Leonard Wheatcroft who examined the men’s lamps. Four men went inbye into the North District along the main intake who was also the travelling road. These men arrived at the place where they left their clothes about 50 yards back from the face of the middle gate, about 11.45 p.m.

The two contractors on the shift were James Stevenson and Joseph Wilkinson and they went up the left-hand bank and set their men to work at several jobs. The regular driller, A Johnson, took the drilling machine from the middle gate up into the left-hand corner of the face, laying out cable as he went, but he was not able to start drilling shotholes as the current was not available. Johnson was set to work on the left tailgate pack.

James Stevenson, Hiram Tagg, Charles Riley and Frank K. Foyster came out of the left bank immediately after the explosion and said that nothing unusual had happened during the shift prior to the blast. The ventilation was good, the compressed air was blowing near the conveyor engine where Stevenson was working and there was no sign of weighting in the roof. Stevenson said:

It was absolutely normal. There was not even a prop broken. It was absolutely right, no sign of weighting and the wastes had not broken down more than usual. There was nothing abnormal and the ventilation was good.

John Ford, electrician did not go inbye with the other men. He left the station. At about 11.30 p.m. when Leonard Wheatcroft was still there but Albert Wheatcroft had left. After examining some electrical equipment at the pit bottom, Ford went inbye along the main return which was also the haulage road. When he arrived at the top conveyor in the middle gate, he switched on the current to the motor and turned the belt round for Wilkinson to examine it. It was found that it needed repair, the current switched off and the Wilkinson stayed to do the necessary repairs while Ford returned to the haulage road about 70 yards outbye from 8’s level. to which he was going to connect a cable which was already connected to a switch box in 8’s level at the foot of the left tail gate.

Ford was working at this switch box when, at 12.45 a.m., Leonard Wheatcroft came inbye. He spoke to Ford as he passed A moment or two later, Ford heard somebody talking and saw that Leonard had been joined by Albert Wheatcroft at the junction at 8’s level with the main haulage road.

At the inquiry, Leonard Wheatcroft said Albert Wheatcroft went with him along 8’s level and then up the left tailgate as far as the ripping lip. They both had flame safety lamps and electric cap lamps. The deputy tested for gas at the lip while Leonard put his hand over his cap lamp and held his flame lamp behind him. There was no indication at Albert’s lamp. This would have been about 1 a.m. In the face opposite the left tailgate, he saw a conveyor pan reared up against a prop and he did not see any men at work.

They travelled along the bank to the middle gate and to point about 50 yards from the face where Wilkinson was repairing the conveyor belt. Here Albert spoke to Wilkinson and sent Leonard into the face to tell the contractor, Stevenson, to leave the packs and get on with the staking of the conveyor engine. Leonard went up the face and shouted to Stevenson, who was working at a pack some 15 yards along the left bank, and Albert passed him under the ripping lip of the middle gate when on his way to the men at work in the left bank. Leonard returned to Wilkinson and helped with the repairing of the conveyor belt.

Shortly after receiving the instruction, Stevenson went to stoke the engine, Albert passed him as he was working in the pack when he informed Albert that there were some loose pans further up the face. Albert replied, “All right, I know that”, and went on his way. Stevenson did not notice what lamps Albert had. About fifteen minutes later the explosion occurred.

Of the 18 men in the left bank, four, James Stevenson, H. Tagg, C. Riley and F.K. Foyster were able to get out. They heard no report but felt a heavy gust of wind which came down the face from the left. Dust was raised and they were knocked down but not burned.

Leonard Wheatcroft, who was in the middle gate, thought a compressed airbag had burst and ran outbye about 200 yards and shut the cock. He returned to the face. He was intent on going back into the bank but Wilkinson retrained him. Wheatcroft took the men outbye and after telephoning for help, he got a safety lamp which he had left hanging on a fence rail at the main haulage return wheel, about 400 yards from the face. He went into the middle gate where he found a cap of the flame of the lamp which he took to be firedamp.

After making the test, he took the four survivors into the intake by way of the slit connecting it with the haulage road. His telephone message was received on the surface by deputy B.G. Brittain which at one summoned the Chesterfield and Mansfield Rescue Stations. The call was received at the Chesterfield Station, which was about three and half miles away, at 2.30 a.m. and at the Mansfield Station, ten miles away, at 2.36 a.m. and the Brigades were at the pit at 3 a.m. and 3.20 a.m. respectively.

The Chesterfield Brigade went inbye by the travelling road and formed a fresh air base on the intake side of the doors in the slit. They then went through the slit into the haulage road and up the middle gate to the face with the help of breathing apparatus due to the foul air. They numbered the bodies as they were found and by 11 a.m. they had been removed from the face into the middle gate and then to the surface by stretcher bearers. There were no falls to impede the recovery of the bodies although the middle bank of the roof was weighting.

Those who died were:

  • George Lenthill,
  • James Stanley Knifeton,
  • Owen Stevenson,
  • George Peasgood,
  • Reginald Hopkins,
  • Frank Wilbourne,
  • Walter Brocklehurst,
  • Sydney Tunnicliffe,
  • Albert Weatcroft, deputy,
  • George Muschamp,
  • Ernest Keithey,
  • Samuel Foyster,
  • Alfred Cyril Johnson,
  • George Wright.

Mr. J.D. Felton, H.M. Divisional Inspector, inspected the pit in the afternoon of the disaster and found three percent firedamp, 400 yards from the face up the left tailgate. The following Monday he made another inspection and the captains of the two Rescue Brigades pointed out the places where the bodies had been found. No safety lamp was found at the face and nothing was found during the inspection to indicate the cause of the disaster but later a pair of tub wheels was seen about 120 yards from the face and about 10 yards nearer the face than the shattered tub. Prior to the tub the explosion the tub had been further up the gate and was then intact. It was also noticed that the upper parts of many of the steel arches supporting the roof and sides of this left tailgate had been removed three or four inches outbye and that some of the lagged arches had been displaced. There was a cavity about 20 feet long outbye from the face of the ripping and there were small pieces of brattice cloth at the face.

In the face, lying on the kirvings, was the Siemens-Schuchert drilling machine and in the cut made by the coalcutting machine, was the drill. The cable was attached to the machine and from there passed under a piece of the conveyor belt, under a conveyor pan and then to the face. The conveyor pan, which was lying against a prop, had been flattened and bent and beyond this pant there was another, also leaning against a prop and between the props there was a shovel with a crumpled blade and the shaft broken.

All this evidence pointed to the face that the force of the explosion had radiated from some point between the bent pan and the displaced steel arches and suspicion was focused on the drilling machine. It may be remembered it had been said that at the time of the explosion the electrician, Ford, was at work the cover on the three-way box in the main haulage road and before starting the job, he had switched off the current from the district and locked the switch in the off position.

The Inquiry into the disaster was held in the Council Chamber, Stephenson memorial Hall, Chesterfield an opened of 13th. December and was finished by 16th December. The Report on the disaster was presented to Ernest Brown, Esq., M, M.P, by Sir Henry Walker, H.M. Chief Inspector of Mines, in March, 1934.

All interested parties were represented and the inquiry investigated all aspects of the disaster. Nothing had been found in connection with the drilling machine that could have caused the ignition of the gas and other sources were looked for. There had been no shots fired and there was no evidence of smoking or matches. The roof was of soft bind immediately over the coal and contained many ironstone balls but there was no evidence of any pick or other tool that had been used, ever causing a spark.

There remained the question of the lamps which were all tested at the Mines Department Testing Station at Sheffield. All the lamps had been recovered intact with the exception of four cap-lamps.. Captain C.B. Platt, Superintending Testing Office gave evidence on these four lamps. He said:

Lamp No.21 was received in lighting order but the hinge between the battery and the lid was broken, thus exposing the battery terminals the fracture of the metal was of recent date, as the surfaces were clean and bright.

Lamp No.31 was received locked and in lighting order. The fuse in the latter case had blown this was found to be due to the bared ends of the cable leads inside the lid being in contact, thus short-circuiting the battery. An ignition of firedamp could not have been caused. However, by this fault, which also did not leave the lamp in a condition which would enable it t ignite an inflammable mixture of firedamp and air.

Lamp No.52 was received locked but the cable had been pulled out of the gland on the battery case. The lantern was in lighting order and the fuse intact. The face that the cable was pulled out of the gland did not cause the lamp top to be unsafe.

Lamp No.99: This lamp was received incomplete, as the headpiece was missing. The battery case was received locked and with the cable still attached to it. From the appearance of the end of the cable, it would seem that the lantern and the cable had been wrenched apart, snapping the copper wires. The ends of the cable were not bared and the fuse was intact, showing that the battery had not been short-circuited during or after the separation of the lantern from the cable.

Captain Platt made experiments with cap lams fitted with bulbs from the colliery and found that in twelve tests, an explosive mixture was ignited on two occasions, when the glass of the lamp and the bulb were broken.

Lamp No.99 had been issued to S. Tunnicliffe and was found, without the headpiece, attached to his body after the explosion. It was not his own lamp. He used and electric hand lamp but on the night of 18th November, he asked to be given a cap-lamp and the lampman, Charles Brailsford gave him No.99. This was the first time Tunnicliffe had use a cap-lamp. A search was made in the face and the waste for several days for the missing headpiece but unfortunately it was never found.

The ventilation system at the colliery was closely scrutinised and the inquiry decided that it was “ill-considered” even when there was no fall on the right bank. The report stated:

Had an overcast been made at the junction of the middle road with 8’s level, each bank could have been given its separate split of fresh air and there would have been no necessity for the board and brattice sheet, which, being on the main haulage road, was a nuisance.

Several theories as the cause of the explosion were put forward at the inquiry but it was generally thought that there had been a sudden evolution of the gas from the goaf just before two o’clock and that ignition had taken place the goaf near the source. As to the cause of the ignition, all possible sources had been ruled out except the missing piece of cap-lamp No.99. It was thought that the man had moved quickly to avoid falling stones and had knocked off the lamp.

After 1st January 1933, manufacturers of approved electric cap-lamps were required to fit the head-pieces of the lamps with cover-glasses of unsplinterable glass except those protected with a safety device which automatically cut off the current from the bulb when the glass was broken. The cap-lamps at the Grassmore Colliery were obtained before this date.

 

REFERENCES
The report on the causes and circumstances attending the explosion which occurred at Grassmore Colliery, Derbyshire, on the 19th November, 1933 by Sir Henry Walker, C.B.E., LL.D. H.M. Chief Inspector of Mines.
Colliery Guardian, 15th December 1933, p.1121, 22nd December, p.1191, 13th April 1934, p.670.

Information supplied by Ian Winstanley and the Coal Mining History Resource Centre.

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